TOWARD THE **PACTUM SALUTIS:**
LOCATING THE ORIGINS OF A CONCEPT*

by Richard A. Muller

I. The Dogmatic Trajectory: Unanswered Questions

The theological term *pactum salutis* and the name of Johannes Cocceius, that most eminent of “federal theologians,” are forever profoundly associated. This association is so profound that at least one modern writer, Wilhelm Gass, believed that Cocceius had invented the concept.¹

In the wake of Gass’ overstatement of the case, a fair amount of scholarship has been devoted to finding the first instance of the doctrine: Heinrich Heppe and Gottlob Schrenk argued that the doctrine was fully present in Olevianus’ *De substantia foederis* (1585), and Schrenk discussed its presence in the covenantal theology of Cloppenburg, just prior to the time of Cocceius.² As Van Asselt points out, Cocceius himself identified Cloppenburg as a major influence on his thought.³

More recently, Lyle Bierma discussed the roots of the doctrine in Olevianus’ thought with more precision than either Heppe or Schrenk.⁴ I have commented on the parallels between the *pactum salutis* and formulæ in Perkins, Polanus, and various other early orthodox writers,⁵ and Bert Loonstra has offered a charting of possible antecedents of the pactum between the time of Olevianus and Cocceius, albeit tending to see

---

* An earlier version of this essay was delivered at Johannes Cocceius 400th Anniversary Symposium, Utrecht University, June 4, 2003.

the language of Beza, Perkins, Polanus, and others of their time as an alternative to the *pactum salutis* rather than as an adumbration of it.⁶ Loonstra’s chief historical concern is to identify the beginnings of the fully covenantal formulation of the *pactum* in four thinkers—namely Cloppenburg, Johannes Cocceius, Edward Fisher, and David Dickson—between 1642 and 1648.⁷

There are, potentially, still earlier antecedents of the *pactum salutis*: hints of the concept may be discerned in Luther.⁸ Andrew Woolsey has identified language of a covenant between the Father and the Son in the early sixteenth-century exegetical work of Johannes Oecolampadius.⁹ G. D. Henderson has sought a version of the concept in the work of Gulielmus Budaeus.¹⁰ Paul Helm has argued antecedents of the doctrine in the thought of Calvin,¹¹ and Richard Greaves noted its presence by implication in the marginal note of the Geneva Bible to Hebrews 9:15.¹² There are also a host of early seventeenth-century adumbrations and formulations, albeit without use of either of the technical terms, *pactum salutis* or *foedus redemptionis*: we will be able to note the concept in the thought of Jacob Arminius (1603), Paul Bayne (1618), William Ames (1623), Edward Reynolds (1632), and Thomas Hooker (1638), among others.

Of course, some of this trajectory of dogmatic development toward the notion of the *pactum salutis* was already known in the seventeenth century, as is evident from the *De oeconomia foederum* (1677) of Herman Witsius.¹³ Witsius noted that, although the *pactum salutis* was not found among the Reformers and their immediate successors, it had been argued closer to his time by a series of eminent writers. First in his list, somewhat surprisingly, is Arminius. Witsius finds Arminius’ comments, from his doctoral oration of July 1603, on the relationship between the Father and the Son to be most suitable—a verdict justified in Witsius’ view by their previous commendation by “the very accurate Amesius.”¹⁴

---

Witsius adds, in further justification of the doctrine, that Ames himself had mentioned it, albeit obliquely, in refuting later Remonstrant theologians: a particular distinction made by them “denies that the covenant entered into by Christ, (He shall see his seed ... and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand), had been ratified.”

Witsius notes that Gomarus had referenced the doctrine in his exegesis of the baptism of Christ, referring to Christ's baptism as “the sign and seal of the covenant between God and Christ; namely, that God would be his God ... [and] he himself was bound to perform obedience.”

Witsius also recognized Cloppenburg, Voetius, Essenius, and Owen as major formulators of the doctrine in the generation immediately before his. He omits Cocceius from the list, presumably because of his reserved polemic against this “celebrated” thinker. Witsius does not appear to have known of the presence of the concept in Oecolampadius or to have registered the fairly clear antecedent formulation of an eternal pactum of Christ with the Father found in the thought of Olevianus. He does not reference Ames' Medulla, nor did he know of the formulations offered by British writers slightly in advance of Cocceius: the doctrine is found in Goodwin, Fisher, Bulkeley, Owen, and Dickson, and by implication in Bayne.

---

15. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, II.ii.16, citing Ames, Anti-Synodalibus, de morte Christi, i.5 and Isa. 53:10.


18. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, II.ii.16; cf. the formulations in Johannes Cocceius, Summa doctrina de foedere et testamento Dei (1648); also in idem, Opera omnia theologica, exegetica, didactica, polemica, philologica, 12 vols. (Amsterdam, 1701-1706), VII, 39-130.

19. Cf. Caspar Olevianus, De substantia foederis gratiuti inter Deum et electos itemque de mediis, quibus ea ipsa substantia nobis communicatur, libri duo (Geneva, 1585), 23, 63, 106, etc., with the extensive analysis in Bierma, German Calvinism, 107-112.

20. But note, William Ames, Medulla S.S. theologicae (Amsterdam, 1623; London, 1630), I.x.xi.4-9; xxv.2-3.


22. Edward Fisher, The Marrow of Modern Divinity: touching both the covenant of works, and the covenant of grace, with their use and end, both in the time of the Old Testament, and in the time of the New. (London, 1645), 35-38. Loonstra cites the Marrow from the 1853 edition annotated by Thomas Boston, valuable for its testimony to the later use and interpretation of the document, but not at all suitable as a guide to the original, given that Boston's text deviates greatly from Fisher's 1645 edition.

23. Peter Bulkeley, The Gospel-Covenant, or, The Covenant of Grace opened ... preached in Concord in New-England (London: Matthew Simmons, 1646), 28-31; ibid, second edition, much enlarged (London: Matthew Simmons, 1651), 1.iv (pp. 31-36); John Owen, Salus electo-
mid-America Journal of Theology

Neither does Witsius mention the later expositions of British writers like Burgess, Rutherford, Blake, Bunyan, Gillespie, and Durham. What is perhaps most remarkable about this chronological presentation of the early dogmatic history of the pactum salutis is the lack of opposition to what, at least on Witsius' testimony, was a relatively new idea with a rather shaky pedigree—an idea, moreover, that did not easily find clear dogmatic precedent, in Witsius' view, prior to Arminius. This lack of opposition in an era of orthodoxy and fairly strict confessionalism raises the question of whether the concept might have had other precedents: the seemingly sudden appearance of the doctrine as a virtual truism within the space of four years itself raises questions. Worlds may arise ex nihilo, doctrinal formulae probably do not. More precisely, these observations raise the question of whether there were elements of Reformed exegesis and doctrinal discussion that laid a groundwork or provided a backdrop to the formulation of the pactum salutis, prior to the first use of the term—and even prior to the dogmatic construction that led to the


24. Paul Bayne, A Commentarie upon the First Chapter of the Epistle of Saint Paul, written to the Ephesians. Wherein, besides Text fruitfully explained: some principall Controversies about Predestination are handled, and divers Arguments of Arminius are examined (London: Thomas Snodham, 1618), Eph. 1:4, in loc. (p. 66); idem, A Commentarie upon the First and Second Chapters of S. Paul to the Colossians. Wherein the text is cleerely opened, Observations thence perspicuously deducted, Uses and Applications succinctly and briefly inserted (London: Richard Badger, 1635), Col. 1:2, 3, 14, 16 in loc. (pp. 8, 10-11, 72, 84-84).

25. Edward Reynolds, An Explication of the Hundreth and Tenth Psalme: wherein the severall Heads of Christian Religion therein contained, touching the Exaltation of Christ, the Scepter of his Kingdome, the Character of his Subjects, His Priesthood, Victories, Sufferings, and Resurrection, are largely explained and applied (London: Felix Kyngston, 1632), 5.


toward the **pactum salutis**

15...term, a groundwork or backdrop conducive to the nearly immediate and very easy acceptance of the doctrine. I propose to divide what follows into four parts, followed by a brief summation: first, a review of definitions in Dickson, Bulkeley, Cocceius, and Witsius with a view to identifying underlying issues and noting the shared exegetical assumptions; second, an examination of the history of exegesis of select Old and New Testament texts used by these four formulators of the doctrine together with a discussion of several of the argumentative collations of key biblical texts used in the formulation of the doctrine; third, a comment on a set of earlier doctrinal formulations that, given the underlying issues identified in the first section of the essay, offer significant precedent for the **pactum**; and fourth, some indication of how these various lines of argument begin to converge around the time of the early dogmatic formulations of the **pactum salutis**.

II. Definitions, Issues, and the Identification of an Exegetical Foundation

The use of the **pactum salutis** or covenant of redemption as a doctrinal argument for the **ad intra** trinitarian grounding of the **ad extra** work of salvation as it terminates on individual persons of the Trinity is particularly apparent in the theologies of David Dickson, Peter Bulkeley, Johannes Cocceius, and Herman Witsius. In the structure of each of these theologies, the **pactum salutis** stands as the first statement concerning salvation over against the failure of man under the covenant of works. It manifests God’s redemptive plan as eternal and as something far more than a reaction to the problem of sin. For all that this doctrine of eternal covenying between Father and Son appears as the most speculative element in the covenant theology, it represents that most basic of issues in the Reformed system—the eternal, divine, and consistently gracious ground of the plan of salvation, the resolution of the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, undertaken redemptively and by grace alone from the divine side.

In this portion of the essay, I propose to examine the relatively early **pactum salutis** formulations of Dickson, Bulkeley, and Cloppenburg and then the later formulations of Cocceius and Witsius, with a view to noting two concerns. First—on the assumption that there are probably reflections to be found in all five writers of a point prior to the establishment of the technical term for the doctrine—I will examine the basic issues at stake for each of the authors in their definitions. Second—on the assumption that the “proofs” cited in doctrinal statements usually have an exegetical pre-history leading to the doctrinal formulation—I will ex-

---

amine the biblical texts cited by these writers as crucial to the doctrine. Both of these assumptions reflect explicitly enunciated patterns of formulation in the era of the Reformation and Protestant orthodoxy: the writers of the era consistently produce doctrinal *disputationes* and *loci* in response to adversaries and as a result of the topical implications of their exegetical efforts.

1. **The covenant of redemption in the formulations of Dickson, Bulkeley, and Cloppenburg**

Basic formulations of the covenant of redemption or *foedus redemptionis* offered by David Dickson date from ca. 1638 onward, namely, from his speech before the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland on the problem of Arminianism (1638), the commentary on 2 Timothy 1:9 found in his Latin commentary on all the Pauline epistles (1645), the *Summe of Saving Knowledge* (1648) probably written by Dickson and James Durham,29 his commentary on Matthew (1647),30 his commentary on the Psalter (1655), and his *Therapeutica sacra* (1656).31 There is also a brief reference to the doctrine, without the use of the term, in Dickson’s 1635 commentary on Hebrews and in his sermons of the same year.32 Dickson’s speech before the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1638, makes explicit use of the eternal covenant of redemption for the refutation of Arminian teaching—with no indication at all that Dickson viewed the doctrine as a new concept. In fact, Dickson presented the doctrine as a standard point in theology, foundational to a right understanding of the Reformed view.33 There has been speculation concerning the progress of Dickson’s thought, with various writers arguing a date of 1637 for a manuscript of Dickson’s *Therapeutica sacra* in which the doctrine of a covenant of redemption first occurs. This contention appears to be based on two letters of Rutherford to Dickson: in the first of the letters, Rutherford wrote to Dickson “I shall go through yours on the covenant at leisure, and write to you my mind thereanent; and anent the Arminian contract betwixt the Father and the Son.”34 In the second

32. David Dickson, *A Short Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Aberdeen: Edward Raban, 1635; Dublin: Society of Stationers, 1637), Heb. 7:22, in loc.; cf. David Dickson, *Select Practical Writings of David Dickson* (Edinburgh, 1845), which contains sermons from 1635 previously only in manuscript.
34. Rutherford to Dickson, 7 March 1637, in *Letters of Samuel Rutherford*, with a sketch of his life and biographical notices of his correspondents by the Rev. Andrew A. Bonar, 5th
of the letters, Rutherford simply comments, “I have gone through yours upon the covenant.” This latter statement is annotated in Bonar’s edition as a reference to *Therapeutica sacra*. But the letter itself does not supply this identification and the reference might simply be to a letter of Dickson on the subject of covenant or, perhaps, to a draft of his speech before the General Assembly; of interest in relation to this latter possibility is Rutherford’s identification of the doctrine of a covenant between the Father and the Son as an “Arminian contract,” a point that does correspond with Dickson’s concerns in his speech.

