THEOPHILUS GALE’S REFORMED PLATONISM:
FOCUSBING ON HIS DISCOURSE OF
“CREATION” AND “PROVIDENCE”
IN THE COURT OF THE GENTILES

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1. Introduction

Despite its worth, Theophilus Gale (1628-1678) and his masterpiece, The Court of the Gentiles (4 vols., 1669-1678; 2nd ed., 1672-1678; hereafter, CG), has not received a great deal of attention among scholars, not only because of a general indifference with regard to post-Reformation Protestant thought, but also because of the inaccessibility of CG due to its voluminous size. Nevertheless, several scholars have been dedicated to the study of Gale and CG in three


2. Its printing history is a somewhat complicated. The first edition of vol. 1 (Of Philologie) and of vols. 2 and 3 (Of Philosophie and The Vanitie of Pagan Philosophie) were published in Oxford in 1669 and 1671, respectively. The second edition of vol. 1 was published in Oxford in 1672; the second edition of vol. 2 (now entitled Of Barbaric and Grecanic Philosophie) appeared in London in 1676; the second printing of vol. 3 was published in London in 1677. Vol. 4 (Of Reformed Philosophie) appeared in London in 1677, and an additional part to vol. 4 (Of Divine Predetermination) was published separately in London in 1678. For this study, the second edition (1672-1678) is used with original spelling and italics. For a detailed history of CG, see Stephen J. Pigney, “Theophilus Gale and Historiography of Philosophy,” in Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Rogers Graham (New York: Routledge, 2010), 93n5; Luciano Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678): The Court of the Gentiles and Philosophia Generalis,” in Models of the History of Philosophy: From Its Origins in the Renaissance to the Historia Philosophica, ed. C. W. T. Blackwell and Philip Weller (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 293.
different but interconnected ways. First, some scholars (for example, Dewey D. Wallace3 and Luciano Malusa4) have studied Gale’s CG with concentration of the *prisca theologia*,5 which traces back not only to Mosaic traditions but also to Hermes Trismegistus (some Hermetism, but no occult Hermeticism or magic), Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato. In this sense, Wallace, who recently has been in earnest study of the relationship between *prisca theologia* and CG, notes that “Gale’s magnum opus *The Court of the Gentiles* promoted a version of the ancient theology, which drew on the patristic, medieval, and Renaissance roots of this tradition and was consonant with learning of his day, especially that of the historical-philological scholarship of international Protestantism but also of the wider republic of letters.”6

Second, several scholars (for example, Clarence Gohdes,7 C. A. Patrides,8 E. N. Tigerstedt,9 Stephen J. Pigney,10 Malusa11) have studied Gale and CG’s significance and influence in a broad or

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specific historical context. For instance, Gohdes notes that Gale had influence upon the intellectual circles of New England, saying in this context that “Jonathan Edwards frequently drew an idea from Gale to clinch an argument.” Not only that, but Patrides, Tigerstedt, Pigney, and Malusa have examined Gale and his CG in conversation with the Cambridge Platonists and their influences—such as Ralph Cudworth, John Smith, and Henry More—seeking an intellectual continuity and discontinuity between the thought of Cambridge Platonists and that of Gale in the late seventeenth-century revival of Platonism in England. In this regard, Pigney cites Gale as a Nonconformist, “since he did not belong to the group that has become known as the Cambridge Platonists, has either been overlooked or contrasted with the Cambridge circle.”

Finally, several scholars (for example, Richard A. Muller, Norman Fiering, Sarah Hutton, Katherine A. Narveson) have


13. Since the issue whether Gale can be labeled as one of the Cambridge Platonists or not is beyond the scope of this study, I will not largely present it here. To put it briefly, whereas Gohdes, Malusa, Patrides tend to regard Gale as one of the Cambridge Platonists, Pigney and Sarah Hutton regards him as one of the Nonconformists based upon congregationalism, but still closely associating with the Cambridge Platonists. See Gohdes, “Aspects of Idealism in Early New England,” 543; Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678),” 289-329; Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists, 1-8; Pigney, “Theophilus Gale (1628-79),” 420; Sarah Hutton, “The Neoplatonic Roots of Arianism: Ralph Cudworth and Theophilus Gale,” in Socinianism and Its Role in the Culture of XVI-th to XVIII-th Centuries, eds. Lech Szczucki, Zbigniew Ogonowski, and Janusz Tazbir (Warsaw: PWN-Polish Scientific Publisher, 1983), 139. However, Gohdes, Malusa, and Patrides’ conclusion would seem to be hasty conclusion because, as Tigerstedt points out, while the Cambridge Platonists did not distinguish between Platonism and Neoplatonism, and tended to revere Plotinus as much as Plato, Gale undoubtedly tended to isolate Plato from the Neoplatonists in CG. See Tigerstedt, “Gale,” in The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato, 47-48. Cf. Pigney, “Theophilus Gale and Historiography of Philosophy,” 80. Also, as Patrides points out, although the Cambridge Platonists did not discard Calvinism, and “while they do agree in some details, their spirit is utterly dissimilar.” See Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists, 6n1. Yet, Gale’s philosophy is the Reformed or Calvinistic philosophy as Gale himself calls in terms of putting theology over philosophy and of acknowledging the incompleteness of human reason and its faculty.


studied Gale’s philosophy in focusing on the particular subject. For example, while Muller briefly examines the relationship between Gale’s philosophy (as a reformed version of Platonism) and theology, Fiering concentrates on examining the moral discourse, which is related with Augustinian voluntarism and Platonism, in Gale’s *CG*. More specifically, Hutton focuses on investigating the relationship between Neoplatonism and anti-Trinitarianism with special reference to the views of two Trinitarian Platonists, Cudworth and Gale, tracing back to Trinitarian heresies.

As seen so far, although the studies with regard to Gale and his *CG* have existed and been investigated in three manners—that is, relation to *prisca theologa*, the Cambridge Platonists, and the particular subject—extensive research for *CG*’s specific subject, despite a vast store of contents of *CG*, has been paid relatively scant attention in comparison to the rest of them. In other words, no one has investigated satisfactorily, with respect to one of the detailed subjects in Gale’s *CG*, how to portray the peculiarity of Gale’s philosophy.

