GOADING THE DETERMINISTS:
THOMAS GOAD (1576-1638) ON NECESSITY,
CONTINGENCY AND GOD’S ETERNAL DECREE

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1. Thomas Goad and Four Centuries of Debate

THOMAS GOAD, a graduate of Eton and Cambridge, later a lecturer at Cambridge, was awarded the B.D. in 1607 and the D.D. in 1615. He served briefly as chaplain to George Abbot, archbishop of Canterbury. He was appointed one of the British delegates to the Synod of Dort as the successor to the ailing Joseph Hall, probably on the recommendation of Abbot. Close to his own time he was described as a “great and Generall Scholar, exact Critick, Historian, Poet, (delighting in making of verses, till the day of his death) School-man, Divine ... a commanding presence, an uncontrolable spirit, impatient to be opposed, and loving to steere the discourse (being a good Pilot to that purpose) of all the company he came in.”

Goad published only one theological work during his lifetime, a somewhat scurrilous tract on the accidental death of an English Jesuit.

The work for which Goad was known in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was his posthumously published “disputation” on necessity, contingency, and the divine will, Stimluus [sic] orthodoxus, a tract viewed particularly in the eighteenth century as supportive of Arminianism.

1. Thomas Fuller, The History of the Worthies of England, who for parts and learning have been eminent in the several counties (London: J.G.W.L. and W.G. For Thomas Williams, 1662), Cambridgshire, 159.

2. Thomas Goad, The dolefull even-song, or A true, particular and impartiall narration of that fearefull and sudden calamity, which befell the preacher Mr. Drury a lesuite, and the greater part of his auditory, by the downefall of the floore at an assembly in the Black-Friers on Sunday the 26. of Octob. last, in the after noone Together with the rehearsal of Master Drurie his text, and the division thereof, as also an exact catalogue of the names of such as perished by this lamentable accident: and a briefe application thereupon (London: John Hauiland, for William Barret, and Richard Whitaker, 1623).

The direction of his theology, particularly as it relates to the Arminian controversy, remains a subject of debate. Those who have examined the rather scant remaining evidence of Goad’s theological positions have typically agreed that he went to the Synod a convinced “Calvinist.” But there the agreement ends. Some, with scant evidence, have held that Goad’s views changed significantly while at the Synod of Dort—indeed that he was convinced by the Remonstrant theses and “went over to the other side.”4 Goad was reported to have concluded his work at the Synod with the rather irenic plea, reiterated by the Remonstrant historian, Geeraert Brandt, “to bring back the strayed sheep with gentleness, and not to use them rigorously,”5 but as Anthony Milton has noted, “these were exhortations that presupposed the victory of Reformed orthodoxy.”6 Various others have noted that Goad was remembered as an opponent of Richard Montagu in the debates that followed publication of A Gagg for the New Gospell? in 1624,7 and have concluded that he was then, still, a committed Calvinist. Others have concluded, on the basis of comments in the preface to a disputation written by Goad but only published posthumously in 1661,8 that Goad did indeed, at some point change his mind and lean toward an Arminian view of the divine decree—if not at Dort, then sometime afterward.9

The 1661 preface to Goad’s work, quite apart from the rumor that he had changed his views at Dort, was certainly taken as the basis for the inclusion of the disputation in a collection of treatises published in 1729 that included John Plaifere’s Appello Evangelium

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8. J. G. in Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, preface.

and Lawrence Womock’s *The Examination of Tilenus before the Triers*, both of which were directed against the Reformed conclusions of the Synod of Dort. The timing of this first republication was, moreover, toward the end of the first phase of the controversy inaugurated by King’s homiletical treatise on predestination, foreknowledge and freedom and Whitby’s *Discourse* on the “five points.” Further attestation of an Arminian reading of Goad’s disputation as significant for the defense of “universal redemption” came from its republication by Thomas Coke and Francis Asbury in the first volume of *The Arminian Magazine*. Recently, Barry Bryant, confirming the eighteenth-century Arminian reading, has argued that the disputation evidences affinities with Molinism, and yet another writer has identified Goad as, like Wesley, challenging “the notion of unconditional election.” Most recently, John Coffey has identified Goad as having “abandoned the Calvinism of Dort,” adding to the evidence for this conclusion the identity of “J.G.”—author of the preface to the 1661 edition—as the English Arminian, John Goodwin. David Parnham has come to the same conclusion. Still, the conclusion that Goad turned toward Arminianism is not unanimous: Nicholas Tyacke has argued that Goad’s disputation was quite compatible with Calvinism.