That speech of 1638 before the General Assembly, is, perhaps, the earliest overt definition of the “covenant of redemption” formally so-called. Perhaps most significantly in this formulation, the general rootage and rationale of the doctrine is clear—and the datum we have gleaned already from Witsius, that Arminius stands as an early formulator, may be implied as well. For Dickson understood the covenant of redemption as crucial to the refutation of the Arminians. In fact, he comments, in introducing the concept, that the Arminians’ main error is this (let me speak it with reverence towards your learning)—not knowing the Scriptures, and the power of God in the matter of the Covenant of redemption betwixt God and Christ; yet there is enough of it in the Scripture. They pointed at it themselves, which, if they should have followed, they might seize all their matter in the midst; for the Covenant of Salvation betwixt God and man is one thing, and the Covenant of Redemption betwixt God and Christ is another thing.

In Dickson’s view, moreover, a central point in the right understanding of this eternal covenant relates directly to election and assurance: in it, “the Mediator was made sure of success before he had put hand to the making of the world; and all the elect were given to him and their salvation put in his hand, with all power in heaven and earth given to him to bring it to passe.”

Contrary to Loonstra’s reading, from the very beginning of its doctrinal formulation, the covenant of redemption was concerned with a complex of doctrinal issues—trinity, christology, covenant, and predestination—and aimed at the resolution of debate concerning the eternal decree and the covenant of grace that had been debated in the last decade of the sixteenth and the first decade of the seventeenth century. In other words, the formulation was in no way a kind of covenantal alterna-

---


tive to the doctrine of the decrees.\(^{38}\) Indeed, for there to have been a covenantal alternative to predestinarianism, there would have had to have been a less-predestinarian or non-predestinarian trajectory of Reformed thought focused on the concept of covenant to generate such a view; and it is clear that there was no such trajectory.\(^ {39}\) Rather there was, prior to Dickson, a rather variegated Reformed tradition in which formulations of covenantal and predestinarian language, as well as of the language of other significant doctrinal loci, were presented together in the thought of a fairly large number of writers, all of whom were situated within the fairly broad boundaries provided by the national confessions of the mid-sixteenth century.

Not only did Dickson’s General Assembly speech of 1638 pose the covenant of redemption, rightly understood, against Arminianism, it is also apparent from other covenant treatments of the era, notably that of John Ball, that part of the continuing Reformed response to Arminian views on election and related issues took the form of an exposition of the covenant of grace.\(^ {40}\) These broad doctrinal concerns carry over into the definition offered by Dickson in 1648 in his *Summe of Saving Knowledge*:

The sum of the Covenant of Redemption is this, God having freely chosen unto life a certain number of lost mankind, for the glory of his rich Grace did give them before the world began, unto God the Son appointed Redeemer, that upon condition he would humble himself so far as to assume the humane nature of a soul and body, unto personal union with his Divine Nature, and submit himself to the Law as a surety for them, and satisfie Justice for them, by giving obedience in their name, even unto the suffering of the cursed death of the Cross, he should ransom and redeem them all from sin and death, and purchase unto them righteousness and eternal life. ... This condition the Son of God (who is Jesus Christ our Lord) did accept before the world began.\(^ {41}\)

This relationship, moreover, between a right understanding of the covenant of redemption and the Reformed view of election carries over also into Dickson’s commentary on 2 Timothy 1:9, where we also find a Perkinsian statement of the designation of the second person of the Trinity as Mediator and a use of the past participle of *pactiscor* (*pactus est*) with reference to the covenanting act.\(^ {42}\) This is also a probable implica-

---

38. Contra Loonstra, *Verkiezing*, 68.
42. Dickson, *Expositio Analytica*, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc. (p. 547): “Christus tamen designatus Mediator, secunda persona Trinitatis, ab aeterno subsistebat, qui pro nobis in foedere redemptionis ante tempore secularia cum Patre inito, pro electis suis pactus est illud quod postea in tempore persolvit pretium redemptionis.”
toward the pactum salutis: Arminius' covenantal thinking pressed the Reformed to deal with the trinitarian ground of covenant in a manner conformable to the Reformed doctrine of the decrees.

Unfortunately, Dickson's speech did not detail precisely where in Scripture he found the covenant of redemption—nor, indeed, does Dickson offer biblical proofs in his lengthy definition in The Summe of Sacred Divinitie. This omission, however, is more than compensated in the clarity of the definitions offered in other of Dickson's writings and, most notably, in the detail of the Therapeutica sacra. The Therapeutica sacra also indicates Dickson's method for establishing the doctrine itself. Most of the texts cited there by Dickson do not reference an eternal covenant between the Father and the Son but, instead, argue the eternal character of all of God's counsels and the relation of the plan of redemption in Christ to the divine counsels. This means that the notion of an eternal covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son is established primarily by way of conclusions drawn from a collation of various texts that present the nature of the work of redemption.

There is, therefore, a series of texts and biblical teachings that Dickson identifies as directly pertinent to the formulation of the notion of a “covenant of redemption” or foedus redemptionis: Acts 20:28; 1 Corinthians 6:20; 1 Peter 1:18-21; and Matthew 26:28, texts in which God is identified as the “disponer” and Christ the “redeemer”; 1 Timothy 2:5-6; Job 19:24; Hebrews 7:22; Romans 5:11; 1 John 2:2; and Romans 3:25, where Christ is given covenantal titles or descriptors such as “Mediator,” “Surety of a better covenant,” and “propitiatory sacrifice”; Ephesians 1:1-15, specifically verses 7, 9, and 14, given its referencing of Christ in relation to God’s eternal counsel; similarly, Acts 15:18; Luke 22:22; and Psalm 2:7ff., where the Father declares his decree and bestows on the Son his inheritance; and the fact that Christ is to be understood as the type of the Levitical priesthood.43 Subsequently Dickson does draw on more Old Testament texts as a foundation for his doctrine, notably Isaiah 52:13-14; Isaiah 53:4-12; Isaiah 59:20-21; and Psalm 40:6.44

Peter Bulkeley's fairly lengthy formulation of the covenant of redemption not only comes from 1646, two years prior to the publication of Cocceius' Summa doctrina de foedere et testamento Dei, it also arose out of a set of sermons preached on the covenant in New England and sent to London for publication. Bulkeley's preface to his first edition carries the date of 3 December 1644—clearly earlier in origin than Cocceius' work, and if we look to full formulations of the doctrine using one or another of the technical terms, preceded only (as far as we know presently) by Dickson's account before the General Assembly.

Bulkeley's discussion of the debates of his own time also indicates to his readers that “there is a Treatise of the New Covenant published some years ago by a precious light in the Church of God, whose worke is

43. Dickson, Therapeutica sacra, I.iv.4 (1664; pp. 27-30); these texts are also loci for the covenant of redemption in Dickson's commentaries—as discussed below in the exegetical section of this essay.

44. Cf. Dickson, Therapeutica sacra, I.iv.47-51.
come almost into all mens hands” that provided a normative account of the doctrine. Its author, were he still alive, Bulkeley avers, would surely have responded to the present crisis—in his absence, Bulkeley will do his best to fill the need. This reference is useful in positioning Bulkeley’s efforts: the treatise of which he speaks so highly is probably John Preston’s massive effort of 1629 on The New Covenant, or the Saints Portion. Not only does the description match, it is also the case that Preston’s work offers covenant definitions with which Bulkeley agrees over against those of Bulkeley’s adversaries. Notable here is Bulkeley’s ex cursus, developed in his second edition, on the theme of the all-sufficiency or all-sufficient goodness of God in covenant, a theme that is the central argument of Preston’s treatise.

The source of Bulkeley’s doctrine of the eternal intratrinitarian covenant, however, is unclear: the doctrine is not present in Preston’s New Covenant, and Bulkeley’s brief definition implies that he is responding to the use of a concept of an eternal covenant between the Father and the Son by his adversaries:

It is granted (some will say) that there is a covenant by which God conveys salvation unto his people, but not such a covenant as hath been mentioned betwixt God and us, but only between God and Christ, and by vertue of that covenant betwixt God the Father, and the Son, we have life and salvation made good unto us.

Bulkeley notes that he can “willingly” grant that there is such an eternal covenant—and he devotes more than two pages to arguing its nature, indicating probably a positive as well as a negative antecedent for his views. The eternal covenant, however, does not rule out a covenant of grace “passing betwixt God and us.” To deny that there is a covenant between God and human beings not only violates the text of Scripture, it also undermines the sacraments, leads to the conclusion that “infideltie and unbeliefe is in us no sinne,” and tends to condone “licentiousesse.” Bulkeley therefore argues a three covenant model, consisting in the covenant of works, the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of grace—as opposed to a two covenant model consisting in the covenant of works and a covenant of grace in eternity to which human beings are not a party.

There are both similarities and differences between Bulkeley’s formulation and that of Dickson. Like Dickson, Bulkeley certainly viewed the notion of an eternal covenant between the Father and the Son as a basic point to be defined correctly in relation to eternal election, and he offers a

47. Bulkeley, Gospel Covenant (1651), III.iii-iv (pp. 194-206).
characteristically Reformed trinitarian reading of election, albeit there is no explicit mention at this point in the treatise of the Arminians. Bulkeley, however, does not supply a term for the doctrine—we find that in Dickson only. In addition, and more important to the formulation itself, Bulkeley identifies his immediate adversaries not as the Arminians but as covenant thinkers in his own New England context who have deviated from the definition found earlier in Preston and others. The problem, Bulkeley notes, has spread to “old England” as well. Whereas the doctrine of the covenant of grace had been rightly defined as an agreement made between God and human beings, with Abraham and his human descendants as partners with God, the more recent writers now opposed by Bulkeley had redefined the covenant of grace as between the Father and Christ. Bulkeley’s formulation of the covenant between the Father and the Son not only, therefore, removes the Arminian problem, it also identifies the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son in order to clarify the covenant relationship between God and human beings in the covenant of grace. This characteristic of Bulkeley’s work also indicates a parallel with Edward Fisher’s formulation in the Marrow, where the notion of a covenant between the Father and the Son, identical with the “eternal purpose” to send Christ, distinct from the covenant of grace between God and human beings, stands as orthodox doctrine over against an antinomian position.

Bulkeley also differs significantly with Dickson in his identification of biblical texts that teach the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son. As indicating “the designation or appointment of Christ the Son, to the office of Mediatorship,” he notes John 6:27; 1 Peter 1:18ff.; and Isaiah 42:1. There is also a commandment of the Father to the Son to engage in various aspects of the work of redemption—Isaiah 40:11; 42:6-7; John 10:18; 12:49. There are also texts indicating a promise of the Father to the Son: Isaiah 11:1-2; 40:10; 42:1, 4, 6; 45:1; 53:10; 55:5; Micah 4:2; John 5:22. On Christ’s part, moreover, there is an acceptance of the designated office: Psalm 40:7-8; Hebrews 5:4-5; 10:7. Christ also promises to trust in the Father for help in accomplishing his office, Isaiah 49:5; 50:7-9; Hebrews 2:13; and to submit to the Father’s will, Isaiah 50:5-6; John 10:17-18; 12:49-50; 17:4-6. Christ also has an expectation of glory conferred by the Father on himself and “his members”—John 17:5, 24.