Through a detailed examination of the subject of *CG*, several erroneous assumptions with regard to the characteristics of the revived Platonism of seventeenth-century England can be amended. For example, the reason for Ernst Cassirer’s judgment that the revived Platonism of seventeenth-century England (regardless of whether it is by the Cambridge Platonists or Nonconformists) was incompatible with Puritan Calvinism should be reconsidered because, as Paul Oskar Kristeller points out, “the place of Platonism in sixteenth-century thought is rather complex and difficult to describe,” due to its combined nature with the tradition of *prisca theologa*, Neoplatonism, and Aristotelianism. Not only that, and more importantly, it is also because Gale’s *CG* synthesizes Calvinism and Platonism, locating the Platonic “ideas” in the divine mind in direct contrast to Cassirer’s argument. Specifically, Gale’s more

specific argument regarding “creation” and “providence” (esp. in Of Reformed Philosophie, fourth volume of CG) clearly reflects a Calvinistic Platonism and Reformed philosophy in terms not only of harmonizing Calvinism and Platonism, but also giving theology or biblical truth superiority over Platonic philosophy in the discourse of creation and providence.

This essay, therefore, will progress in three steps: (1) as a background study, Gale’s eclectic or compromised principle of characterizing the relationship between philosophy (especially Platonism) and theology presented throughout four volumes of CG will be examined in order to apply this principle into the next section—examining the specific subject (Section II); (2) as a case study for seeking evidence of Cassirer’s error, Gale’s particular subjects—that is, “creation” and “providence”—will be scrutinized, for Gale’s discourse of creation and of providence is unique in terms not only of having continuity and discontinuity between the classic Platonic idea (presented in Plato’s works—for example, Timaeus, Laws, Cratylus, Philebus, etc.) and Gale’s argument, but of integrating Gale’s platonic discourse with Calvinistic thought and Reformed philosophy (Section III); and (3) as a conclusion, based on the previous study, whether or not Gale’s philosophy in the discourse of creation and providence can be called “Reformed philosophy” or “Calvinistic Platonism” will be evaluated (Section IV).

2. Gale’s General Principles In CG

Most scholars have labeled Gale’s philosophico-methodological characteristic as two principles, namely, holding an eclectic Platonism and advocating a superiority of theology over philosophy. As far as Gale’s principles are concerned, Muller, Wallace, and Pigney tend to evaluate them positively as well as to regard them as valuable; they believe that these principles not only clearly reflect the philosophical tendency closely associated with Calvinism in the late seventeenth-century revival of Platonism in England but also valuably mirror a continuity and discontinuity between Gale’s eclectic Calvinistic Platonism and traditional Calvinism. On the other hand, in the perspective of general

historiography of philosophy, Malusa negatively evaluates Gale’s principles as “unsuccessful attempts” because Malusa believes that they “are used to justify a theological conception totally foreign to the Platonic viewpoint.” However, if Malusa’s negative evaluation is accepted, there is more to lose from it than to gain, for the uniqueness of Gale and the CG would be lost; which is distinct from the Cambridge Platonists—even though Gale was closely associated with them—in the revived Platonism in England as well as Gale’s particular value, which not only eclectically combines Platonism with Calvinism but also places Calvinism above Platonism, as we shall see from now on in detail.

2.1. Eclectic Platonism: Corrupted Philosophy vs. Useful Philosophy

Gale is neither a blind follower of philosophy nor does he oppose it; rather, he is an eclectic adopter who comprehensively views strengths and weaknesses of philosophy and then tries to embrace or reject it selectively. In this regard, Gale notes:

Philosophie was, in its first descent, a Generose, Noble thing, a Virgin Beautie, a pure Light, borne of the Father of Lights, in whose Light alone we can see light. But, alas! How soon did she lose her original Virginitie, and primitive puritie? How soon was she, of an Angel of Light, transformed into a child of darknesse? ... how have the lasciviose Wits of lapsed human nature ever since gone a Whoring after vain Philosophie?31

For Gale, philosophy is originally not only a noble thing and a pure light but also the “more excellent and perfect the thing.” Gale’s positive evaluation on philosophy ultimately converges on praising Platonism, saying that “it is true, Plato had clear Traditions of the Deitie and Divine Perfections.” According to Gale in the context of prisca theologia, Plato is the philosopher who “transport[s] Jewish Traditions into Grece” and also discusses “Jewish sacred

29. Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678),” 327. In order to support his negative evaluation of Gale’s philosophico-methodological principles, Malusa draws from Johann Jakob Brucker’s Kurze Fragen (Ulm, 1731), noting that “Brucker critically observed that in Gale’s works there was the appearance of a hermeneutics that often demonstrated an inattention to the texts and to critically reliable accounts because it was more concerned with a theological overview than with historical truth.” See Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678),” 329-330.
32. Gale, CG, III: 3; Gale, CG, fol. A2r.
Dogmes.”  

Not only that, but Plato’s metaphysics or supernatural philosophy has great notions with regard to God’s essence, unity, attributes, universe, soul, and so on, saying that Plato “seems to have had Traditions (originally Judaic) ... in imitation of Moses.”

Furthermore, in Gale’s view, Plato’s philosophy “has been generally entertained by the best of Christian Philosophers” as demonstrated by Justin Martyr, Augustine, Picus, Mirandulanus, Savonarola, Wesselus, Ramus, etc., who put Platonic philosophy to good use.

However, despite the good use of Platonic philosophy, its pure light and virgin beauty have been lost and then transformed into darkness, inasmuch as philosophy is “corrupted” and thereby traditions (originally come from the sacred Scriptures and Jewish Church) are “broken.”

For Gale, the corrupted philosophy can be divided into two main targets: on one hand, the contemporary “new philosophy” and, surprisingly enough, given his own philosophical sympathies, Platonism on the other hand. Firstly, Gale is hostile to the contemporary “new philosophy” which is substantially designated to Hobbes and Cartesianism. Gale claims that modern thinkers introduce a “skeptical method” in order to grasp the truth by a depraved reason.