The lengthy historical debate over the document, certainly leaves room for further analysis. And, as this essay hopes to demonstrate,

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there is strong reason to identify Goad’s views neither as “Bezan” nor as Arminian, but as broadly Reformed and much in agreement with the views of other members of the British Delegation, notably, John Davenant and Joseph Hall.

2. The Preface and the Document

The author of the preface to the 1661 edition, “J.G.,” John Goodwin, notes that Goad was “one of the most eminent Divines at the Synod of Dort,” and indicates that he procured this manuscript of Goad’s work when he purchased various books once owned by Goad’s “deceased Amanuensis.” Goodwin’s role in the publication of the document is significant. As Coffey has indicated, Goodwin learned his theology at Cambridge during the tenures of John Preston and John Davenant and was enough influenced by their teaching to be identified as a protégé, especially close to Davenant. Coffey also points out that Davenant’s lectures at Cambridge intended, as far as possible, “to acknowledge Arminian concerns within a moderate Calvinist framework.”

Given the impossibility of dating the manuscript in relation to the time of the Synod of Dort, Goodwin goes on to state that he is uncertain whether Goad “was then of that judgment, which he declared in this Disputation.” Goodwin assumes, however, that the disputation was a product of “after thoughts” that “inclined” Goad “to the truth, and swayed his belief,” providing a useful guide “through these obscure intricacies controverted betwixt the Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants.” This characterization of the disputation is remarkably akin to the stance of Davenant, shortly after Dort, at the time of Goodwin’s studies. Accordingly, the reader should “have reason to bless the God of Truth for the discovery”—namely, Goad’s discovery of the truth. The question immediately arises as to whether these comments are highly vague or utterly precise. Read as vague, and assuming that Goodwin held the “truth” to run counter to the Canons, the comments become a testimony to Goad’s turn toward Arminian or Remonstrant teachings. Read, however, as utterly precise, Goodwin’s comments would place the “truth” of Goad’s arguments “betwixt” the Remonstrants and the Contra-Remonstrants—arguably occupying a position within the boundaries of the Reformed confessions and, therefore, not Arminian; but also not in accord with the outlines of the contra-Remonstrant position strictly understood.

18. J. G. in Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, preface.
20. J. G. in Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, preface.
The “disputation” itself runs to some twenty-two pages, and evidences quite a few of the characteristics of the formal academic disputations of the era such as Goad would have either composed or debated during his years at Cambridge. The work begins by posing opposite positions in the form of questions and sets about refuting one and affirming the other in an essay replete with arguments, objections, and replies. The work is also quite circumspect with regard to the identities of warring parties: Goad notes opinions held by “Divines” in the “the Reformed Churches” without indicating that their views are either unique to the Reformed or necessary to Reformed identity—and he writes of other views that are held by those who subscribe to “Orthodox Religion,” without indicating whether these are characteristically Reformed views or simply views acceptable to Christians more generally. Although the preface mentions Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants, the treatise itself gives no overt indication of the theological parties against which it is directed and mentions no theologians by name. The only adversaries explicitly noted are Stoics and Epicureans, and the only contemporary thinkers mentioned, Du Vair and La Vosino, were not party to the controversies.

Goad begins by posing “two particular Queries” that stand, at least initially, in seeming opposition. The first,

Whether or not all things that ever have or shall come to pass in the world, have been, or shall be effected necessarily, in respect of an irresistible Decree, by which God hath everlastingly determined, that they should inevitably come to pass?

And the second,

Whether or not many things have not been done contingently, or after such a middle manner between impossibility of being, and necessity of being, that some things which have been might as well not have been, and many things which have not been might as well have been, for ought God hath decreed to the contrary?

22. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 8, correcting “Du Vain” to “Du Vair; and 15, citing La Vosino, De particuli providentia, a work that I have been unable to identify. Guillaume Du Vair was a popular philosopher and orator of the era whose collected works were published in 1617: Les oeuvres du Sr. Du Vair, garde des seavx de france: comprises en cinq parties: 1. les actions oratoires, 2. arrests sur questions notables, 4. l'eloquence françoise, 4. traitez philosophiques, 5. traitez de piete, & saintes meditation (Estienne Verevl, 1617). His major philosophical work was translated and published in England: The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks. Written in French, and englished for the benefit of them which are ignorant of that tongue, by T.I. fellow of New-Colledge in Oxford (London: Felix Kingston, for Thomas Man, 1598).
23. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 1, with the reference to the “Queries” on 2.
He points out that resolution of these questions will be of considerable use in the current debates over predestination, free will, the cause of sin, the special decrees of God and particular providence, debates that involve “Protestants, Papists, Lutherans, Arminians, [and] Puritans.” The opposing sides in the debate over these two positions contained, by Goad’s account, eminent thinkers. Responding positively to the first query were “Divines completely Reverend, both for their knowledge and practice of Religion” who were “therefore deservedly of precious esteem in the Reformed Churches”; while in favor of the second opinion were “some others of a good (though perhaps not of so great) a name … both for their Learning and love of Orthodox Religion.”