Whereas Dickson’s citations were primarily from the New Testament, 51

51. Bulkeley, Gospel Covenant (1651), III.vii (p. 255); the Arminian problem is noted in ibid., III.x (p. 275).
52. Bulkeley, Gospel Covenant (1646), fol. A5 recto. The unnamed adversaries here are surely “antinomians”—Bulkeley is aware of the beginnings of debate in England, perhaps of the writings of Crisp, which had begun to appear in 1643 and in which the covenant is declared to be between God and Christ on behalf of the elect.
53. Bulkeley, Gospel-Covenant (1646), 29, 31. The debates in New England are gathered and annotated in David D. Hall, ed., The Antinomian Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968); there is, however, no such covenant definition in these documents.
54. Fisher, Marrow of Modern Divinity, 35-44.
with only one initial Old Testament reference (Psalm 2:7ff.), the balance has shifted in Bulkeley's reading to Old Testament texts, primarily drawn from Isaiah. Only in Dickson's extended argumentation are there references to Isaiah. Bulkeley's initial New Testament references, moreover, are not Pauline as were Dickson's, but heavily Johannine, with the only shared reference being 1 Peter 1:18. (In relating the eternal covenant to the temporal covenant of grace, Bulkeley does, later on, draw on Titus 1:2 and 2 Timothy 1:9.)

By comparison with Dickson's and Bulkeley's formulations, Cloppenburg's is very brief. It begins as a counter to a Remonstrant teaching concerning the possibility that Christ might have chosen not to suffer and that he might have sinned, which, in Cloppenburg's estimation, “utterly abolishes the eternal preordination of Christ to obedience,” taught in 1 Peter 1:20, inasmuch as the decree preordaining Christ's obedience was founded or established by Christ himself, as *homoousios* with the Father. If Christ is true, eternal, and omnipotent God, who eternally wills to assume the office of salvation, the will of his assumed nature could in no way deflect him from his task. So also does the Remonstrant position undermine the infallibility of the promises of all the prophets concerning the inheritance of blessing in Christ. How could Christ fail to accept the burden placed on him, inasmuch as it had been compacted beforehand by God with respect to Christ? And as for the notion that Christ might sin—how, Cloppenburg asks, could this argue the free choice of the sinless Christ, as if that would be achieved by nullifying the obedience agreed on between him and the Father from eternity? Cloppenburg shares the citation of 1 Peter 1:18ff. with Dickson and Bulkeley. He also cites Hebrews, but not the same verses as Dickson or Bulkeley; he offers no Old Testament citations as the others had; and he introduces Galatians 3:15-17, a text not used by either Dickson or Bulkeley.

Given the standard interpretive model of the era, namely that doctrines are to be found either in explicit biblical statements or in conclusions that can be drawn from a collation of thematically related biblical texts, these early definitions of the covenant of redemption indicate, on one hand, the assumption of a strong biblical foundation for the doctrine (by way of drawing conclusions from the collations), but on the other, little agreement about which texts ought to be used. The differences between Dickson's, Bulkeley's, and Cloppenburg's formulations indicate their independence from one another and also, perhaps, point toward significant earlier precedent for the doctrine, perhaps in traditions or trajectories of exegesis of particular texts.

---

57. Cloppenburg, *De foedere*, III.xv; the Remonstrant source is not identified.
2. The pactum salutis in the definitions of Cocceius and Witsius

For Cocceius, the stability of the covenant of grace derives from the fact that the covenant rests, not on the human fulfillment of an obligation but on a testament or inheritance—and the solidity of the testament, in turn, rests on an eternal pactum, not between God and fallen humanity but between God and the mediator. This pactum consists in the will of the Father to give the Son as the redemption of humanity and the will of the Son to procure this salvation.60 Witsius, similarly, indicates two foundational agreements in the establishment of salvation, the first and prior, “between the Father and the Son,” the second, dependent on the first, “between God and the elect.” The first of these agreements is, in brief definition, “the pactum which intervenes between God the Father and Christ the Mediator” or, simply, “the agreement ... between God and the Mediator,”61 consisting in “the will of the Father, giving the Son to be the head and Redeemer of the elect; and the will of the Son presenting himself as their Sponsor.”62 This utterly gracious willing on the part of the Father and the Son has the nature of “a compact or agreement,” one in willing, given the unity of the Godhead, but nonetheless appropriated in a distinct manner to the Father and to the Son, given their personal distinction. Cocceius is particularly careful to identify the unity of the divine essence at this point and the way in which the persons of the Father and the Son relate, as one God, to the distinct work of the Son in the office of mediator.63 This eternal pactum provides, moreover, a foundation for the relationship between the Father and the Son that is worked out in the temporal economy.64 The Son’s role in the temporal economy appears, now, not as an afterthought or a mere means to an end, but as the very essence of the eternal will of the triune God.

In addition to postulating this intra-trinitarian pact involving the voluntary self-designation of the Son, Witsius parallels his formulation of the pactum with a discussion of the relationship between the divine and human natures of Christ and the decree of election:

The beginning and first source of all grace is election, both of Christ the Savior, and of those to be saved by Christ. For even Christ was chosen of God, and, by an eternal and immutable decree, given to be our Savior; and therefore is said to be foreordained before the foundation of the world (1 Pet. 1:20). And they whom Christ was to save, were given to him by the same decree (John 17:6). They are therefore said to be chosen in Christ (Eph. 1:4). That is, not only by Christ as God, and consequently the elector of them; but also in Christ as mediator, and on that account the elected, who, by one and the same act, was so given to them to be their Head and Lord, as at the same time they were given to him to be his

60. Cocceius, Summa de foedere, iv.87; v.88.
61. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, ii.i.1.
62. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, ii.i.2.
63. Cocceius, Summa de foedere, v.91; cf. v. 92-95; note also Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, ii.i.2.
64. Cocceius, Summa de foedere, v.93-96; cf. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, ii.i.2.
members and property, to be saved by his merit and power, and to enjoy communion with him.65

In these formulations of Cocceius and Witsius, several biblical texts and several debated doctrinal issues appear and reappear with some emphasis. Cocceius and Witsius share, for example, the grounding of the term *pactum salutis* in the reference to a “council of peace” (*consilium pacis*) found in Zechariah 6:13, a text not referenced by either Bulkeley or Dickson. This text does not occupy a prominent place in their argumentation of the doctrine itself, nor, as we shall see, does the text figure prominently in the exegetical pre-history of the doctrine—rather its presence in later federal theology indicates a development of exegesis subsequent to the initial appearance of the doctrine and its formulae.66 Cocceius and Witsius also both look to a series of Psalms reflecting the sonship of the Messianic ruler (Psalm 2:8; 16:2; 22:3; 40:7-9; 45:8; 80:17; 86:2; 119:122) and to various passages in Isaiah and Jeremiah that connect the theme of the servant of Jehovah with the redemption of God’s people (Isaiah 4:2; 38:14; 49:4-6; 53:10-12; Jeremiah 30:21).67 These texts not only serve as the primary Old Testament foundations of the doctrine in both Cocceius and Witsius, they also identify the common exegetical ground with somewhat earlier writers like Dickson, Bulkeley. In addition the citations link both Cocceius and Witsius with the exegetical pre-history of the doctrine.

Given their shared hermeneutical assumptions, it is arguable that the texts crucial for both Cocceius and Witsius in the establishment of the doctrine are from the New Testament—texts that the federal theologians assumed offered direct testimony to a covenant or pact between the Father and the Son and that also provide grounds for a christological reading of various already-noted prophetic texts from the Old Testament. Here again we can note elements of continuity not only with Dickson, Bulkeley, and Cloppenburg, but also with the earlier exegetical tradition. In Witsius’ discussion, the initial establishment of the doctrine arises out of three texts on which he comments at length: Luke 22:29; Hebrews 7:22ff.; and Galatians 3:17, the latter text being central to Cloppenburg’s argument and, also as in Cloppenburg’s formulation, Witsius brings the text of 1 Peter 1:20 to bear.68 Cocceius indicates that Hebrews 7, with such texts as “the law maketh men high priests ... but the word of the oath maketh the Son, who is consecrated forever” (v. 28), demands that texts referring to Christ as the servant of God be referred not only to his human nature but also to his divinity in its assumption of the form of a servant—thus, in Cocceius’ view, the recognition that Christ is mediator according to both natures serves to generate the *pactum salutis*. Similarly, Luke 22:29, where Christ appoints his disciples to the kingdom on the ground that his Father has previously designated him to rule, clearly places Christ’s testa-

---

68. Witsius, *Oeconomia foederum*, II.ii.2-5.
mentary work prior to the gracious gift of the covenant to God’s human children—while Galatians 3:17 grounds the Abrahamic covenant on a prior agreement in God with respect to Christ—a text that Cocceius confers with Ephesians 1:4-5. There are numerous other texts cited by Cocceius but, on the use of these in particular, Witsius stands in close agreement with him.69

It is also clear, particularly from Cocceius’ arguments, that these theological conclusions were not reached without controversy, nor were they without impact on the continuing debate with Rome and the Remonstrants. He offers what might be viewed as a series of negations of Remonstrant doctrine, particularly as it tended to undermine or deny the necessity of Christ’s obedience to the law in his office as Sponsor.70 Perhaps even more pointedly in several places, he argues his christological case against Bellarmine. With reference to the impossibility of the second person of the Trinity renouncing his role as sponsor or guarantor of the testament of salvation or “resisting” the will of God, he cites Bellarmine as having wrongfully accused Calvin and Beza of the error.71 On the point that Christ was necessarily obedient but nonetheless obeyed God most freely, Cocceius attacks the Remonstrants once more, but again negatively references Bellarmine.72 So also when he notes that Christ is mediator according to both natures, Cocceius attacks Bellarmine and Stancarus for “wrongly denying that Christ, as God, is mediator,” and in his commentary on Hebrews, explicitly connects the doctrine of Christ as mediator according to both natures with the pactum salutis, where the Son, as distinct from the Father, eternally engages in his sponsio, in compact with the Father.73

III. Exegetical Trajectories: Text and Interpretation in the Early Orthodox Era

1. The history of exegesis and the pactum: the importance of the approach

One of the distinctly fruitful alternatives to purely dogmatic theories of the development of covenant thought is the examination of exegetical trajectories, on the ground—capable of being expressed in methodological terms understandable in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—that, at the time of the Reformation neither “covenant” per se, nor the

70. Cocceius, Summa de foedere, v.97, 99.
71. Cocceius, Summa de foedere, v.96.
specific notion of a covenant between the Father and the Son, was understood as one of the standard theological loci communes extracted from exegesis, but that by the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, it was so understood and, indeed, by the middle of the seventeenth century the exegetical discussion had become refined enough, in accord with a series of rather pressing doctrinal questions, that such topics as covenant of works, covenant of grace, and even the pactum salutis had appeared as theological loci or as sub-categories of theological loci.\(^74\) The discussion of exegetical backgrounds to and warrants for the pactum salutis is, moreover, of importance in the historiography of the pactum, inasmuch as various writers, like Loonstra and Beckwith, have argued an absence of exegetical warrant for the doctrine, largely without examination of the exegetical tradition.\(^75\)

It is significant to note in this context that exegetically developed understandings of a divine pactum are found scattered through the earlier tradition of comment and philological analysis. Thus, Luther can comment in his 1519 Galatians lectures that Christ, as immortal God, “made a pactum” while as one who was to become mortal, “made a testamentum.”\(^76\) The point, of course, is that equals can compact together while a testament can only be made by one who is capable of dying. Luther does not formulate an intratrinitarian covenant here—but there is an implication of a pactum made by Son, prior to the testamentum that he engaged upon as the one who would become the incarnate Mediator: the language of Iesus Christus, deus immortalis ... quia futurus mortalis places both the testament and the prior pactum in eternity. Oecolampadius explicitly identified a covenant or pact between the Father and the Son in his reading of Isaiah 54:10 and 55:3. The one relevant reference of Budaeus to pactum that I have located is not a precedent for the pactum salutis, but simply for the use of pactum, with testamentum, as a suitable rendering for diatheke—in relation to the text of Acts 3:25.\(^77\) Arguably, as in the case of the covenant of works, we will be able to document an interpretive as distinct from a dogmatic tradition providing a background to what became the Reformed doctrine of the pactum salutis.