In this regard, according to Gale, Hobbes is “the great Leviathan of our Age and Nation,” who makes “public profession of his Atheism, and disbelief of all things, which admit not of sensible Demonstration.” Thus, Gale greatly expresses his concern over “new philosophy;” since this is abused by atheistic wits, “our Theologie ... [thereby] has received great damage.”

Gale’s second target, surprisingly, is Platonism. Although Gale respects that Platonism is a “good product of Nature’s Light” based upon the conviction that it is “the choicest Contemplations of Pagan Philosophie,” Gale, at the same time, does not deny the fact that it has been “the Prolific cause of the worst Heresies and Corruptions in the Church” such as Monasticism, Pelagianism, Arianism, and generally speaking, all the evils of Papacy. Specifically, Gale contends that Platonism in its Neoplatonic form has been very detrimental to Christianity. For Gale, “New Platonicks” is the “cursed mixture of Platonick philosophie with Christianity,” which leads

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34. Gale, CG, I, fol. *2r; Gale, CG, I: 8.
35. Gale, CG, II: 419.
36. Gale, CG, IV, fol. A3r.
38. Although it cannot be denied that one of Gale’s main targets is Aristotelianism, he tends to center his attack upon the “new philosophy” and Platonism, in comparison to Aristotelianism. For Gale’s objections to Aristotelianism, see CG, IV, fol. A3r.
40. Gale, CG, IV: 217. For the relationship between Hobbes’ notion of liberty and predestination, see Gale, CG, IV, Bk. 3, 209.
41. Gale, CG, IV, fol. A3r.
42. Gale, CG, I, fol. *5v.
philosophy into a darkness such as a radical Mysticism. For Gale, therefore, “the corruption of the best things is ever worst.” Gale further notes:

Philosophie in its Origin and primitive Idea was most Auguse and Gloriose: But now, alas! alas! what an inane, confused, sterile thing is it! How difficult is it to separate any regular Use from the Abuse thereof! The prodigiose Abuses; which Philosophie, by reason of the Vanitie, Errors, and Prejudices of man’s corrupt mind, has been obnoxious.

In other words, if Platonism is corrupted and abused by man’s depraved mind, it is very difficult to make a pure Platonism that is isolated from an abused Platonism. In this regard, for Gale, philosophical eclecticism is valuable, restating that therefore “sound philosophie” is eclectic. Gale clearly proposes how to work an eclectic methodology, namely, through “beams of Divine Light” which come from “Sacred Revelations,” one can have a discerning eye to identify whether a certain philosophy is corrupted or not as well as whether it can be of good use. In this sense, Gale substantially appeals to the authority of “Divine Revelation” and its “Light” for deploying his philosophical eclecticism. This tendency toward endorsing the superiority of the Scriptures over philosophy in a philosophical eclecticism is a primary principle that penetrates Gale’s CG and therefore, will be dealt with the next section in more detail.

2.2. Subordinating Philosophy to Theology

Gale basically cannot perceive any event in the history of philosophy as independent; rather, they are all united by Divine revelation. In this regard, the ultimate source and origin of philosophy is God. Gale notes:

We must remember that God (who is the original Idea of al truth, the eternal wisdome and fountain of al light) is the first Exemplar, and Efficient of al Philosophie. For as God made althings according to the eternal universal Idea of his own Wisdome and Decrees; so likewise has he stamped, and

43. Gale, CG, II: 265.
44. Gale, CG, III, fol. A2r.
45. Gale, CG, III, fol. A2r.
47. Gale, CG, II, fol. A2r.
deeply impressed on the very beings and natures of althings made, certain characters or intelligible ideas and resemblances of his own divine wisdome, which the Scholes usually terme the Light and Law of nature; which is nothing else but those created emanations, or rayes of light and order stamped on the beings of things, and scattered up and down in the Universe; which offering themselves to the human understanding, become the objective matter of Philosophie.⁴⁹

Thus, philosophy, not only in the form of natural law but also of a kind of emanation, cannot be greater or deeper than its origin and root—namely, God and Divine revelation; for its fundamental nature is a tributary of the Divine wisdom. Although philosophies, of course, “had some notices of God, yet they did not like to retain him in the true science or right understanding of him” due to “venomous corruptions in Philosophie.”⁵⁰ In this sense, “corrupt Philosophie had on corruptions in Theologie.” ⁵¹ In order to purify a corrupted theology which is marred by “Vain Philosophie,” the “Reformation of Philosophie” is urgently needed.⁵² Gale proposes general rules about how philosophy can be reformed into three ways: Firstly, “[t]hat all Philosophie be reduced, to and measured by its original and perfect Exemplar, the Divine Word and Light;” Secondly, “[t]hat so much only of Pagan Philosophie must be admitted as may subserve Christian Theologie, not oppose the same;” and lastly, “[t]hat not the end of Ethnic Philosophie, or Philosophers, may be assumed by us, but only such Philosophemes as may serve to explicate Dogmes in Theologie.”⁵³ According to Gale, these general rules were effectively followed by Augustine, stating that “Platonic Philosophie may be greatly useful if well managed, and rendred subservient to Theologie, as in Augustin.”⁵⁴ On the other hand, Origen paces the opposite way to Augustine; for, according to Gale, Origen tends to make a “reduction of the Scriptures,” placing philosophy above the whole of theology.⁵⁵

In this regard, Gale further notes:

If it [philosophy] fal on great and acute wits, it becomes lubricious, inordinate, and incertain; but if it be mixed with a serious, meek, humble mind, it greatly conduceth to the true and proper good. So greatly useful may Platonic Philosophie be, if loged in a serious, humble, meek, believing mind; which

⁴⁹. Gale, CG, II: 5.
⁵⁰. Gale, CG, III, fol. A3r.
⁵¹. Gale, CG, IV, fol. A2r.
⁵². Gale, CG, IV, fol. A2r-v, A3r
⁵⁴. Gale, CG, IV, fol. A3r.
⁵⁵. Gale, CG, IV, fol. A3r.
hath both Wisdome and Grace to render the same subordinate to Theologie.56