The parties to the dispute, then, are not specifically identified, except that the proponents of the first opinion are esteemed in the Reformed Churches—but, therefore, also not to be identified as the sole representatives of the Reformed faith. The proponents of the second view are “orthodox” but are not identified with a specific confessionality. As to Goad’s own opinion, he confesses that he had, for a long time “halted between” and “Sceptically hovered over” both options until, finally, he found arguments to “confirm the second, and confute the first opinion.”

In relation to Goodwin’s comments in the preface, Goad arguably halted in between a Contra-Remonstrant Reformed option and an alternative Reformed view—with the alternative Reformed view being located “betwixt” the Remonstrant and Contra-Remonstrant views and being capable of arguing a viable place for contingency in the middle between impossibility and necessity. Significantly, Goodwin also had written of finding a “middle,” in his case, between “two extreams”—one that denied “co-operation of the first Cause with the second” leaving the second cause relatively independent of God and another that claimed the sole causality of God, to the exclusion of genuine secondary causality. In Goad’s approach, one of Goodwin’s extremes, sole divine causality, provides the basis for the first approach (the one that Goad denies), but Goodwin’s other extreme (the utter freedom of secondary causes) is absent, and Goad’s second approach has already established a middle ground, to the exclusion of the radically libertarian or more precisely Epicurean view.

27. John Goodwin, *Apolytrosis apolytroseos*, or, Redemption redeemed wherein the most glorious work of the redemption of the world by Jesus Christ is … vindicated and asserted … : together with a … discussion of the great questions … concerning election & reprobation … : with three tables annexed for the readers accommodation (London: John Macock for Lodowick Lloyd and Henry Cripps, 1651), 7, hereinafter cited as *Redemption Redeemed*. 
3. Goad on Necessity and Contingency

Goad quite pointedly opposes the view that “all things whatsoever, end or means of little or great moment, come to passe necessarily and unavoidably, by reason of God’s eternal Decree,” a view that he associates with Stoic fatalism and “Turkish Divinity” and that renders God the author of sin. To argue “that God is that cause of all the actions that are sinful, but not of the sinfulness of the actions,” Goad views as an “evasion” of the issue and a “frivolous distinction.” Nor is it acceptable to identify the act as sin on the part of the human agent and as a form of punishment on the part of God—the result remains the same: if all things occur necessarily and unavoidably as the result of an irresistible divine decree, God is the author of sin. Rather, it must be affirmed that “some events” are contingent “in respect of God” and, accordingly, that “God decreed that all his creatures ordinarily, and for the most part, should work according to their several kinds and endowments.”

Among these kinds of creatures are both natural agents and voluntary agents, the former acting naturally, the latter voluntarily. The acts of a voluntary agent, Goad adds, are such that they “may as well be not done as done ... because if the creatures may not as well omit them as do them, they do them not voluntarily but necessarily.” Further, if such things are done voluntarily, they are done contingently—indeed, echoing his colleague, Davenant, Goad indicates that God “must have decreed that they should be done contingently,” which is to say that some things or effects stand in between impossibility and necessity, the thesis of Goad’s second summary question at the outset of his disputation.

28. Goad, *Stimulus orthodoxus*, 3, 4; Goodwin, *Redemption Redeemed*, 11, also speaks of determinism as “Turkish.”
31. The distinction between natural agents as “necessary,” having potency to one effect and voluntary or rational agents that have potencies to more than one is a standard scholastic distinction common in the era: see, e.g., Rudolph Goclenius, Sr., *Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur* (Frankfurt: Matthias Becker, 1613), 744; Johannes Combachius, *Metaphysicorum, libri duo univerasam primae philosophiae doctrinam theorematibus brevissimis comprehendentes, & commentariis necessariis illustrantes: studiosis ejus disciplinæ perquam utiles & fructuosí* (Oxford: W. Turner, 1633), 199. Goad references it to “Du Vain,” perhaps meaning Du Vair, *The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 9-11. The distinction also appears in Goodwin, *Redemption Redeemed*, 12.
Bryant assumes that the phrase found in the summary question, “contingently, or after such a middle manner between impossibility of being, and necessity of being,” points toward a Molinist approach. But Molinism, quite specifically, identifies a “middle knowledge” and Goad’s phrase is not about knowledge, whether divine or human: the “middle manner,” references a manner or mode not of knowing, but of being, that lies in between the impossible and the necessary. Thus the phrase “after such a middle manner between impossibility of being, and necessity of being” is synonymous with and in explanation of “contingently,” inasmuch as contingency, as indicating something that can either be or not be, occupies the place between impossibility and necessity. The argument, therefore, merely affirms contingency, an affirmation that was common to nearly all parties to the dispute over predestination, necessity, and freedom.