---


76. Luther, Lectures on Galatians (1519), in WA 2, 521; LW 27, 268; cf. Hagen, “From Testament to Covenant,” 8.

77. Budaeus, Commentarii linguae graecae, col. 705.21-33: “In tertio Act. Apostolorum, οὐ μετὰ τῶν προφητῶν, καὶ τῆς διαθήκης τῆς εἴπε τὸ θεὸς πρὸς τῶν πατέρων ζῴων. Quibus verbis non tam testamentum quam pactum significatur, quod Deus pactus est cum maioribus de servatore ex eo genere nascituro. Licet eo nomine testamentum uocetur, quia testoris morte demum confirmatum est, ut idem inquit ad Hebraeos cap. VIII. & quod Deus testamentum mutasse dicitur, ut haereditatem uiae immortalis ad externas conuerteret nationes, ut Lactantius inquit.” I cite the 1548 edition of Budaeus; the reference may in fact be of an earlier date, but I have been unable to examine the first edition (1529); cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, IV.xx.
tis, a tradition that was rarely cited but probably known to the formulators of seventeenth-century covenant theology.

As a corollary of this point it can also be noted that examination of the exegesis of texts used to support the pactum salutis as found in modern commentaries will be counterproductive: the issue is the exegetical preparation for the pactum in the commentaries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This approach is of particular importance in view of the tendency of scholarship to avoid examination of the exegetical prehistory of dogmatic ideas—including the unfounded claim of at least one writer that covenant theology sprang entirely from dogmatic thinking with little or no exegetical background.

By way of clarification: we know that the exegetical method pioneered by Melanchthon and, to a certain extent by Bucer and Oecolampadius, and then developed with a set of rather different nuances by such figures as Bullinger, Vermigli, Musculus, and Calvin, looked at exegesis as generating topics or loci. From the time of Melanchthon to the height of the development of seventeenth-century orthodoxy the issue of “method” in the sense of the establishment of a proper methodus or “way through” the topics of theology was one of the central concerns of Protestant theologians, both in their work of exegesis and in their efforts to teach the more doctrinal or dogmatic forms of theology. It was the assumption of the theologian that exegesis, traditionary discussion of theological issues, and contemporary debate all contributed to the identification of the standard topics or loci communes of discussion—with exegesis as the prior exercise that not only generated the topics or loci but also governed the other forms of discussion. The work of compiler of loci—the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century dogmatic or systematic theologian—consisted in the establishment of the proper order for teaching the topics, the methodus or, to borrow further on Melanchthon, the via or path through the sometimes thorny patches of the topics.

This sensibility of a developing exegetical and theological discussion that is productive of theological loci clearly explains the identification of basic Pauline topics as the heart of theology in such writers as Melanchthon and Calvin—and it explains also the addition of loci to both of their theologies between their first and last editions. Even so, as I have observed elsewhere, this understanding of the movement from exegesis to topics to a proper methodus, via, or ordo docendi accounts in large part for the initial absence of the doctrinal topic of covenant from such works as Zwingli’s Commentarius, Melanchthon’s Loci communes, Calvin’s Institutes, and Bullinger’s Decades, despite the significant interest in cove-

78. As is clearly the case in Loonstra, *Verkiezing*, 194-268.
nant found in Zwingli’s and Bullinger’s tracts, the clear referencing of covenant in the more or less systematic works of Bullinger and Musculus, and the substantive discussion of covenant in the exegetical works of Bullinger and Calvin— as it also accounts for the seemingly sudden appearance, without major debate over its usefulness, of covenant as a doctrinal locus in the writings of later generations of Reformed writers, beginning with Ursinus and Olevianus shortly after the deaths of Calvin, Vermigli, and others of their generation, and continuing with the rapid rise of a two-covenant vocabulary in the generation of Fenner, Perkins, Rollock, and others, a decade before the beginning of the seventeenth century.

This potential explanation of the origins of the topic is confirmed when one examines the exegesis of some of the texts that eventually contributed to the pactum salutis. There are a series of subtle shifts that occur in the exegesis of the Old and New Testaments during the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries arising in part from the shift from an exegesis based largely on the Vulgate to an exegesis based largely on the Hebrew text of the Old and the Greek text of the New Testament and in part from a re-examination of texts in the light of doctrinal issues raised during the Reformation. As an illustration of this point, several of the texts we will examine, when read according to the patterns of translation and exegesis prevalent prior to the beginning of the sixteenth century, would not have produced or supported a doctrine like the pactum salutis, but, in view of philological and exegetical developments during the century, contributed strongly to its formulation, particularly when placed into the context of other texts related to the understanding of covenant, the eternal plan of salvation, and Christ’s role as Mediator.

One of the initial issues raised by an exegetical study of the pactum is that its biblical foundations vary among the early writers with reference to which specific texts ought to be employed to argue the doctrine, but that the method used by these various writers is relatively uniform— namely, not the citation of a single text, as if the pactum were directly testified by a single, particularly clear place in Scripture, but by the collation of various texts from throughout the Bible. In other words, if the earliest doctrinal formulations of the pactum salutis or covenant of redemption give us any indications of the exegetical origins of the doctrine, those origins lie in the method of drawing conclusions from the juxtaposition of texts. In the case of Old Testament texts, we are dealing with a broadly christological hermeneutic that assumes Christ to be the fulfillment of Old Testament prophesies of redemption and the ultimate thing signified by various Old Testament types or figures. Even so, the New Testament texts provide a foundation in the work of Christ, understood both as the fulfillment of prophecy and as the realization of God’s eternal plan of salvation.

The point, of course, is not to expect to find the term pactum salutis or foedus redemptionis embedded in the exegesis: that does not even oc-

81. Muller, Unaccommodated Calvin, 154-155, 183, 253 notes 89-90.
82. Cf. Muller, PRD II, 7.4 (C.1, 4, 5).
Toward the Pactum Salutis

cur consistently in the commentaries on key texts written by later proponents of the fully developed doctrine. The point is to identify the establishment of an exegetical ground for the eventual inference of the doctrine by way of comparison and collation of texts, given that this was the theological method of the time. By way of method, I propose to rehearse the exegetical history of various texts that appear prominently in early statements of the doctrine of the pactum salutis and then review the exegetical collation of arguments used by several of the early formulators of the doctrine in order to ascertain how (or whether) the doctrinal collation and its conclusions reflect the exegetical background.

2. The appearance of the pactum in Old Testament interpretation

Psalm 2:7-8 ultimately furnished a nearly ideal exegetical basis for the pactum salutis, given that it contains reference to the divine decree according to which the Son is declared begotten and, in its understanding of the begetting of the Son in a royal ceremonial context, adds the bestowing of the earth and its nations as the “inheritance” and “possession” of the Son. Augustine, followed by medieval exegetes like Thomas Aquinas and Nicolas of Lyra understood the Psalm christologically, taking verse 7, “Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee,” as a reference to the eternal begetting of the second person of the Trinity and verse 8, “Ask of Me, and I shall give Thee the nations for Thine inheritance,” as a reference to the entire “temporal dispensation” of salvation made possible through the incarnation. Aquinas explicitly adds that the “special law (privilegium) of eternal generation” is the foundation of Christ’s right of inheritance of the nations.

Calvin, rather uniquely, disputed the traditional reading of the “day” of the Son’s begetting as the eternal divine day in which the generation of the Son from the Father takes place—for Calvin, begetting is here to be understood not in the technical trinitarian sense but in the sense of the manifestation of Christ as king to the world. Still, the primary referent of the text for Calvin is Christ in whom the words of the Psalm are “more truly fulfilled” than they were in David. Christ is portrayed as “presenting himself before the Father” even as the Father, for the sake of humanity here constitutes “his own Son governor over the whole world.” The “inheritance” noted in the text refers, therefore, to Christ’s Mediatorial kingdom and to the fact that “the Father will deny nothing to his Son which relates to the extension of his kingdom.” In short, Calvin does not offer

83. See the discussion of exegetical method in Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725. II. Holy Scripture: The Cognitive Foundation of Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 2003), chap. 7.
84. Augustine, Psalms, ii.6-7.
85. Thomas Aquinas, In psalmos Davidis expositio, Ps. 2, n. 6; cf. Nicholas of Lyra, Postilla super totam bibliam, Liber psalmorum, Ps. 2, in loc.
86. Calvin, Commentary upon Psalms, 2:7-8, in loc. (CTS Psalms, 1, pp. 16-19). N.B., I have cited Calvin’s commentaries from Commentaries of John Calvin, 46 vols. (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1844-55; repr. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979). The set is abbreviated as CTS, followed by the biblical book and, when applicable, the volume number of
a doctrine of an intratrinitarian *pactum* here, but he does provide the later formulators of the *pactum salutis* with elements of their exegesis. The annotations in the Geneva Bible follow Calvin’s reading.87

Beza’s brief statement of the “argument” of the Psalm offers little more on the subject. In Beza’s view the Psalm teaches that Christ, as “true God and true man,” has been “appointed” by his Father to be the ruler of the entire world, indicating perhaps that Beza understood the reference to begetting as referring to the eternal Son in relation to the Father as well as to the incarnation.88 Beza, unfortunately, did not include this Psalm in his more extended Psalter meditations.89

Calvin’s refusal to find an eternal begetting in Psalm 2:7 was, moreover, directly opposed by various other Reformed writers of the era, notably by the annotations of the Tremellius-Junius Bibles and the annotations of Ainsworth and Diodati.90 There, the phrase, “this day have I be-gotten thee,” is specifically understood in two ways, given the two natures of Christ—first, of the eternal generation of Christ, and, second, of the historical David and Jesus, at the moments of their anointing or being manifest to the world in their offices, with references to 1 Samuel 16:13 in the case of David, Hebrews 1:6 in the case of Christ.91 Not only does this argumentation closely resemble the point made by Perkins in his trinitarian argumentation concerning the eternal decree, it is also the sense in which Arminius read the text of Psalm 2:7 in his *Oration on the Priesthood of Christ*—and in both Perkins’ and Arminius’ reading, the issue was an eternal designation to or imposition of Christ’s office, in Arminius’ understanding, a specifically covenantal act.92 In Diodati’s annotations the same pattern of argument on the text rather clearly adumbrates the *pactum salutis*:

---

the commentary on that particular book. Latin texts of Calvin’s commentaries, unless otherwise noted, will be cited from *Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1863–1900), hereinafter, CO.

87. *The Bible and Holy Scriptures conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament ... with moste profitable annotations* (Geneva: n.p., 1562), Ps. 2:7, in loc., hereinafter cited as *Geneva Bible* (1562); and *The Bible that is, the holy Scriptures contained in the Old & New Testament* (London: Robert Barker, 1612), Ps. 2:7, in loc., hereinafter cited as *Geneva Bible* (1612).

88. Theodore Beza, *The Psalms of David, truely opened and explained by Paraphrasis*, according to the right sense of every Psalm (London: Henrie Denham, 1581), Ps. 2, in loc. (p. 2).


I will declare] viz. I the Son of God will by my Gospel proclaim my Father’s counsel concerning the establishment of my kingdom. ... Hath said] viz. hath decreed concerning me, to whom he hath communicated all his counsel, that as am his essentiall son, proceeded from him in an unspeakable manner ... such as I am from my birth, by entering into possession of the new spirituall kingdom, which he hath given me, as I am his son and heir: and also mediator of his church: see Matt. 28:18; Acts 13:33; Rom. 1:4; Heb. 1:2.

The following verse, moreover, “Ask of me and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance,” is identified by Tremellius as “the institution of the Priestly Office of Christ, concerning which, see Hebrews 5:4 & seq.” What has occurred here is a closing of the circle of argument—the christological reading of the Psalm has been confirmed by its christological citation in Hebrews 5:5, the priestly office of redemption has been drawn into the exposition as per verses 4 and 6, and, moreover, important for the association of the Psalm with the pactum, the eternal nature of the transaction in Psalm 2 has been adumbrated by its association with Psalm 110:4 in Hebrews 5:6, “thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchisedek”—a doctrinal point that could also serve to link the argument with Zechariah 6:13. In other words, the marginal comment and cross-citation in the Tremellius annotations provide the basis for a series of conclusions drawn by the collation and mutual interpretation of like texts, the hermeneutical basis for the Protestant construction of doctrinal loci.