Thus, philosophy—when it abandons haughtiness and then humbles itself before theology—can be reformed and purified. When Gale speaks of “reformed philosophie,” he comes very close to the philosophical method and style, particularly Hugo Grotius and his work, De Veritate Religionis Christianae, in terms of sharing the Grotius’ ability to synthesize Reformed theology with classical philosophy and the Scriptures, with the concept of philosophical progress, as Gale himself states.57 Not only that, but Gale claims that his tendency, which places theology and the Divine Scriptures over philosophy, is supported by the “concurrence of the Learned”—for example, John Preston, John Owen, Thomas Goodwin, James Ussher, and so on.58 In this sense, Gale’s principle—subordinating philosophy to theology—is not an independent scheme; rather, it is the shared thought and blueprint with the Puritan tradition of that time. However, Gale does not try to underestimate the function of reason and of philosophy at all;59 rather, he adopts a position midway between Paul’s warning (that is, to beware of ‘philosophy and vain deceit’ [Col. 2:8]) and the moderate rationalism of the Cambridge philosophers.60 For Gale, philosophy is still a “Noble Thing” as long as it is subordinate to and searches for God’s Word and grace.61 Therefore, the good philosopher should pursue truth with reason, while always aware that truth ultimately could only ever be attained by Divine revelation.62 In this sense, Gale has a compromised sense between philosophy and theology, but still sees theology as superior to philosophy.63

As seen so far, Gale has two general principles that flow

57. Gale, CG, III: 9-12. However, Gale has some reservations about Grotius’ tendency, specifically in the Annotationes ad Novum Testamentum, to use the Scriptures to back up arguments in favor of a reconciliation with the Church of Rome. See Gale, CG, III: 10-12. Cf. Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678),” 298.
59. Gale, CG, II: 405-406, 410-413.
60. As Patrides points out, with regard to degree of reason’s utility, although there is wide spectrum among the Cambridge philosophers from a radical deistic view to the moderate rationalistic view, in any case it would be difficult to regard Gale as one of formal members of the Cambridge Platonists; for Gale’s reason would be properly working under the light of divine revelation and God’s grace in a kind of Calvinistic sense. Cf. Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists, 42-61.
62. Gale, CG, IV: 489-491. For the detailed discourse of Gale’s thought with regard to the relationship between reason and Divine revelation, see Pigney, “Theophilus Gale and Historiography of Philosophy,” 90-92.
predominantly throughout CG—namely, an eclectic Platonism and the principle that philosophy should be subordinate to theology in a compromised manner. With regard to these principles, Malusa’s negative evaluation that Gale’s principles are considerably “vague” due to its mixed nature between philosophy and theology should be reconsidered; for, contrary to Malusa, they rather can be the unique “philosophical cannon” in a way compatible with Christian doctrine.

This would not only show the close association between Gale and his Puritan contemporaries, but also disassociate him from the moderate rationalism of the Cambridge philosophers; all the while highlighting Gale’s sobering view of the nature and extent of reason. In the fourth volume of CG, these principles are uniquely applied in one of the specific discourses—that is of Creation, and Providence in the General—and yields Gale’s unique form “Reformed Platonism” as well.

3. Gale’s Reformed Platonism In the Discourse of “Creation” and “Providence”

In order to develop his discourse on Creation and Providence, Gale frequently quotes from Plato’s works (for example, Timaeus, Laws, Cratylus, Philebus, etc.). In fact, Plato’s large influence on Gale would not be surprising, for, as Kristeller points out, “Plato’s influence on Western thought has been so broad and profound” in late antiquity, the Middle Ages, or more recent times. In this respect, Gale’s work, if borrowed by a modern thinker’s expression, also would be one of the footnotes to Plato. In this context, even Calvin’s theology, as David C. Steinmetz notes, may rest comfortably with many Platonic ideas—though not in a substantial manner, stating that although Plato’s theory of creation “was not quite what the Christians had in mind, to affirm a creator god of sorts was, from Calvin’s perspective,” was, “at least a step in the right direction.”

However, in comparison to Calvin and Augustine, who use a dense filter when employing Platonism, Gale quotes liberally from

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64. Malusa, “Theophilus Gale (1628-1678),” 288.
66. In comparison to vols. 1-3 of CG, Of Reformed Philosophie (fourth volume of CG) is mainly consists of particular subjects—e.g., moral philosophy, politics, metaphysics, the doctrine of God, and so on. Also, an added book of Of Reformed Philosophie (Book III) deals with divine predetermination as well.
69. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.1 1n, 1.5.5n.
71. According to Kristeller, the most important representative of Platonism in
Plato’s works and owes much to them for building his idea with a relatively sparse filter. Nevertheless, his Platonic discourse of creation and providence does not move far away from two general principles—that is, eclectic Platonism and the order of priority between philosophy and theology—as examined in Section II. Rather, it adheres solidly to these principles throughout Of Creation, and Providence in the General. 72 Not only that, but it is also true that Gale’s philosophical methodology—in other words, “reformed Platonism” (specifically in terms of holding the middle way between a radical Calvinism and the moderate rationalism)—has scarcely been aware of many modern scholars who have studied Plato’s Timaeus, despite that these studies are based on religious background. 73 Of course, although many scholars (for example, Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils, Norbert M. Samuelson, R. Hackforth) have substantially perceived theology’s adoption of Platonic elements presented in the Timaeus within their own theological or philosophical interest, 74 no one has largely mentioned or introduced the unique pattern particularly shown in Gale’s CG. Viewed from Gale’s discourse, this unique pattern has three developing steps: Firstly, the discourse starts from the passages quoted eclectically from Plato’s works; ancient Latin literature was “St. Augustine, who acknowledged his debt to Plato and Plotinus more frankly than most of his modern theological admirers.” Yet, Augustine’s Platonic doctrines are closely related with the universal forms in the mind of God, incorporeal nature of human soul, and the immediate comprehension of these ideas by human reason, not with the whole doctrines. Also, Augustine rejected other Platonic or Neoplatonic doctrines that seemed incompatible with the Christian dogma.” Kristeller, “Renaissance Platonism,” 55. Cf. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII, 5, 99; IX, 1; Steinmetz, Calvin in Context, 236-238.