What is more, Goad has specifically indicated that God decrees contingencies, a point that runs counter to the implications of scientia media. He premises his assumption concerning the contingency of the created order on the ultimate freedom of God: “All things are done contingently in respect of God, which for ought he hath decreed might with as much possibility not be as be.” Although this premise belongs to Goad’s argument against the determinists that he initially identified as within the Reformed camp, it is nonetheless a premise that Goad shared with numerous Reformed contemporaries who affirmed the freedom of God in his willing of all things and the resultant radical contingency of the created order with respect to God (allowing for necessities as well as contingencies and free acts with respect to the order itself). One contemporary of Goad, William Twisse, stated the point in no uncertain terms: “For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely, and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently. ... If he doth worke at all ad extra [God] must needs worke freely that is contingently.”

Inasmuch as God’s free willing of anything, as free, must also be understood as contingent (namely, capable of being otherwise), the result of God being necessarily the first cause of any and all things is the (necessary!) contingency of all of the effects of God’s willing with respect to God.

35. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 9; contra the reading in Parnham, Heretics Within, 408.
God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds: If so, then God is the cause that many things are done contingently, one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily, and therefore contingently. ... For example, it is impossible that man should do any thing without God, therefore God is a cause necessary to the being of all things effected by him, yet because many things done by the free choice of man, might as well have been omitted (God in no ways constraining him to them) these are not necessary effects of God. The Reason of this is plain, because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily, having liberty to do as well one thing as another, yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do, and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice.37

The argument is also quite distinct from that either of Molina or of Arminius. Goad, like Ursinus and others among the Reformed, understands voluntary or free acts as a species of contingency.38 And although his distinction between contingency and causality or fortuity differs,39 his understanding of contingencies, including free choices, assumes an ongoing divine concurrence in both cause and effect and not, as in the cases of Molina and Arminius, a concursus entering into the effect.40

4. Goad on Free Choice, Dual Causality and Divine Foreknowledge

When he comes to his explanation of free choice, Goad first notes the tendency of his deterministic opponents to reduce freedom to spontaneity:

They say, That Gods decree doth not compel any mans will to any thing, that he should do such a thing whether he will or no; but he so disposeth and worketh it, that it shall desire

37. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 23.
38. Cf., e.g., Zacharias Ursinus, Explicationum catecheticarum ... absolutum opus: totiusque theologiae purioris quasi novum corpus ... nec non miscellaneis catecheticis seorsum excusis (Neustadt: Wilhelm Harnish, 1598), 77: “discrimen est inter liberum & contingens. Nam omne liberum est contingens, sed non contra, omne contingens est liberum. Liberum igitur est species contingentis, ut etiam fortuitum & casuale."
40. Cf. Richard A. Muller, God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 253-55. Goodwin also seems not to follow a Molinist view of concurrence: see Goodwin, Redemption Redeemed, 12-13 (§8), where he assumed concurrence in the actions themselves, but not to the imposition of necessity.
that which God would have done. And therefore, they say, Man hath use of his will, because whatsoever he doth, though necessitated to it by God, yet he doth it willingly.\textsuperscript{41}

Such a resolution of the question of free choice, namely one that reduces freedom to uncoerced spontaneity, Goad dismisses as “flim-flam”—not that he denies that freedom is opposed to coercion, as distinct from necessity; or that he denies that spontaneity devoid of coercion is an ingredient of freedom of choice. Rather, once the issues of agency and choice are identified, it should be evident that “the prerogative of a voluntary Agent consisteth not in doing that which it desireth to do, or rather in desiring to do that which it doth ... in freedom from coaction and violence; but in a liberty of choice to do or not to do this or that, and so in freedom from the necessity of immutability.”\textsuperscript{42}

In Goad’s view, this freedom “to do or not do this or that” is fundamental to the very nature of voluntary agents as ordained or ordered by God from eternity:

God, say we, \textit{ab aeterno}, hath ordered that such Agents as he created voluntary, should have a double liberty in their operations, \textit{viz.} a liberty of contradiction, to do, or not to do; as a Painter may choose whether he will work or no: and a liberty of contrariety, to do a thing after this or that manner; as a Painter may use what colours, in what quantity, after what fashion, he pleaseth.\textsuperscript{43}

Here, both in what he denies and in what he affirms, Goad offers some indication of whose definitions he has chosen to oppose and with whose he agrees. He opposes those who define freedom as spontaneity or absence of coercion but who also hold a “necessity of immutability” according to which the choice is determined to one effect—whereas he agrees with those who define free choice as consisting in both liberty of contradiction and liberty of contrariety.

\textsuperscript{41} Goad, \textit{Stimulus orthodoxus}, 9.

\textsuperscript{42} Goad, \textit{Stimulus orthodoxus}, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{43} Goad, \textit{Stimulus orthodoxus}, 11-12; contrary to the assumption of Parnham, \textit{Heretics Within}, 408, Goad’s language here does not indicate “equipoise” or indifference in a libertarian sense: what Goad implies is that voluntary agents have, in \textit{actu primo} a potency to more than one effect and that the indifference exists only prior to the determination of the will toward its object. See the extended discussion of this issue in Francis Turretin, \textit{Institutio theologiae elencticae, in qua status controversiae perspicue exponitur, praecipua orthodoxorum argumenta proponuntur, & vindicantur, & fontes solutionum aperiuntur}, 3 vols. (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1679-1685), VII.i.8; X.iii.4; and cf. my comments on Turretin’s approach to this issue in Richard A. Muller, “Jonathan Edwards and Francis Turretin on Necessity, Contingency, and Freedom of Will. In Response to Paul Helm,” in \textit{Jonathan Edwards Studies}, 4/3 (2014), 266-85, here, 274-76.
Goad therefore would clearly oppose the Luther of *De servo arbitrio*, as well those among his Reformed contemporaries who drew positively on the definitions found in the recently published *De causa Dei* of Thomas Bradwardine, where *libertas* was identified as not contrary to a *necessitas spontanea* or a *necessitas immutabilitatis*, and where God was considered as “able in some manner to necessitate all created wills to their free acts.” William Ames, a major supporter of the Contra-Remonstrant cause, was among those who drew heavily on Bradwardine, specifically on his views of freedom and necessity. So also, albeit without further explanation, Arminius’ younger colleague and sometime opponent, Lucas Trelcatius Jr., distinguished freedom into freedom from bondage (*servitudo*), coercion (*coactio*), and immutability of necessity (*immutabilitas seu necessitas*), and indicated fallen human beings lack freedom from bondage; all human beings are free from coercion; but only prior to the fall were human beings free from the necessity of immutability. There are, then, Reformed voices, notably some allied to the Contra-Remonstrant cause, that Goad opposed as fatalistic and Stoic. And, admittedly, he would probably have rejected as inadequate some of the explanations offered by Calvin and Beza. But this does not set him apart from the Reformed tradition, broadly understood. In his understanding of free choice in terms of the liberties of contradiction and contrariety, Goad stands in agreement with definitions shared by

44. Cf. Martin Luther, *De servo arbitrio*, in WA 18, 720-21; with Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres*, ed. Henry Saville (London: Norton, 1618), III.x (p. 678): “Alter accipitur necessitas pro necessitate naturali, pro necessitate fatali, pro necessitate violentae coactionis, & pro necessitate spontaneae stabilitas permanentiae, seuetiam [licet] non tam proprius necessitas immutabilis vocatur. ... Libertas dicitur isdem modis; scilicet libertas a necessitate primo modo dicta, libertas a necessitate naturali, a necessitate fatali, a necessitate violenta, a necessitate praecedente, & a necessitate sequente”; and concluding (p. 686), “pater ergo quod non negat a libero arbitrio hominis necessitatem spontaneam.... Necessitas enim spontanea nequaquam libertati repugnat.” Bradwardine did, however, allow for a version of liberty of contradiction: see Heiko A. Oberman *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: A Fourteenth-century Augustinian. A Study of his Theology in its Historical Context* (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1957), 66-67; and Gordon Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 99-100. Leff argues (p. 109) that Bradwardine ultimately excludes all contingency in the created order; Oberman agrees (p. 76), but argues further that freedom (*libertas*) of will remains.

45. Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, III.i (p. 637): “Quod Deus potest necessitare quodammodo omnem voluntatem creatam [ad] liberum actum suum...”; and subsequently, “Deus posse necessitare quodammodo omnem voluntatem creatam ad liberum, imo ad liberrimum actum suum ... Deus enim potest vellevoluntatem creatam producere liberum actum suum, & hoc antecedenter, & prior naturaliter voluntate crea.” Also cited in Ames, *Bellarminus enervatus ... in quatuor tomos divisius* (Amsterdam: Ioannes Iansonus, 1628), t. IV, IV.i (p. 77).

46. William Ames, *Bellarminus enervatus*, t. IV, IV.i (p. 77), citing both of the above noted places in Bradwardine.

English Arminians like Plaifere and with a significant line of predecessors and contemporaries in the Reformed tradition, among them, Zacharias Ursinus, Franciscus Junius, Francis Gomarus, and Edward Reynolds. It is crucial to recognize that the dividing line between Reformed and Arminian was not over the definition of freedom as consisting in liberty of contradiction and liberty of contrariety, nor even over the issue of a primary moment of indeterminacy in willing, but over the issue of the movement of the will from a root or primary actuality of indifference or indeterminacy to its determination of a particular object—with the Arminian argument, like the Molinist or Jesuit argument, maintaining an indifference in the operation of secondary actuality of the will.

The necessity, grounded in omniscience, that God know all things, is a necessity of certainty or infallibility and not a causal necessity: “God necessarily knew that Adam would fall, and yet he knew that [Adam] would not fall necessarily, for it was possible for him not to have fallen.” Goad indicates that before the fall, Adam was “equally poised between perseverance and defection,” without pursuing further the question of how or where one ought to construe the moment of indifference—if in the primary actuality, the view conforms to Reformed approaches; if in secondary actuality, it would be Arminian. The argument, then, has been ironically stated in order to find ground for possible agreement. Still, in Goad’s view, it is not as if God merely foreknows events without ultimately being their cause. God “is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable


49. On this issue, see Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae, X.iii.3-4

50. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 25; similarly, Reynolds, Treatise of the Passions, 544-45.

51. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 20.
to be a cause,” but in such a way that “many things are contingent in respect of him.”

This assumption that many things are contingent with respect to God allows Goad to argue, further, that there is a “sense” in which “God is the cause of all we do,” but nonetheless not responsible for sin. Human beings cannot do anything without God or, as it is often stated, apart from or outside of the divine will. As Goad puts it, God is “necessary to the being of all things effected by him; yet because many things done by the free choice of man, might as well have been omitted (God in no ways constraining him to them) these are not necessary effects of God.” Even when human beings sin, they live, move, and have their being in God. God does, therefore, provide the “strength”—technically, the providential concurrence—by which human beings sin, but he neither necessitates nor induces the sin. God remains creator and providential conserver, but the human agent alone is the sinner:

God is the cause of all those things in which we sin, and yet whatsoever he doth is exceeding good; he is not the cause that we intend any sin, but the cause that we are able to commit those sins we intend. ... Of all our good actions he is the first cause, we are the second; of all our sins we are the proper cause, he is only the Conditio sine qua non.

Virtually the same argument was used by Goad’s colleague at Dort, John Davenant, in his defense of the Canons against Samuel Hoard. There are, in other words, two causal agents operative in all free acts of human beings, God as the first cause and the human being as the second, but immediate cause. In the act, both the divine and the human causality are necessary to the act taking place, and neither by itself sufficient. The “act of our will ... must suppose also the concourse of God.” That human freedom should function in this way rests in turn on God’s decree “that many things should be done contingently, or after such a resistible manner, that they might

52. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 23.
53. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 23.
54. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 22-23.
55. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 24.
56. John Davenant, Animadversions written by the Right Reverend Father in God, John, Lord Bishop of Salisbury, upon a treatise intituled, Gods love to mankinde (London: John Partridge, 1641).
56: “In good actions the freedome of men elected is not vain, thought the end be determined; because God hath together with the end determined that by their free actions they shall attain unto it. In bad and wicked actions of the reprobate their freedome of will is not vain; because thereby ... Gods justice is cleared in their damnation. Neither is there any indeclinable or insuperable necessity domineering over free-will”; responding to Samuel Hoard, Gods Love to Mankind Manifested, by disprooving his absolute decree for their damnation (London: s.n., 1633).
57. Goad, Stimulus orthodoxus, 24.
without *frustrating* His decree have been *left* undone: yea, we see now, that *contingency* itself is *necessary* in respect of God’s will, who will have many things done *voluntarily.*”\(^{58}\) Once again, Goad’s argument finds a parallel in Davenant’s defense of the Canons.\(^{59}\)