The Dutch Annotations explicitly refer the “decree” of verse 7 to the “ordinance” or “statute” made by the Father “on behalf” of the Son in establishing his rule over the church and interpret the begetting of the Son as eternal. Dickson, writing in 1653, some fifteen years after his initial formulation of the covenant of redemption, sees the text as a direct testimony to the doctrine. The Psalm, in his view, begins with a reference to the vain conspiracy of the kings of the earth to destroy the “stability” of Christ’s kingdom and then sets forth grounds for our belief in its unshakable stability. The second of these reasons is given in verses 7 and 8:

The second reason of the stability of Christ’s kingdom is, the decreed agreement between God the Father and the Son in the covenant of redemption; some articles whereof Christ by his prophet doth here reveal; for this is the speech of Christ the Son of God, to be incarnate. ... The Son of God as he is a person, concurring in the decree of establishing the church, and kingdom of God in it, against all opposition; so is he party contractor in the covenant of redemption: and as he is the promiser and

93. Diodati, Pious and Learned Annotations, Ps. 2:7, in loc.
94. Tremellius-Junius, Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici, Ps. 2:8, in loc.; similarly, Diodati, Pious and Learned Annotations, Ps. 2:8, in loc.
95. The Dutch Annotations upon the Whole Bible: Or, All the holy canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament ... as ... appointed by the Synod of Dort, 1618, and published by authority, 1637, trans. Theodore Hask, 2 vols. (London, 1657), Ps. 2:7, in loc.
undertaker, to pay the price of the redemption of his people; so also is he the receiver of promises.\textsuperscript{96}

Psalm 2:7-8 also appears with reference to the \textit{pactum salutis} in various later works of the Reformed orthodox.\textsuperscript{97}

Calvin’s reading of Psalms 40 and 45 offers little reflection of the highly christological readings found in many of his predecessors and contemporaries. Nonetheless, there are a few traditionary understandings present in his exegesis that look toward later covenantal reading of the texts. In Psalm 45 in particular, he reads the central reference to royal wealth and ivory palaces (vv. 8-12) as a prophecy of the kingdom of Christ, specifically to the calling of the Gentiles.\textsuperscript{98} Whereas Calvin understood Psalm 40 primarily, if not solely, as referring to David, Tremellius identified it fully as a christological Psalm. Indeed, in the Tremellius annotation, verse 7 (i.e., 6), “Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire,” is a prophetic reference to Christ as “our Prophet, and the servant of God in the mystery of our redemption,” in which he voluntarily took on the role of priest and sacrifice to God.\textsuperscript{99} Ainsworth also identifies the text as a reference to Christ’s sacrificial work,\textsuperscript{100} and Diodati declares that the verse, collated to Hebrews 10:5, refers to “the abolition of the sacrifices of the law by Christ.”\textsuperscript{101} The following verse “in the volume of the book it is written of me,” Tremellius refers to the law that is obliged in covenant by the servant of God,\textsuperscript{102} while Diodati identifies it as a reference to “Christ’s coming in the flesh,” specifically to his promise to submit himself to the law in his earthly work.\textsuperscript{103} None of the commentaries examined employs the term \textit{pactum salutis} or \textit{foedus redemptionis} at this point, but all indicate a covenantal character belonging to the arrangement of Christ’s redemptive work. Thus, Psalm 40 becomes a collateral ground for the \textit{pactum}, that argues prophetically a prior covenanting in and with Christ to engage in the work of redemption, specifically for the sake of ending ritual sacrifice by taking on all of the requirements of the law for his people.\textsuperscript{104}

Similarly, the Tremellius’ reading of Psalm 45 is primarily christological, referring in verse 7 (i.e., 6), “Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever,” to the kingdom or administration of Christ and to the majesty, righteousness, and divine glory” in Christ by reason of “the gifts and calling of God” to his office. The anointing with “the oil of gladness” (v. 8; i.e., 7), refers to “the spiritual anointing by which the kingdom of God is righteousness peace and gladness in Christ.” In its reference to beloved “daughter” (vv. 10-12; i.e., 9-11), the Psalm refers to the believer and the

\textsuperscript{96} Dickson, \textit{Explication of the Psalms}, 2:7-8, in loc.
\textsuperscript{97} Cf. Burgess, \textit{True Doctrine of Justification}, 376; Cocceius, \textit{Summa de foedere}, v.88; Brakel, \textit{Redelijke Godsdiensst}, I.vii.2; Pictet, \textit{Theologia christiana}, VIII.xxv.2.
\textsuperscript{98} Calvin, \textit{Commentary upon the Psalms}, 45:10, in loc. (CTS Psalms, II, pp. 187-188).
\textsuperscript{99} Tremellius-Junius, \textit{Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici}, Ps. 40:7, in loc.
\textsuperscript{100} Ainsworth, \textit{Psalms}, 40:7, in loc.
\textsuperscript{101} Diodati, \textit{Pious and Learned Annotations}, Ps. 40:7, in loc.
\textsuperscript{102} Tremellius-Junius, \textit{Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici}, Ps. 40:8, in loc.
\textsuperscript{103} Diodati, \textit{Pious and Learned Annotations}, Ps. 40:7, in loc.
\textsuperscript{104} Cf. Burgess, \textit{True Doctrine of Justification}, 376.
church as sponsa, the one pledged or betrothed.\textsuperscript{105} Diodati’s interpretation follows much the same pattern of argument. At verse 6, moreover, Diodati concludes, via a collation with Hebrews 1:8, that this is a reference to Christ as “true eternall God” who is also the mediator and “Lieutenant generall to his Father” in the work of redemption.\textsuperscript{106} Given that the use of these texts as grounds of the pactum did not assume direct reference to an eternal covenant but only collateral reference to the designation of Christ to his mediatorial office and kingdom, the older exegesis provided a significant precedent and ground for the later more formal argumentation.

Similar understandings are found in the older exegesis of Psalm 110. Calvin, whose exegesis of the Psalter was frequently less christologically oriented than that of his contemporaries, nonetheless held that this Psalm referred specifically to Christ. In his initial statement of the argument of the Psalm, moreover, Calvin indicated that it taught “the perpetuity of Christ’s reign, and the eternity of his priesthood.” Moreover, this reign and priesthood refer to an office bestowed by God on Christ: “God conferred upon Christ supreme dominion, combined with invincible power” and “installed” him “into the priestly office with all the solemnity of an oath.”\textsuperscript{107} This interpretation is not the equivalent of a doctrine of the pactum salutis, but it does offer significant elements of the later doctrine—and it is the interpretation of the Psalm indicated in Olevianus’ adumbration of the pactum.\textsuperscript{108}

In his extended commentary on the Psalm, Edward Reynolds argued that “the Summe then of the whole Psalme ... is this; The Ordination of Christ unto his Kingdome, together with the dignitie and vertue thereof,” with verses two and three teaching specifically “The Consecration of him unto that everlasting Priesthood, by the vertue & merit whereof he purchased this Kingdome to himselfe.”\textsuperscript{109} The first verse of the Psalm implies the doctrine of the Trinity in its statement “the Lord said unto my Lord,” and in the following phrase, “sit thou at my right hand,” refers to “the unction and obsignation” of Christ to his kingdom by “the Word or Decree of his Father”—specifically, a designation of Christ not to his Regnum naturale, which as God he has, with the Father, from eternity, but to his Regnum oeconomicum or “Dispensatory kingdom,” which he has as “Christ the Mediator ... by Donation and unction from the Father.”\textsuperscript{110} Reynolds does not use the term “covenant” to describe this transaction, but he includes in his rehearsal of the work of the Son in his mediatorial office all of the elements of Christ’s work as subsequently included in the stipulations and promises of the pactum salutis. Further, Reynolds identifies the second person of the Trinity as a “surety” for and a “head” over...
“sinful men” according to the “ordination” of the Father and “his own voluntary submission.” Reynolds’ reference to the divine decree places his formulation in the context of earlier trinitarian constructions of the doctrine of predestination, as found in the thought of Perkins, Polanus, and others—his identification of the Father’s act as an “obsignation” points toward later language of the *pactum salutis*. Indeed, Fisher understood Reynolds as arguing the *pactum*. Much the same interpretation is offered by Tremellius and Diodati, albeit in a far less developed form.

The federal connection is explicitly drawn in other Reformed commentaries of the era—by way of an understanding that the eternal decree of God can be understood as a covenant. Ames’ exposition indicates that the text refers to the kingly and priestly offices of Christ and that the stability of Christ’s heavenly rule rests on “the decree, the covenant or promise of God.” With reference to Psalm 110:1, Abbot writes,

> God the Father in his eternal counsel and covenant, said to his son, who is God and man, my Lord and Saviour ... for that thou art my fellow in the God-head, hast undertaken to do my whole will in the Redemption of man, and condescended to take his nature the better to effect it, and therein hath effectually wrought it, by dying for sin ... I give thee therefore all power and authority in that very nature, to rule and exercise sovereign and supreme jurisdiction over the Church.

Subsequently, Abbot identifies the decree of God as an “immutable oath” to confer “everlasting priesthood” on his Son, the Mediator and Saviour.

Various of the texts drawn by later writers from Isaiah certainly bore a christological as well as a covenantal reading among earlier exegetes. Isaiah 11 is understood by virtually all of the exegeses as a prophetic reference to Christ and to the establishment of his eternal kingdom. This is certainly the case in Calvin’s reading—although he does not read the text either as highly covenantal or as referencing a prior eternal agreement between the Father and the Son. Tremellius’ and Diodati’s readings are similar to that of Calvin.

Isaiah 42:1-6 is also referenced by the writers of the seventeenth century in discussions of the *pactum salutis*. The text had been Lat-

---

nized variously, with Lactantius offering “in testamentum generis mei” and Jerome “in foedus populi.” In Lactantius’ reading, moreover, the text is already specifically christological, an address of “the Most High Father” to “his Son.”\textsuperscript{120} Lyra assumed the christological reading of the text and referred the servant status of Christ to Philippians 2:7.\textsuperscript{121}

Tremellius’ annotation at verse 1 indicates that the text refers to the work of Christ as founded on the “calling of God the Father,” a teaching, he reminds his readers, that also assumes the full divinity of the Son, who is one God with the Father and Spirit: “I am Jehovah, that is my name, and my glory I will not give to another” (v. 8), in Tremellius’ view confirms the calling of the divine Son to be the Christ. At verse 6, Tremellius reads “I will ... give thee for a covenant” (\textit{tradam te in fedus populi}) as a reference to the identity of Christ with the “angel of the covenant.”\textsuperscript{122} These comments stand in continuity with those of Calvin, who had related the text directly to Christ’s assumption of the mediatorial office and, although he did not raise the specific issue of an eternal transaction or appointment, he did note that “it was by a voluntary determination” that Christ “subjected himself to God, and subjected himself in such a manner as to become also of service to us,” adding, with reference to the divinity of the Son, that his “exceedingly low condition does not hinder him from still continuing to possess supreme majesty.”\textsuperscript{123}

In Diodati’s reading, without the technical terminology of the doctrinal formulae, we find a clearer indication of the \textit{pactum}, in significant continuity with Calvin’s comment on the text:

\textit{Behold!} God the Fathers words concerning the sending of his Son into the world. \textit{My servant} namely, my Son, who in his humane shape took the form of a servant upon him, \textit{Phil. 2:7}, insomuch as he subjected himself to the Law of God, which was the covenant of servants, for to be judged, and recompensed of God according to his works, to the extremity of all rigour; and in this manner he accomplished the work of God, to his glory and the salvation of men, without any respect to himself.\textsuperscript{124}

Then at verse six, “I will give thee ... for a covenant to the people,” Diodati offers the paraphrase, “I will make thee an acceptable and effectual Mediatour between me and my Church, upon which shall be founded my covenant of grace,” indicating a prior arrangement between the Father and the Son on which the covenant of grace rests.\textsuperscript{125} The importance of the text to the doctrine arises, certainly, because in it God speaks to Christ specifically as himself a “covenant” given to his people, not as one given in covenant with them.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{120} Lactantius, \textit{Divine Institutes}, IV.xx.
\textsuperscript{121} Nicholas of Lyra, \textit{Postilla super totam bibliam}, Liber Esaie, Is. 42, in loc.
\textsuperscript{122} Tremellius-Junius, \textit{Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici}, Isa. 42:1, 6, in loc., citing Mal. 3:1.
\textsuperscript{125} Diodati, \textit{Pious and Learned Annotations}, Isa. 42:6, in loc.
\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Burgess, \textit{True Doctrine of Justification}, 376.
Diodati, moreover, here refers his readers collaterally to Isaiah 49, where he elaborates briefly on Christ’s fulfillment of the law for his people, following this significant reading of Isaiah 49:1-2—“Hath called me] that is to say, God the Father shall make known his everlasting decree concerning the sending and office of me his Son, whilst I shall be yet in the Virgins womb, from whence I shall take humane flesh. ... Hath hid me] viz. He hath appointed me in his secret counsell, to perform (in th’ appointed time) the great work of the deliverance of his Church, and discomfiture of his enemies.”