72. This section is the chapter 8 of book II in CG. See Gale, CG, IV: 430-468.


74. E.g., Samuelson (in Jewish context) Reydams-Schils (Stoic), and D’Ancona (Arabic) primarily tend to find similarities and dissimilarities between the work of νοῦς or ψυχή and that of theistic God within the discourse on creation and providence according to their own theological or philosophical interest. For instance, Samuelson notes that the Timaeus calls living celestial objects “gods,” in which is embedded the idea of νοῦς, but Genesis does not. See Samuelson, “The Foundations For the Jewish View of Creation,” 194. Also, whereas Reydams-Schils tries to find the continuity and merging form between Platonism and Stoicism, D’Ancona’s attempt is to find an example of continuity and adaption in early Arabic philosophical literature from Plato’s Timaeus. See Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, 11-40; D’Ancona, “The Timaeus’ Model for Creation and Providence,” 206-237.
secondly, based upon Platonic notions, Gale expounds on his argument of creation and providence; and lastly, in light of the Scriptures, Church Fathers, and Christian tradition, the discourse is evaluated, amended, and confirmed. Throughout Gale’s discussion of creation and providence, this pattern is not only working closely with two general principles, eclecticism and order of priority between theology and philosophy, but also the foundation upon which Gale builds his “Reformed philosophy.”

3.1. Reformed-Platonic Narrative of “Creation”

Gale’s most important themes in the discourse on creation are the issues of “God’s efficient cause” and “ex nihilo.” In order to demonstrate the former, Gale faithfully follows the pattern in three developing steps. Firstly, in the ordinary, Gale starts his argument from Plato’s *Phaedo* and introduces the notion of “prime cause and efficiency.” Although Gale does not quote any passage directly from *Phaedo* (but he does mention the passages from *Phaedo* in the earlier section of CG which explain Plato’s Physics), based on his later argument it can be derived that he might have the specific passage of *Phaedo* (particularly 96e-97c) in mind—for example, “Mind [νοῦς] should be the cause of all.... Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.” In this sense, for Gale, God who is identical with νοῦς is not only the “first Cause” but also the “principal supreme Efficiency,” stating that “creation is the Efficiency of the first Cause, whereby he made althings at first.”

Borrowing notions from *Timaeus* (28 a3), Gale also argues that “creation is the most perfect of all actions, by which a participate Being may be communicated [with the creatures].” In this regard, when it comes to embark upon the discourse of causality matter in creation, Gale considerably depends upon Platonic notions of causality and uses them as a foothold to deploy his further argument.

For the second step, Gale—based upon this Platonic notion—expounds on his argument that “creation is the sole Prerogative of God,” for “creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator.” Gale further notes:

He [Creator] has no passive power or mater to worke on, but

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75. Gale, CG, IV: 431.
76. Gale, CG, IV: 387-400 (title is Of Gods prime Causalitie, Efficiency, and Concurse in general)
78. Gale, CG, IV: 388, 431,
79. Gale, CG, IV: 432. In *Timaeus* (28 a3), Plato maintains that generation and destruction of all things are connected in the realm of Becoming or participate Being. See Plato, *Complete Works*, 1,234 (Timaeus, 28 a3).
80. Gale, CG, IV: 431-432.
only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created, which requires an infinite active power in the Agent.... Active creation is the Act of the Divine Wil, as the effective principle of althings.... The Human Wil doth not want any other executive power to execute its commands, unlesses it be in such things as it cannot by itself reach: but the Divine Omnipotent Wil reacheth althings: therefore it can execute its own commands, without the mediation of any executive power.\textsuperscript{81}

In this sense, God's creative-active act in creation is executed not only by the Divine omnipotent Will but also by omnipresent Will throughout all creations. For Gale, God's active action for creation is "not a successive but a momentaneous Action: but al the productions of second causes, as they are inferior to, and instruments of the first cause, are successive motions."\textsuperscript{82} At this point, although the contents with regard to the second causes for successive creation are implied throughout the \textit{Phaedo} (96a-97),\textsuperscript{83} Gale does not immediately draw them out—at least in the section of creation in the fourth volume of \textit{CG} (but, it exists in the section of providence\textsuperscript{84}); instead, he focuses more on God's efficient cause in order to highlight it, stressing God's active act for creation. This tendency exactly shows how to work an eclectic Platonism in Gale's discourse of creation; in other words, using it enthusiastically for necessary notions (for example, the efficient cause of νοῦς') and discarding it for a while for undermining notions to Gale's core argument (for example, secondary causality).

As the last step, the argument of "God's efficient cause" in creation is confirmed in light of the Scriptures or Church Fathers. For instance, Gale equates God's efficient cause in creating the world with God's verbal act in Genesis 1:3, stating that "Gen. 1. 3, \textit{God said, Let there be light},...can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil" as the first cause.\textsuperscript{85} Heb. 11:3 and Pet. 3:5 also are passages Gale introduces to support the notion of God's active act from the Scriptures.\textsuperscript{86} Furthermore, as a backup argument, Gale appeals to the authority of Christian tradition—for example, primarily Augustine's commentary of the Psalm and John of Damascus' \textit{An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith}—especially for supporting and building the relationship between God's Divine Will

\textsuperscript{81} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 432, 434.
\textsuperscript{82} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV: 432.
\textsuperscript{83} Plato maintains that not only human acts but also other natural circumstances shown in nature are working as the causes in relation to the first prime cause. See Plato, \textit{Complete Works}, 83-84 (\textit{Phaedo}, 96a-97).
\textsuperscript{84} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV: 456-457.
\textsuperscript{85} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV: 433.
\textsuperscript{86} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV: 434.
and the efficient cause in creation. In this regard, as examined in Section II, Gale tries to compromise between an eclectic Platonism and the Scriptures or Christian tradition in his discourse of creation for articulating or proving his thought. Yet, in terms of ultimately using Platonic notions eclectically for the last step—that is, for establishing the scriptural or traditional reconfirmation of the argument, Gale's compromised tendency still maintains the prominent position that theology holds over philosophy.