Goad also assumes, as part of his argument, that God decreed the contingent and free operations of secondary causes to be free and contingent and, accordingly, foreknows them as such. Contingent events are, therefore, not contingent in the same way with respect to God as they are with respect to human beings.\(^{60}\) Inasmuch as human begins are temporal, or as Goad states it, moral, they lack infallible foresight, but it is also the case that, “in that same proportion we have *knowledge* of them, they are not *contingent* but *necessary*: for every thing, so far forth as it is in *existence*, or in near preparation for it, is *necessary.*”\(^{61}\) If moreover, contingency stands midway between necessity and impossibility, to the extent that a contingency, as possible, “inclineth to *existence* it is necessary.”\(^{62}\) God, as both eternal and all-knowing, must therefore know things both as they exist and as they are inclined toward existence—and knows them as necessary. The necessity here is derived, however, not causally, inasmuch as it refers to contingently and freely caused events and things, but logically: it is a necessity *de dicto*, not *de re*, a necessity of the consequence or necessity of the present. And, in Goad’s view, once the difference between the eternal divine and temporal human existence has been acknowledged, this logical necessity that a contingent thing be what it is applies to God’s knowing much as it applies to human knowing. This use of the necessity of the consequence or necessity of the present also has significant parallels among Goad’s Reformed contemporaries.\(^{63}\)

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58. Goad, *Stimulus orthodoxus*, 9. Note that the phrase “without *frustrating* His decree” may reference the Reformed criticism of the notion of conditional decrees in either the Arminian or the Amyraldian approaches as “frustrable” decrees or counsels in God: cf. Pierre du Moulin, *Éclaircissement des controverses Salmuriennes, ou defense de la doctrine des eglises reformées sur l’immutabilité des decrets de Dieu, l’efficace de la mort de Christ, la grace universelle, l’impuissance à de se convertir et sur d’autres matières* (Leiden: J. Maire, 1648), IX.ii (p. 233); and John Davenant, *De Gallicana controversia D. Davenantii sententia*, as appended to Davenant’s *Dissertatio de morte Christi ... quibus subnectitue eiusdem D. Davenantii Sententia de Gallicana controversia: sc. De Gratiosa & Salutari Dei erga Homines peccatores voluntate* (Cambridge: Roger Daniels, 1683), 293-94.

59. Davenant, *Animadversions*, 11: “The grace prepared for the Elect in Gods eternall Predestination, and bestowed upon them in the temporal dispensation, so causeth their belief, repentance, perseverance, as that it imposeth no necessity or violent coaction upon the wills of men, but causeth their free and voluntary endeavours”; similarly, 33: “the eternall decrees of Gods will take not away the liberty of mans will.”


Goad’s argument for divine concurrence or co-causality in relation to contingent and free acts does not, moreover, tip the hat in an Arminian or Remonstrant direction. If all temporal things are contingent from the perspective of the divine will, there remain necessities as well as contingencies relative to the temporal order itself. “Things of greatest moment,” Goad indicates, “are done necessarily, by the immediate power of God, either by swaying men from their own proper inclinations, or by supernatural means quite crossing their enterprises.”

God can and does change human hearts for the sake of his church and to his own glory. There are also what Goad calls “middle sort of events ... neither trivial nor extraordinary,” which remain contingent, but are nonetheless managed by God who engages them with his power either to be merciful or to enact justice. “Very few matters of consequence are merely contingent.”

There is a significant parallel here with Joseph Hall’s conciliatory approach to the issue of divine willing in his effort to delineate a Reformed via media for the parties at Dort: quoting Zanchi, Hall notes that God wills some things absolutely (such as the creation and governance of this world, Christ’s death for the salvation of the elect, and therefore also the performance of “all things that are necessary” to the salvation of the elect); and some things conditionally (such as the salvation of all who “keep the Law, or believe in Christ”). There is also a significant difference to be noted between Goad’s approach and Goodwin’s on the same issue. Where Goad writes of some “things” done necessarily by God by his immediate power, Goodwin writes of an absolute divine determination only of beings “in respect of their Natures, or constituting principles,” leaving all other actions in the realm of contingency and freedom.