This reading of Isaiah 49:1-2, moreover, stands in continuity with Calvin’s reading where, “Jehovah hath called me from the womb,” refers not to the eternal calling of believers, but to the calling of Christ himself which is eternal and prior to the calling of believers. Calvin paraphrases: “in short, the meaning is, that Christ was clothed with our flesh, by the appointment of the Father, in order that he might fulfill the office of Redeemer, to which he had been appointed,” by implication, an appointment made in eternity. Further, verse 4 of chapter 49, in Calvin’s view, is clearly a reference to Christ and his work, specifically to the truth that “nothing shall hinder him from executing his office.” There is only a short distance from these readings of the Prophet to the *pactum salutis*. Indeed, this is the text used by Goodwin in 1645 as the basis of his brief statement concerning the covenant between God and Christ.

Calvin’s comment on Isaiah 52:13 continues this line of argument: in Calvin’s view the prophet refers to Christ as “his Servant” because of the “office to which the Father has appointed him.” Tremellius and Diodati echo the point by simply noting that Christ is the chief subject of the verse and referring their readers to previous annotations.

As for Isaiah 53:10-12, there were virtually no exegetes in the pre-critical tradition who did not identify this, together with the other Servant Songs, as teaching of Christ and his work. Calvin, for one, does not argue the eternity of this work directly or attempt to refer verse 8, “who shall relate his generation,” to the eternal begetting of the Son—but he does identify the “covenant of eternity” in chapter 55:3-4 as ratified eternally in David, the type of Christ, who shadowed forth the “Redeemer that was to come” inasmuch as David was the “surety” of the temporal covenant. It is worth noting that berith in Isaiah 55:3 was already rendered as *pactum* in the Vulgate, while Calvin renders it as *foedus*, yield-

130. Goodwin, *Encouragements to Faith*, 14
ing “et percutiam vobiscum foedus seculi, misericordias Davidis fideles” in place of the Vulgate rendering, “et feriam vobis pactum sempiternum, misericordias David fideles.”

Prior to Calvin, moreover, various texts from this portion of Isaiah had been explicitly pressed toward a doctrine of an eternal covenant between the Father and the Son by Oecolampadius. In his comments on Isaiah 54:10 and 55:3, he refers to the “covenant of my peace” and the “everlasting covenant” as grounded in Christ, specifically, as a pactum of the Father cum filio sua, standing in relation to the broader, eternal covenant made between God and the elect. 135 This reading carries over directly into later exegesis and theology. Burgess understood the texts in this way. 136 Diodati paraphrased the words “hath called thee” in Isaiah 54:6 as “hath re-united thee to himself by the covenant of grace,” and understood 55:4-5 as “words of God the Father to his Son,” confirming the Son’s calling to the work of mediator extending the covenant, through the work of his Son, to the Gentiles. 137 Unfortunately, neither the Geneva Bible nor Tremellius offered specific annotations on the phrases “covenant of my peace” and “everlasting covenant.” Still, Tremellius provides some basis for the later doctrinal conclusion of an eternal covenant between the Father and the Son: he renders the phrases “fedus pacis” and “fedus perpetuum,” respectively, identifying the sense of the texts generally as referencing the eternal reconciliation and grace provided by God as both promised and covenanted in Christ. The fedus perpetuum, moreover, he reads as a blessing or benefit covenanted with David but promised in Christ. 138

Zechariah 6:13, relatively prominent in later doctrinal discussions of the pactum salutis, offers little exegetical foundation for the doctrine even in the early and mid-seventeenth century—and cannot be understood as either the primary biblical basis for the doctrine nor as an exegetical stimulus toward its development. It is not cited at all by Dickson, Bulkeley, Fisher, or Owen, 139 but is mentioned first by Cocceius, repeated by Burgess and Gillespie, and treated at more length by Witsius, albeit not as the primary ground of the doctrine of the pactum. 140 This relatively late appearance, therefore, of Zechariah 6:13 as a proof of the pactum salutis stands in direct relation to the trajectory of its interpretation and, as will become evident, to the eventual development of an interpretive pattern that brought this text and its reference to a “counsel of peace” into relation and collation with other texts that had earlier become associated with the doctrine of the eternal covenant.

135. Johannes Oecolampadius, In Iesaiam Prophetam ... Commentariorum Libri VI (Basel: Andreas Cratander, 1525), Isa. 54:10; 55:3, in loc. (fols. 265b, 268a).
136. Burgess, True Doctrine of Justification, 376.
137. Diodati, Pious and Learned Annotations, Is. 54:6; 55:4-5, in loc.
138. Tremellius-Junius, Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici, Isa. 54:10; 55:3, in loc.
139. Cf. Dickson, Therapeutica sacra, I.iv.47-51; Bulkeley, Gospel-Covenant, 28-31; Owen, Salus electorum, i.iii, in Works, X, 168-171.
Calvin had argued that the “Branch” referred to in verse 12 was Christ and that the counsel of peace was a reconciliation of the kingly and priestly offices, identifying the counsel as between the offices rather than between God and the Messiah. This exegesis tended to carry over into the next several generations of Reformed commentators, with the result that the text and annotations of the Geneva Bible and the Tremellius-Junius Bible offer no significant adumbration of the pactum at Zechariah 6:13, nor does the commentary on the minor prophets by Daneau.

Pemble’s extended exposition, first published in 1631, views the whole passage as Messianic and, at verse 5 takes specific issue with the Jewish exegesis of Kimchi, who had taken the two parties in the “counsel of peace” as Joshua and Zerubbabel, the types of priest and king; rather, in Pemble’s view, the passage must be taken with reference to the antitype of both, namely, the Messiah, Christ. Pemble continues the line of argument that the text refers to a conjoining of the priestly and kingly offices, but he adds that the reconciliation that is prophesied is the reconciliation of the church with God accomplished by the conjunction of priesthood and kingship in the offices of Christ. The term “counsel of peace,” refers, then, to Christ’s purchase of all peace for his church according to his priestly office and his maintaining and defending the peace in his kingly office. In contrast with earlier writers, Pemble speaks of the accomplishment of reconciliation between Christ and God as the active parties in the counsel. The potential for a relationship to the doctrine of the pactum salutis appears in the referencing of the text to the reconciliation of the priestly and kingly offices in Christ—an exegetical development that is found also in several other texts, notably Psalm 2:7-8 and Hebrews 5:4ff. This reading of the text carries over into Hutcheson’s exposition, and it is certainly understood by later writers like Burgess and Gillespie as the basis for their use of the text with reference to the pactum salutis. Burgess probably has used Pemble and Gillespie cites him directly.

This latter point, the relation of the text to the conjunction of kingly and priestly office in Christ, remained with the doctrinal theologies of the era, at the same time that the importance of Zechariah 6:13 to the for-

---

143. Pemble, Exposition upon the Prophesie of Zecharie, Zech. 6:13, in loc. (in Works, p. 431).
144. Pemble, Exposition upon the Prophesie of Zecharie, Zech. 6:13, in loc. (in Works, p. 431).
146. Burgess, True Doctrine of Justification, 376; Obadiah Sedgwick, The bowels of tender mercy sealed in the everlasting covenant: wherein is set forth the nature, conditions and excellencies of it, and how a sinner should do to enter into it, and the danger of refusing this covenant-relation (London: Edward Mottershed, 1661), I.i.2 (pp. 4-5); Gillespie, Ark of the Covenant, 1 (pp. 6-7).
mulation of the *pactum* was not uniformly accepted. Thus, various later theologians omit consideration of the text in their discussions of the *pactum*, others recognize the limited usefulness of the text to the doctrine, given the dispute over its exegesis, and some later writers identify it as a major foundation of the doctrine. By way of conclusion, if the examination of Zechariah 6:13 in the exegetical tradition offers little help in identifying the basis for the *pactum* in Old Testament exegesis, examination of the interpretation of the passages in the Psalms and in Isaiah highlighted by Dickson, Bulkeley, Cocceius, and Witsius and collated by them with various New Testament texts, notably from Romans and Hebrews, is more fruitful.

3. The *pactum salutis* and trajectories in New Testament interpretation

Given the assumption held nearly universally among pre-critical exegesists that the scope of Scripture was to be identified as the fulfillment of God’s promise in Christ, as covenant, or simply as Christ, the biblical foundations of the *pactum salutis*, including the interpretive foundations of the Old Testament texts consistently cited in doctrinal expositions of the *pactum*, are to be found primarily in the New Testament. Beyond this, it is evident that the various New Testament texts cited in relation to the *pactum* functioned as a group or, more precisely, as a collation, from which the doctrine was to be inferred. In the case of some of these texts, the primary interpretive issue in relation to the eternal *pactum* was the establishment of a connection between covenantal language and clear references to the eternality of Christ’s priesthood or mediatorship. In other cases, the exegetical issue appears to have been the rather sudden appearance of covenantal or pact language in particular texts as the Reformers set aside the Vulgate in favor of the Greek text and then attempted to re-translate the Greek using the lexical and philological techniques available in the sixteenth century.

An example of this latter interpretive development is the Reformed exegesis of Luke 22:29, a text rejected by Beckwith as having no relevance to the doctrine. In Calvin’s rather traditional reading, “Therefore I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father hath appointed unto me,” implies that “though he was ordained by the Father to be a King, yet he was not immediately raised to his glory.” There is no covenantal implication, given that Calvin renders the text, “Et ego dispono vobis sicut

---

disposuit mihi Pater meus regnum.” Specifically note here that the verb, in both places, “appoint unto you … appointed unto me,” diatithemi, is rendered by Calvin—reflecting both the Vulgate and Erasmus—as dispono.152

Beza, by way of contrast, moves the text into new doctrinal associations by way of philological issues and re-translation. He renders the text “Ego vero paciscor vobis, prout pactus est mihi Pater meus regnum,” rendering diatithemi as paciscor, “to make a covenant” and, given the tenses of the verbs, we have, “I make a covenant with you [present] … as my father has made a covenant with me [past].”153 Beza comments at length on his re-translation of the text: the Vulgate, he notes, badly renders diatithemi as dispono (Beza does not indicate that Calvin also used this reading), while others render it lego, to ordain or appoint, given that in certain formulae, do, to give or bestow, and lego can indicate an inheritance or testamentum. More importantly, given this testamentary connotation, the relationship between the verb diatithemi and the noun diathke comes to the fore in Beza’s reading. Diatheke, Beza indicates, refers in a unique manner to Christ’s testament, that through his death we become heirs of the kingdom, as the Apostle teaches in Hebrews 9:17. It is in this sense that the term Novum Testamentum refers to the “covenant of the Gospel” (Evangelicum foedus), paralleling the meaning of the Hebrew, berith, and indicating a pactum made between living parties, as in the words of institution (Matt. 26:28).154 This text, however, Beza notes, refers more specifically to the debate among the Apostles over their rank and ministerial function.155 The cross-reference to Hebrews 9 at this point in Beza’s Annotationes is also of considerable importance, inasmuch as it connects the pactum in Luke 22 with the eternal testamentum of Hebrews 9.