Gale’s pattern of three developing steps, however, does not always exist, as seen in the case of “God’s efficient cause;” rather, when dealing with the particular subject, the first step does not appear at all, only the second and third step appear—especially when dealing with an issue such as “ex nihilo.” Not only that, Gale does not refer to the important Platonic notion “Demiurge” at all in both discourses on Creation and Providence in CG. Perhaps, the answer regarding the question of why Gale does not use Platonic notions presented in Timaeus—for example, the Demiurge and its works—at all when he deals with creation, is simple: they definitely run counter to the Biblical concepts of creation. For example, as demonstrated in the Timaeus 30a, the Demiurge does not create out of nothing; he imposes order on chaos, as much as possible. Also, in order to achieve his aim, the Demiurge puts to use the so-called “auxiliary causes” (συναίτια)—for example, solidification and liquefaction with the four elements (soil, water, air, and fire). However, Gale takes a completely opposite stand against these Platonic notions, arguing that

> for the first independent Cause being a pure simple act, must necessarily precede al mater, and thence be the cause thereof: that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the reft; whence it follows, that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing.

For Gale, the nature of God’s creation is not co-operative with auxiliary preexistent matters, as Platonism holds, but is an independent and authoritative act that happens ex nihilo. Not only that, contrary to Platonic notion that the Demiurge as “imitator” frames the world by imitating Idea for achieving perfection and

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88. Plato, Complete Works, 1,236 (Timaeus, 30 a2-6). For the difference between the Demiurge’s work and the biblical God’s work of creation, see Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, 27-28; Hackforth, “Plato’s Theism,” 439-447.
89. Plato, Complete Works, 1,249 (Timaeus, 46 c7-e6).
90. Gale, CG, IV, 433 (emphasis added).
goodness of the world,\textsuperscript{91} Gale’s God is “creator” in terms that “the world was framed by the Word of God.”\textsuperscript{92} For Gale, the Word of God presented in Genesis 1 is the “efficacious efficience of his Divine Will in the production of all things.”\textsuperscript{93} In this regard, a possible power to create out of nothing and the Divine efficient Will as the first cause converge on the power of the “Word of God” as an acting power of creation, not as that of imitation.\textsuperscript{94} This idea is unquestionably incompatible with Plato. Thus, since Gale does not mention any Platonic ideas, at least in relation to “\textit{ex nihilo},” his pattern of three developing steps does not retain its structure as well. In other words, Gale strategically tends to choose or abandon Platonic notions in the eclectic manner only by recognition of whether or not they are compatible with the Scriptures or Christian tradition.\textsuperscript{95} At this point, Gale’s general principles—eclecticism and the order of priority between theology and philosophy—still work as well throughout the discourse on creation.

### 3.2. Reformed-Platonic Narrative of “Providence”

Gale offers a great deal more space to the discourse on providence than to the discourse on creation in the fourth volume and the second book of \textit{CG}. Gale’s pattern of three developing steps still exists, but more clearly than it did in the argument on creation. Specifically, in comparison to creation, the discourse on providence is more receptive to Platonic notions as providing steps into this topic—even sometimes without carefully considering the distinct difference between Platonic and Christian terms.\textsuperscript{96} For example, as the first step, Gale largely borrows from Plato’s book X of \textit{Laws} and \textit{Philebus} in order to expound the extent and nature of providence.\textsuperscript{97} Yet, Gale not only uses Platonic notions (for example, νοῦς, ψυχή, δημιουργός, or even Ζεύς as Ζήνα and Δία) mixed with “God,” but also frequently regards them as possessing the same meaning as “God.” In this regard, according to Gale, divine providence in general is

that efficience of God, whereby he conserves and governs allthings, according to the eternal most wise counsel of his own Wil. Providence is the Wil of God, whereby allthings receive their most exact Order and Regiment.... Providence is said to be the \textit{Reason of Order}, whereby all means are surely

\textsuperscript{91} Plato, \textit{Complete Works}, 1,199-1,223 (\textit{Republic} Bk. X).
\textsuperscript{92} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 434.
\textsuperscript{93} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 433.
\textsuperscript{94} Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 433-434.
\textsuperscript{95} Cf. Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 437.
\textsuperscript{96} Especially, see Gale, \textit{CG}, IV, 437-438, 441, 447, 449.
\textsuperscript{97} Cf. Plato, \textit{Complete Works}, 1556-1558 (\textit{Laws} X 900-901); 415-417 (\textit{Philebus} 27e-29).
disposed towards their end. 98

As Gale clarifies, this definition of providence as the “reason of order” stems from the idea of *Philebus* 28c, namely, “all the wise are agreed, in true self-exaltation, that reason [νοῦς] is our king, both over heaven and earth. And perhaps they are justified.” 99 Gale further notes that “the Divine Mind [νοῦς] that disposeth and directeth all things according to their orders, and is the cause of all things.” 100 In this instance, for Gale, νοῦς as “ Providential Intelligence and Wisdome” is identical with God. 101 Not only that, Gale’s discussion—God’s providence “even about the smallest things greatly conduceth to the good of the whole” 102—starts from *Laws* X, stating that “no gods [θεῶν] neglect anything because of sloth and laziness, because no gods, presumably, suffer from cowardice... [T]heir [that is, θεῶν] special job—an expression of their perfect virtue—is to watch over the universe.” 103 At this point, even though Plato uses “θεῶν” as the subject, Gale uses “God”—specifically, Gale substitutes the singular noun (God) for the plural (θεῶν). In addition, quoted from *Timaeus* 28-29, Gale states that “God [but, in *Timaeus*, referring to δημιουργός] 104] in the framing the World had his eye on the eternal Law or Exemplar.” 105 Furthermore, Gale replaces Ζεῦς as universal Spirit with God, maintaining that God as universal Spirit [but, in *Cratylus*, referring to Ζεῦς] 106 animates or vivifies the world as His providential influence and concurrence. 107 After all the analysis, it can be revealed that all Platonic notions (for example, νοῦς, ψυχή, δημιουργός, Ζεῦς, etc.) simplify and then converge on the one name “God” throughout the whole of Gale’s discourse on providence. In other words, while Gale uses Platonic ideas as the foothold for developing his argument, he actively borrows them, even replacing certain notions, in order to fit them into his argument. In this sense, to some extent Gale’s eclectic Platonism in the discourse on providence—even though Gale is on the alert for “New Platonicks”—bears some analogy with the Neoplatonic tendency that Plotinian δημιουργός or νοῦς turns into the “First Principle,” namely, “the Creator.”