5. Some Further Comments and Conclusion

In the light of the connections that we have identified between Goad’s thought and directions in the Reformed theology of the era, we can return to the preface by J.G. and the possibility that its phrase “betwixt the Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants” was stated with precision. Given the identity of “J.G.” as John Goodwin, there is no difficulty in concluding that the comment was this specific. Goodwin, after all, was himself a significant theological mind. Taking Goodwin at his word, we are left with the conclusion that the

64. Goad, *Stimulus orthodoxus*, 16.
65. Goad, *Stimulus orthodoxus*, 16.
Arminian Goodwin published a moderate Reformed treatise that mediated between Remonstrant and Contra-Remonstrant views. Several of Goad’s arguments, notably, his arguments concerning the primary causality of God, the relation of primary to secondary causality, the basic definition of free choice, the character of voluntary causality, and the issue of foreknowledge resonated with Goodwin’s views. Not that Goad had turned Arminian, but that he had irenically identified a basis for peaceful discussion on the controverted points between Arminians or Remonstrants and a purposely moderate Reformed position.

Arguably, Goad’s position echoes a variety of irenic Reformed writers including John Davenant and Joseph Hall, both of whom were delegates to the Synod of Dort and whose Reformed identity has never been questioned. The treatise, then, sits “betwixt” the libertarian approach of the Arminians and the more deterministic approach of some Reformed thinkers. This conclusion confirms Tyacke’s judgment, but, arguably, with more detail as to the exact import of the disputation. We can also conclude that Goad both went to the Synod of Dort and left it Reformed. His concluding recommendation to the Synod bespeaks the broadly Reformed theology of the British Delegation that, like his later disputation, was wary both of Arminian theology and of the kind of Reformed pronouncements that had led to accusations of Stoicism.

If Goad wrote the treatise toward the end of his life, clearly with the debates at Dort still in view, his effort to distinguish between his own views and that of the Stoics may well have been a response to the polemics of the era in which Samuel Hoard had pointedly critiqued the Canons of Dort and identified the Reformed position as Stoic, with Goad attempting to mark out a middle position for the Reformed between a fatalistic Stoic position and an indifferentistic Epicurean view—a pattern repeated with some consistency among the Reformed orthodox. Goad’s argumentation does specifically argue a liberty of contrary choice in human beings as opposed to what Goad identified as a Stoic notion of liberty—Stoic liberty being defined as the freedom to accomplish what one has willed, as opposed to the freedom to will one thing or its opposite. Much of Goad’s argumentation, in any case, has parallels in Davenant’s response to Hoard.

Goad’s approach, then, intentionally excludes a strictly deterministic argument such as implied in the language of a necessity of immutability, potentially found in Contra-Remonstrant circles. Nor is his view to be confused with the Molinist or Arminian concepts of scientia media or limited divine concursus, as hypothesized by Bryant, nor does the treatise challenge unconditional election—election is not mentioned, conditional decrees are not mentioned, and the treatise

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does leave room in its argument for necessity willed by God in matters of “greatest moment,” matters specifically concerned with God’s glory and the good of the church. By implication, these comments point toward Goad’s own Reformed position on election and the order of salvation. Barely a decade after Goad’s death, the Westminster divines declared that God decrees all things, some to be necessary, others to be contingent and free, the very point that Goad attempted to explain (Westminster Confession of Faith, V.2).

The disputation was, therefore, just a bit out of place, tacked on to the end of works by Plaifere and Womock—and its publication in their company begs some explanation. There could be no objection to the publication of Plaifere and Womock in the same volume. Both opposed what they took to be Calvinism and both supported the Arminian cause against the theology of the Canons of Dort. Whereas Plaifere had a fairly clear grasp of the more technical language of the Molinist-Arminian scientia media, Womock wrote in a far less technical mode, but neither dealt in any detail with the variety of more technical Reformed discussions of necessity, contingency, and freedom. When their writings were proposed for publication together with Goad’s work, moreover, the contrast between Plaifere’s and Goad’s views was probably less than evident to eighteenth century pamphleteers: by 1729 the refined Reformed approaches to necessity, contingency and freedom had dropped from view in the demise of the older scholasticism, and by 1789 the older Reformed theology was being assimilated to the fully deterministic approaches of the era that had born fruit in such works as Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the Will and Henry Home, Lord Kames’ Essays.

As the Stimulus orthodoxus indicates on its first page, it intentionally did not elaborate on the disputed issues of predestination, grace and free choice, and the cause of sin, but rather offered a ground work for resolving the disputes. In its own time, having been written during the two decades after the Synod of Dort, Goad arguably intended his work to be received as a piece of irenic Reformed theology intended to clear away problems in understanding the interrelationship of divine and human willing and to offer a way of affirming contingency and freedom at the same time that God was acknowledged to be the first cause of all things.

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69. As argued by Bryant, “Molina, Arminius, Plaifere, Goad, and Wesley,” 93-103; and Maddox, “Seeking a Response-able God,” 122n.