In Piscator’s analysis, the shift in translation has taken firm root: verses 28-29 are described as “the preparation of the disciples by promises of gladness and glory in the reign of Christ” and the latter verse is rendered, strongly echoing Beza, as “ego igitur paciscor vobis, prout pactus est mihi Pater meus regnum.”156 Piscator appears, moreover, to press the point away from the restrictive ministerial reading given by Beza to a broader more generally covenantal reading. Diodati’s remarks on the phrase, “appoint unto you,” reflect Beza and the new sense of a covenantal dimension to the verse: this is “a term used in Testaments: whereof

the Lord hath made a solemn act in the holy Supper before his death, Heb. 9:17." Significantly, moreover, although Diodati has followed Beza explicitly, he does not, like Beza, cite Matthew 26:28, but refers the whole to Hebrews 9, where the promised eternal inheritance is said to take effect on the death of Christ. This reading of the text, moreover, as found in Beza, Piscator, and Diodati, passes over into the doctrinal formulations of the *pactum*.

Galatians 3:16-17 is another case of the creation of significant doctrinal associations by a revision and re-translation of the text. In the Vulgate the text read, “hoc autem dico, testamentum confirmatum a Deo, quae post quadringentos et triginta annos facta est lex, non irritam facit, ad evacuandam promissionem”—“now this I say, the testament confirmed by God, the law which was made four hundred and thirty years afterward does not annul, render the promise void.” Following Erasmus, virtually all of the Reformers re-translated the Greek and added the phrase “erga Christum” or “respectu Christum” after the second clause of the verse, yielding, in Calvin’s version, “hoc autem dico, pactum ante comprobatum a Deo erga Christum, lex quae post annos quadringentos et triginta coepit, non facit irritum, ut abroget promissionem.”

The crucial phrase, “in Christ,” is a text that was not in the Vulgate and that was introduced by Protestants of the sixteenth century because it was found in what they viewed to be the best Greek codices, where, εἰς Χριστόν appears following the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. In addition, the Greek *diatheke*, is now rendered not as *testamentum* but as *pactum*. Quite simply, the critical and philological re-casting of the text yielded a doctrinal connection that had not previously been present. The orthodox theologians regularly cite Galatians 3:17 as a basis for arguing the *pactum salutis*, given that the *diatheke* mentioned in the text is first said to have been given “to Abraham and his seed,” the “seed” being identified as in the singular and indicating Christ, and then is said to have been “confirmed before of God in Christ”—implying the priority, by inference, the eternity, of the confirmation in Christ.

If we look, moreover, at the trajectory of Reformed exegesis, it is arguable that there was an increased emphasis placed on this text in the era of early orthodoxy. Thus, by way of example, Calvin’s exegesis was rather brief, noting that the “seed,” as a singular, indicates Christ and that, therefore, “Christ” is “the foundation of the agreement” between God and Abraham. Calvin also notes that Paul teaches “that a covenant had been made in Christ, or to Christ,” adding the phrase “erga Christum” to his text, following Erasmus. Calvin, however, points this covenantal act not back into eternity, as Cocceius and Witsius would do, but

---

157. Diodati, *Pious and Learned Annotations upon the Holy Bible, plainly Expounding the Most Difficult Places Thereof*, 3rd ed. [London: James Flesher, 1651], Luke 22:29, in loc. [In this edition, the English translator and editor has collated the 1641 Italian with the 1646 French annotations.]


toward the historical gathering of all nations into the promise through Christ.\textsuperscript{160} It should be noted that, in this case, there is no startling shift in translation in the movement from the Reformation to early orthodoxy. Calvin already renders \textit{diatheke} as \textit{pactum}—a point of continuity both with Beza’s rendering and with later federal readings of the text.\textsuperscript{161} Similarly, in the so-called Geneva New Testament, namely the English translation begun in Geneva in 1560 and based in large part on Beza’s philology, the relevant portion of verse 17 reads, “And this I say, that the covenant that was confirmed afore of God in respect of Christ, the Law which was foure hundred and thirtie years after, can not disanull.”\textsuperscript{162}

This reading reflects the sixteenth-century revisions of the New Testament from Erasmus onward, and specifically the Bezan collation of the Greek text that became the Textus Receptus: Beza, like Erasmus and Calvin, includes the phrase “in respect of Christ,” which has since been deleted from the text of various modern Bibles. Beza’s short annotation on the text indicates that it offers a comparative argument, “if an authentic human covenant (\textit{pactum}) remains firm, so much more so a covenant (\textit{pactum}) of God.” Given this solidity of divine covenants, it is clear that the Law was not given to abrogate the promise made to Abraham, for that covenant was made “with regard to Christ” and its execution depended on Christ.\textsuperscript{163}

In his longer annotation on the verse, Beza indicates that he does not favor Erasmus’ \textit{erga Christum}. \textit{Erga}, “towards” or “in relation to” is, in Beza’s view a vague rendering. The Apostles’ point, Beza argues, is that the \textit{pactum} graciously made by God with Abraham, had been uniquely founded in Christ, so that both Jews and Gentiles might be one in Christ as the seed of Abraham.\textsuperscript{164} Beza therefore preferred the closer connection implied by \textit{respectu Christi}, with respect to Christ, or by \textit{respicientem in Christum}, looking back upon or having a regard for Christ. The Tremellius-Junius Bible goes perhaps even further, rendering the text as “quòd pactio quae antè confirmata fuit à Deo in Christo,” unfortunately without annotation.\textsuperscript{165}

Perkins’ extended comment approaches the text with many of the same issues that Calvin and Beza had in mind. He notes, first, that the promise is given to Abraham and his seed, and that the “seed,” clearly, is Christ. He then elaborates, drawing into his discussion several other related texts, that the name “Christ,” like the singular “seed,” indicates “first and principally the Mediatour,” but also, like “seed,” identifies

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160.] Calvin, \textit{Commentaries on Galatians}, 3:16-17, in loc. (CTS \textit{Galatians}, pp. 94-96).
\item[162.] Beza, \textit{Novum Testamentum}, Gal. 3:17: “Hoc autem dico pactio quae anteq\textit{\`e} confirmatum a Deo respectu Christi, Lex quae post annos quadringen\textit{\`e}s & triginta coeperit, non facit irri\textit{\`e}tam”; cf. Beza, \textit{Annotationes}, Gal. 3:17: “Hoc autem dico, pactio quae Deo prius sanctit\textit{\`e} respicientem in Christum, Lex quae quadringen\textit{\`e}s & triginta post annos extitit, irritam non facit.”
\item[163.] Beza, \textit{Annotationes}, Gal. 3:17, margin.
\item[164.] Beza, \textit{Annotationes}, Gal. 3:17, in loc., citing 2 Cor. 1:20, 24.
\item[165.] Tremellius-Junius, \textit{Biblia sacra, sive libri canonici}, Gal. 3:17, in loc.
\end{footnotes}
Christ as the seed not of the flesh but of the promise, the one who is the mediator is the head of the church. There is, therefore, for Perkins, perhaps reflecting Beza’s reading of the text, an extended corporate sense of “seed”: “the seed is first Christ Iesus, and then all that believe in Christ,” namely, those given to be children of Abraham “by the promise & Election of God.”

Perkins then adds, in a formula that resonates with his *Exposition of the Creed and Golden Chaine*, that the “communion” here indicated between Christ and the elect is grounded in the fact that “Christ as Mediatour, is first of all elected, and wee in him: Christ is first justified, that is acquit of our sinnes, and wee justified in him: he is heire of the world, and we heires in him.” When he comes to verse 17, Perkins reiterates that the covenant was confirmed “to Abraham, as beeing Father of all the faithfull, and then to his seed, that is first to the Mediatour Christ, and consequently to every beleueer, whether Iewe, or Gentile.” This priority of Christ derives from the fact that “he is the scope and foundation of all the promises of God.”

This mediatorship, moreover, is grounded in an eternal appointment: “The Sonne of God takes not to himselfe the office of a Mediatour, but he is called and sent forth of his Father: whereby two things are signified; one, that the office of a Mediatour was appointed of the Father; the other, that the Sonne was designed to this office in the eternall counsel of the blessed Trinitie.” The election or designation of the Son as mediator, a theme not referenced in Calvin’s or Beza’s comments on this text, is a major theme in Perkins’ thought. Its basic rationale is to press the issue of an appointment and anointing of Christ back into eternity inasmuch as it pertains to the divine as well as to the human nature of Christ—on the ground that he is mediator according to both natures. He cites Galatians 3:16, echoing his commentary, in his *Exposition of the Creed* as key to the transition between the doctrine of the church and the doctrine of predestination.

Rollock’s commentary on Galatians follows the then fairly standard translation of the text, rendering *diatheke* as *pactum*. His commentary also emphasizes the identity of Christ as the seed of Abraham but, contrary to Perkins, does not allow the extended corporate sense of the seed as secondarily referring to Christ’s members: “this appears from the following verse, in which Christ’s name is properly presented, where it is said that the covenant (*pactio*) had been previously confirmed by God with respect to Christ.” Rollock then comments on the implication of Paul’s statement that the covenant is made with respect to Christ:

> the promise is therefore both made by Christ and made in Christ as he is mediator, for unless he had interceded as mediator between God and

---

man from the beginning, truly, that covenant of grace would never have
been concluded with humanity. For ... in him the promises of God are
firm and invariable, undoubtedly, since he himself is the foundation
upon which the promises are, as it were, set forth, on which they stand
firmly in eternity, and receive his fulfillment.172

We do not have the term pactum salutis here—but we do have the
covenant promise made with respect to Christ as mediator and its eternal
foundation, grounded on his intercession a principio. As in the case of
Perkins, the text has drawn on the theme of Christ's mediation and has
pressed the issue of covenant mediation into eternity, given the Reformed
insistence that Christ is mediator according to both natures. Piscator, we
note, does not press the exegetical argument for an eternal pactum at
this point.173

This covenant exegesis in relation to Christ also appears strongly in
the Dutch Annotations on Galatians 3:17, without the explicit eternal re-
ferent, albeit with the cross-referencing to the Epistle to the Hebrews
where the concept of eternal testament does appear:

And this I say [That is, this I meane by the foregoing examples of humane
covenants or testaments] the covenant [that is, then that much more the
covenant of God remains firm without alteration] that was before now
confirmed by God [namely, with an oath, Gen. 12:2 and 15:8 and 17:4
and 22:17; Heb. 6:14, 15 &c. And with other outward signs and seals] on
Christ, [namely, forasmuch as it was to be confirmed by the death of
Christ as Testator, Heb. 9:15....]174

In Diodati's Annotations, however, the comment has not only focused
on the phrase added from the Greek codices but also offers an adum-
bra tion of the eternal pactum: "In Christ[ That is, of which covenant Christ
already appointed and promised for a Mediatour, was the onely founda-
tion, known and apprehended by the fathers."175 In Dickson's exegesis,
moreover, pactum has become the preferred term for diatheke in Gala-
tians 3:15-17—and Dickson adds both that this pactum between God
and Abraham is understood to be "with respect to Christ" inasmuch as it
has been confirmed "by a testamentary sacrifice" (per sacrificium testa-
mentario), but also that its promise represents a pactum not subject to
the mutation of the Law because it is the Dei absoluta promissio.176 Gala-
tians 3:17 is a primary proof for Witsius.177

fuit semen illud Abrahae cui promissio facta est: promissio igitur & facta est Christo & facta
est in Christo tamquam mediatore, nisi enim ille a principio intercessisset mediator inter Deum
& hominem, profecto foedus illud gratuitum cum homine non fuisse itum. Paulus 2 Cor.
1.20. Quotquot, inquit, sunt promissiones Dei, in ipso sunt etiam & Amen, hoc est, in ipso
constantes sunt ac invariables, nimium, quia ipse est fundamentum supra quod sunt quasi
extractae & in quo stant firmiter in æternum, ac complementum suum capiunt."