As the second step, Gale proceeds with his argument based on these active usages of Platonic ideas. According to Gale, God’s
providence “is not merely speculative, but practic and active: for all Laws properly and primarily tend to action.” 108 In this sense, providence is “not merely permissive, but energetic and efficacious.” 109 Related to this, Divine providence for Gale is closely aligned with the act of the Divine Will, arguing that “the Providence of God primarily regardes the Will of God: for all the Divine Reasons, Ideas, Decrees, and the eternal Law of Providence must be resolved into the Divine Will, which is the sole measure of Gods Operations towards his Creatures.” 110 Thus, if one denies God’s providence based on the act of the Divine Will, he or she will be “both nefarious or blasphemous and erroneous.” 111 Focusing on the Divine providential Will, Gale tries to compact the nature of providence into five points:

(1) Indeed the whole of Divine Efficience procedes immediately from the Divine Will.... (2) That Providence belongs to the Divine Will is manifest from its very nature, which consists in a wise ordering allthings for its last end.... (3) It belongs to the intrinsic Reason of Divine Providence, as Divine, not only to intend and order all means towards its last end, but also infallibly to attain its last end: which implies an absolute, efficacious, omnipotent Will.... (4) That Providence belongs to the Will of God is evident from the formal parts thereof, Conservation and Gubernation, which are Acts of the Divine Will. (5) The Mode of Divine Providence is expressed by the Word of God. 112

In this regard, God’s providence, which is grounded on the Divine Will, implies an absolute and efficacious power to be conserved and governed properly over all creations. Not only that, God’s providence for Gale is deeply based upon the eternal Law. Gale notes:

The eternal Law is Queen of allthings both mortal and immortal. This eternal Law, as it regardes Providence, is nothing else but that order, method, purpose or counsel, which the most wise God hath from al eternitie determined with himself in his Divine Decrees, as the rule of his Gubernation and Disposition of allthings for his own Glorie. 113

Since the Divine providence is grounded on the eternal law and

108. Gale, CG, IV, 442.
109. Gale, CG, IV, 455.
110. Gale, CG, IV, 443.
112. Gale, CG, IV, 443-444.
113. Gale, CG, IV, 443.
God as the prime cause is the founder of the eternal law,114 “no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence, but in Virtue received from, and subordination to God the prime Cause, is most evident.”115 However, according to Gale, it does not mean that the order of providence is “fixed by Fate” without considering any freedom of the second cause as the Stoics hold; rather, “Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreeable to the exisence and condition of the second causes of subjects it workes upon. The Neccessitie and Immobilites, that attends the Providence of God, doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes, but confirme the same.”116 In this regard, Gale—in a similar vein with the Augustinian tradition—believes that men “act freely, because the Providence of God determines them so to act according to their Natures.”117 Thus, Gale concludes: “Divine providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible.”118 With regard to the extent of the Divine providence, Gale starts with the idea that God is “the prime mover in al motions, and therefore present with al: the application of Actives unto Passives is by him.”119 Borrowed from Laws X,120 Gale emphasizes that God’s providence extends to all things, arguing that it not only “extends itself universally to al and singular Beings, Actions, Substances, Accidents, Models, etc.,”121 but also “reacheth al natural, preternatural, supernatural and moral actions and events.”122 All things considered, the nature of Gale’s argument of providence primarily consists of advocating and expounding on the Divine Will, the relationship between the providential first and second cause, and its scope, based upon Platonic ideas and arguments.

As seen in the discourse on creation, Gale’s ultimate concern is to confirm his entire argument in the discourse on providence to the authority of the Scriptures and Christian tradition as well. Although Gale substantially quotes and uses Platonic terms without proper

115. Gale, CG, IV, 450.
117. Gale, CG, IV, 457. Gale's argument is very similar to Augustine's. In the context to the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom, Augustine notes that "although God foreknows our future wills, it does not follow from this that we do not will something by our will.... [Because] although God has foreknowledge of everything, we do will what we will.... [Thus] it is going to be our will and our power, since He has foreknowledge of our will. Nor could it be our will if it were not in our power. Therefore, He has foreknowledge of our power. Hence power is not taken away from me due to His foreknowledge—it is thus mine all the more certainly, since He whose foreknowledge does not err foreknew that it would be mine." See Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, 3.3.7-3.3.8 (emphasis in the original).
118. Gale, CG, IV, 459.
120. Especially, see Plato, Complete Works, 1559 (Laws X 902).
121. Gale, CG, IV, 454.
122. Gale, CG, IV, 455.
care, the result is that to some extent Gale offers a nuanced understanding of δημιουργὸς or ψυχή as designations for God, but his ultimate conclusion regarding providence does not aim at a Platonic but a biblical conclusion. Quoting from Deut. 8:3, Gale notes that “we may not understand any perceptive or revealed word, but the providential Word of God, or good pleasure, which provided means, either ordinary or extraordinary, for the sustenance of man.”

In other words, according to Gale, God’s providence remains “by every word that procedeth out of the mouth of God” as presented in Mat. 4:4, Ps. 107:20, 147:15, Pet. 3:5-7 and Gen. 1:3. Thus, “Decrees and Acts of the Divine providential Wil [are] expressed by the Word of God.” Not only that, after quoting briefly from Laws X and Timaeus 28 regarding eternal Law, Gale substantially appeals to Augustine’s discourse of eternal law in the Biblical sense. Furthermore, Gale does not conclude the issue of providence’s scope with Laws X, but instead with Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles. He also concludes the issue of the divine Will and wisdom in providence with Damascus’ argument. In this regard, the previous argument, followed by Platonic notions, is re-illuminated and reconfirmed by the Scriptural truth and Christian tradition.

With regard to Platonic notion of ψυχή, Gale not only draws its role from the concept of the Trinity, but also labels it as the Holy Spirit, in contrast to Platonic idea. For instance, the Spirit of God ascribed to God in “Sacred and Platonic Philosophie” must be understood in the concept of “Distinction, Relation, and Order between the three Persons in the Trinitie.” Also, according to Gale, Platonic ψυχή “must be understood of the Spirit of God [that is, the Holy Spirit].” By ψυχή as the Holy Spirit, “the whole Providential Efficience and Concurrence at Creatures are conserved, sustained, actuated, propagated, animated, fomented, disposed, and governed to

123. Gale, CG, IV, 444.  
124. Gale, CG, IV, 444.  
125. Gale, CG, IV, 445.  
126. Gale, CG, IV, 441-443.  
127. Gale notes that “in contra Gent. 1. 3. c. 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, he [Aquinas] proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways: (1) By giving virtue to act. (2) By continued conservation of that virtue. (3) By moving the Agent to act, and applying the virtue to the action. (4) As he is the principal Agent in every Act, and al other Agents but Instruments. (5) As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents.” See Gale, CG, IV, 454, 458.  
128. Gale states that “in thod. Fid. 1. 2. c. 29, he [Damascus] addes: Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature, or Essentially: As therefore he is good, he provides: for he that provides not, [for such as are under his care] is not good: but as he is wise, he takes care to provide the best things. Therefore, it becomes us, attending to these things, to admire al, to praise al, to receive, without curious inquisition, al the works of Providence, albeit, they may seem to many injust; because incognite, and incomprehensible, as in what follows.” See Gale, CG, IV, 458.  
129. Gale, CG, IV, 445.  
130. Gale, CG, IV, 449.
their proper ends and usages.”  

Not only that, but the Holy Spirit as ψυχή is involved in “continued creation” as a kind of conservation, arguing that “the Spirit of God is not more distant and remote in the conservation, than he was in the first causation of things: God is more intimate to everything, than the most intimate part of its own Essence is.” Gale further notes—although he does not mention Aquinas, but in a similar sense with him—that “[c]reation gives Being and Existence unto things, Conservation, Continuance in Being.” In addition, Gale’s ψυχή is different than the Platonic ψυχή; for the former is personal, but the latter is not. In other words, whereas Gale’s ψυχή is actively concerned with the details of the creatures’ lives (for example, their farming) and therefore, superintends rain, snow, and even the movement of clouds for this, Platonic ψυχή—even though there are much debates of the role of Platonic ψυχή in the modern scholarship—does admittedly less actively participates in the universe than Gale’s idea of ψυχή. The latter merely in which merely watches over the universe. In this regard, Gale not only uses Platonic notions eclectically, but also reproduces and recolors them in light of theology and Biblical truth.

As seen so far, even though Gale follows the pattern of proceeding along three steps in both the discourse on creation and the discourse on providence, the center of gravity fundamentally fixes on the third step—that is, the process of reconfirmation in light of the Scriptures and tradition. Expressed differently, it can be said that the reason the first step (Platonic idea) and second step (Gale’s argument) exist is ultimately for elaborating and confirming the third step (Scriptural re-illumination). Therefore, as Gale notes in the fourth volume of CG’s Preface, this notion is exactly how Gale wants to fulfill the way of “Reformation of Philosophie” for the “Reformation of Theology.”

4. Conclusion

Cassirer’s judgment that the revived Platonism of seventeenth-

131. Gale, CG, IV, 447.
132. Gale, CG, IV, 462.
133. Gale, CG, IV, 464.
136. There is much scholarly debate on the role and meaning of the Platonic idea of ψυχή. For example, there are different interpretations about the degree of participating of the cosmic ψυχή into the world. For a detailed discussion for this, see Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 79-104; D’Ancona, “The Timaeus’ Model for Creation and Providence, 211-217; Samuelson, “The Foundations For the Jewish View of Creation,” 167-198; Hackforth, “Plato’s Theism,” 439-447.
137. Plato, Complete Works, 1552-1558 (Laws X 896-900).
century England was incompatible with Puritan Calvinism is not altogether valid in light of this study. Rather, as viewed from Gale’s discourse on creation and providence, this Puritan author not only used Platonism eclectically, while adhering solidly to the principle that theology (including the Scriptures and Christian tradition) is superior to philosophy from a Calvinistic perspective. For Gale, these principles—eclectic Platonism and the order of priority between theology and philosophy—are core constituents, which achieve Gale’s final goal, the “Reformation of Philosophie.” In doing this, Gale follows his unique pattern which consists of three developing steps, namely: (1) starting the argument eclectically from Platonic notions; (2) elaborating the argument based on Platonic ideas presented previously; and (3) re-illuminating and reconfirming the argument in light of the Scriptures and Christian tradition. This pattern is not always present, for it sometimes collapses if a certain Platonic notion is not compatible with the biblical truth (for example, ex nihilo); it also, for the most part, works with the two principles—eclectic Platonism and the order of priority—throughout the discourse on creation and providence. As an example the Platonic notions of prime efficient causality, νοῦς, ψυχή, and δημιουργός function as a first step for developing Gale’s arguments—not only about the nature of creation and providence but also about its providential causality and scope, which is keeping with the second step of Gale’s eclectic method. Then, Platonic elements are reconfirmed, being re-illuminated in both Scripture and tradition—not only in light of the Scriptures but also following Augustine, Aquinas, Damascus, etc. Yet, the fundamental nature of this pattern is dependent upon the third step (the process of the scriptural reconfirmation) and therefore, on this point, Gale’s philosophy certainly deserves to be called “Reformed Philosophie,” as Gale titles the fourth volume of the Court of the Gentiles. Expressed differently, in terms not only of holding the core Calvinistic notion—specifically, acknowledging the highest authority of the Scriptures—and following Christian tradition but of eclectically employing Platonism, there is good reason to call Gale’s philosophy “Calvinistic or Reformed Platonism” as well.

Gale’s “Reformed philosophy” or “Calvinistic Platonism” presented in the discourse on creation and providence is not an “unsuccessful attempt” as Malusa believes; rather, it is a unique philosophical method that brings balance to the extremes of radical Calvinism and the moderate rationalism represented by the Cambridge Platonists. In terms of walking his own way with a balanced mind—even though he lived in the chaotic intellectual-theological circumstances of his day filled with “New Philosophy” such as Hobbesianism and Cartesianism—Gale’s philosophy has a well-deserved reputation for being called “Reformed Philosophie” as well.