173. Johannes Piscator, Analysis logica omnium epistolarum Pauli ... ina cum scholiis &

174. Dutch Annotations, Gal. 3:17, in loc.

175. Diodati, Pious and Learned Annotations, Gal. 3:17, in loc.

176. David Dickson, Expositio Analytica, Gal. 3:17, in loc. (p. 322); again, contra
Beckwith, "Unity and Diversity of God’s Covenants," 99; cf. Williams, "Decree of Redemption is
Another text of some importance here is 2 Timothy 1:9, given the appearance of the eternal covenant in Dickson’s exegesis of the text, ca. 1645. Earlier exegetes do not press the connection. For Piscator and Diodati, as for Calvin and Beza, the text simply refers to the eternal decree and is a reflection of Paul’s thought in Ephesians 1:4-7, although Beza, it may be noted, emphasizes that the text indicates an eternal will to give grace to the elect in Christ.178 In Dickson’s 1645 reading, however, the divine “purpose and grace … given us through Christ Jesus before the world was” refers directly to the eternal foedus redemptionis: “Christ, moreover, the designated Mediator, second person of the Trinity, subsisting from eternity, who for us, in the covenant of redemption entered upon with the Father before all times, compacted for his elect what he would pay as the price of redemption afterwards in time.”179

Various texts from the Epistle to the Hebrews also come into play here—notably Hebrews 5:4ff.; 7:22ff.; 8:8-10; and 9:15-18. In his annotations on these texts, Beza not only argues the issue of translation of diatheke as foedus or testamentum, he also consistently shows a preference for the term pactum in his own discussions. Thus, in his comment on Hebrews 7:22, Beza identifies Christ not only as the testator of the inheritance of God’s people, but also as fideiusor, a clear adumbration of the language of the pactum salutis.180 In the next chapter, at verse 6, Beza summarises, “there is now offered a comparison of the Old or temporary covenant, the sponsors of which were the Levitical priests, with the New, of which the eternal sponsor is Christ, not in such manner that it is more excellent in every way than the former, but inasmuch as he declares the former [i.e., the Old] abrogated by the latter [i.e., the New].”181 In his exegesis of 9:16, in discussing the need for and the impossibility of a human being reconciling himself to God, Beza indicates that therefore, the Son of God interposed himself, was incarnate, received the punishment for sin, and reconciled humanity to the Father. He then speaks of the pactum between God and the human race taking the form of a testamentum, given that we have “from the hand of Christ” what has been compacted (pactus est) between God and man, namely, an “eternal inheritance.”182 In the margins of the Geneva Bible, this Bezan annotation on the new testament provided by the Mediator becomes the simple statement “made between God and Christ, who by his death shulde

in Effect a Covenant,” 132-133.

177. Witsius, Oeconomia foederum, II.ii.5.
178. Piscator, Analysis epistolarum Pauli, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc. (p. 642); Diodati, Pious and Learned Annotations, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc.; cf. Calvin, Commentaries on the Second Epistle to Timothy, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc. (CTS 2 Timothy, pp. 195-196); Beza, Annotationes, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc.
179. Dickson, Expositio Analytica, 2 Tim. 1:9, in loc. (p. 547).
181. Beza, Annotationes, Heb. 8:6, in loc.: “Aggreditur collationem Veteris ac temporari foederis, cuius sponsores fuerunt Levitici pontifices, cum Novo, cuius aeternus sponsor est Christus, ut non modo intud esse illo omnibus modis praestantis, sed etiam illud per hoc abrogatum fuisse declarat.
182. Beza, Annotationes, Heb. 9:16, in loc.: “Habet ergo in manu Christus id de quo pactus est cum hominibus Deus, aeternum nimirum haereditatem.”

Toward the Pactum Salutis
make vs heires.” 183 Again, the exegesis presses toward the notion of a covenant between the Father and the Son.

In Piscator’s comment, the basic definition is unchanged—it is a covenant made or promised to all in Christ—so that the parties to the covenant, by inference, are God and the human race; but Piscator does add to the definition that the covenant is from eternity. 184 Rollock’s commentary on the text presses the issue further. He begins by noting that the sense of the text (vv. 20-27) rests on the truth (vv. 17 and 21) that Christ is a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek: Jesus (v. 22) is identified as the sponsor of a “better covenant.” 185 This text is the first term of an enthymeme, he notes, that drives the conclusion that Jesus’ priesthood is greater than that of the Levites. Another enthymeme follows: Jesus was made priest not without an oath; therefore he is a better surety. 186 When one asks the underlying reason for this superiority of Christ over the Levitical priesthood, it is certainly that the Levites were prevented by death from having a perpetual priesthood—but Christ’s priesthood is perpetual because of his eternity or eternal duration (ipsius aeternitate, sive duratione aeterna). 187

What remains to be done here, in order for the exegesis to connect with the pactum salutis, is the association of the eternity of Christ’s priesthood with the identification of the covenant as made “with respect to Christ,” or of the kingdom as compacted between the Father and Christ, or of Christ as “given for a Covenant of the people” by God the Father—a correlation that can be seen in the cross-referencing patterns of Diodati’s annotations and confirmed in the collation of texts found in Burgess. 188 David Dickson’s commentary on Hebrews, published in 1635, emphasizes not only Christ’s sponsio or suretyship, it also identifies it as agreed upon between Christ and the Father; at 7:22, he comments that “Christ is here called Suretie of this covenant” because “Jesus is content to be Suretie: and the Father hath consented & ordayed, and made him Suretie,” 189 and he also argues that the epistle testifies to the fact that the Son, as God, together with the Father initiates the covenant of grace. 190 We have, in such comments on the text, moved by way of exegesis fully into the realm of the pactum salutis, albeit without the term—but that, of course, is the point of this portion of the study.

183. Geneva Bible (1562), Heb. 9:15, in loc.
184. Piscator, Analysis epistolae Pauli, Heb. 8:6ff., observatio (p. 757): “Fedus Evangelicum seu fedus gratiae, est quo Deus gratia suum favorem in aeternum duraturum promisit omnibus in Christi credentibus, sub conditione quidem illius fidei....”
189. Dickson, Short Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Heb. 7:22, in loc.
190. Dickson, Expositio Analytica, Heb. 1:9, in loc. (p. 590): “Deus per os propheti testatur de Filio ... quod foederis gratiae cum Patre ini.”
4. From exegesis to doctrine: collations of texts and patterns of argument

Already in the commentaries on various texts that we have examined in relation to the development of the pactum salutis, the exegetical methods of the era had indicated patterns of cross-referencing and collation of texts. Several of the commentators on various passages in the Psalter, Luke 22:29, and Galatians 3:16-17, had introduced interpretive cross-references to verses in the Epistle to the Hebrews relating to the confirmation of God’s covenant and testament in the death of Christ as testator. Similarly the cross-referencing of Ephesians 1:4-7 and 2 Timothy 1:9 drew together covenantal argumentation with understandings of the eternal election of Christ. These exegetical collations, in turn, are echoed in the collations of texts found in the somewhat later doctrinal expositions of the pactum salutis as a theological locus, namely as a locus or topos arising out of the exegesis of a series of topically related texts. The citation of collated biblical texts in the dogmatic works, then, reflects not an arbitrary effort to proof-text a doctrine but an understanding of theological issues already raised in the exegetical tradition.

Dickson, thus, gathers five groupings of biblical attestations to the doctrine: his collations of texts are, respectively—first, Isaiah 52:13-53:12, collated with Isaiah 6: 9-10; 1 Thessalonians 4:3; John 6:39; 12:37; 17:9-10; and Hebrews 7:25; second, Isaiah 59:20-21, collated with Romans 11:5-7, 26; Isaiah 59:20; third, John 6:37-45; fourth, John 10:14-30; and fifth, Psalm 40, collated with Hebrews 10:4-14. Bulkeley, similarly, emphasizes texts from Isaiah and John, albeit with a slightly different focus than Dickson.

At a somewhat later date, Anthony Burgess offered a particularly tightly presented collation of texts: Isaiah 42:1, 6; 53:10-11; Psalm 2:8; 40:7; Zechariah 6:13; Hebrews 7:28; and, by implication, albeit not explicitly referenced, Romans 5:14 and 2 Corinthians 15:22, 45:

To understand better how much Christ is obliged for us as a Surety, its good to take notice, That there is passed a kind of Covenant or Agreement between the Father and the Sonne concerning our redemption. ... for thus the Scripture represents the Father stipulating and agreeing with the Sonne, that if he will lay down his life for such, and will become their Surety, to make up all the breaches that their sinnes have made, then he shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied, Isa. 53:10-11. So Psalm 40:7. Christ is there brought in as a Surety, offering himself for us, and readily accepting of Gods will in this matter. We see then the Father enjoying or requiring, and the Sonne accepting of this work, and upon this he is called Gods servant, and his ears are said to be opened. Hence Isa. 42:1, 6. Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my elect in whom my soul delighteth; I will give thee for a Covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; yea this agreement seemeth to be confirmed with an oath, Heb. 7:28, and for this service Christ is required, Psal. 2:8, to ask of God and he will give him the Heathen for his inheritance: So that the Church

---

of God is given Christ, as a reward for that obedience, which he shewed in accepting of the Office of a Surety for us. This stipulation is made by a learned man to be that counsel of peace, Zech. 6:13, which is said to be *between the Lord, and the man whose name is the Branch*. Though others do by both understand *Jew* and *Gentile*. . . .

Thus, in Burgess collation, given the understanding of Christ as the *scopus* of Scripture and the traditional reading of messianic texts in Isaiah as references to Christ and his work, Scripture clearly sets forth both the divine requirements or stipulations placed upon Christ as a foundation for his work, the obedient response of Christ to those stipulations, the sealing of this agreement specifically identified as a "covenant," and the bestowal of a reward on the fulfillment of the stipulations. The doctrine arises quite directly from the collation—the collation obliges the patterns of drawing doctrinal conclusions from biblical texts—and all of the texts are read according to the lines of interpretation found in the earlier exegetical tradition. Even the use of Zechariah 6:13 is qualified, given the varied readings of the text in the exegesis of the era. Burgess concludes, "and for this agreement it is, that Christ is called the second *Adam*; for as with the first *Adam* God plighted a covenant concerning him and his posterity, if he did not fall; So also did he indent with Christ and his seed concerning eternal life to be obtained by him."

IV. Doctrinal Formulation in the Early Orthodox Era Relevant to the *Pactum Salutis*

1. Doctrinal issues at the close of the sixteenth century: mediation according to both natures and the eternal mediatorial role of the Son

There is also a series of collateral issues and exegetically generated topics that contributed to the doctrinal point. Several of these were highly polemical issues that led to theological formulation and defense on the part of the Reformed. Thus, the standard medieval definition of Christ’s mediatorial office, inherited by way of a strict reading of passages in Augustine, was that Christ was *medius* or “between” God and man because of the union of the two natures, divine and human, but that he was *mediator* according to his human nature only—a definition based on Augustine’s reading of 1 Timothy 2:5-6, “... there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all.” The Reformed definitions, framed certainly as early as the generation of Calvin and his contemporaries, identified Christ as mediator according to both natures—a point followed with remarkable consistency by developing Reformed theology and a point critiqued heavily by Roman theologians like Bellarmine. Christ, in Bellarmine’s view, could not be mediator according to both natures inasmuch as in his divinity,

Toward the *Pactum Salutis*

Christ is fully God and cannot mediate with himself—or, if this were possible, then the Father and the Spirit would be mediators as well.\(^{195}\) If, moreover, Christ is mediator according to both natures, then in some sense the divinity of Christ, with the humanity, is subordinate to the Father in engaging the task of mediation and becoming a ransom or a guarantee, namely, a surety or sponsor, of human redemption.

This issue, coupled with the Augustinian trinitarian sensibility of the persons as radically co-equal according to essence, generated a series of adumbrations of *pactum salutis* in Reformed theologies written prior to 1630. Given the gradual development of covenant as a topic, moreover, these formulae do not appear in the *locus de foedere*, but initially in the *locus on the person of Christ* and somewhat later in the *locus de praedestinatione*. For example, in his brief credally-shaped discussion of salvation in Christ, John Hooper could write that the “the mercye of the father, the sonne, and holye ghost ... was provoked to ordeine the sonne of god second persone in Trinitie ... to become man & to redeeme and save the lost”—identifying an intratrinitarian ordination of the Son by the full Godhead and implying, therefore, a self-ordination or self-designation of the Son to the work of mediation at the same time that the Son is declared fully God, having all of the same attributes as the Father. This from 1550.\(^{196}\) A similar comment can be found in Beza’s *Confession de la foy* of 1558, in his chapter on Christ: he writes of the Son as “ordained” from eternity by the Father to be the Mediator.\(^{197}\)

A biblical focus, if not the specific point of departure, for such formulae as they begin to appear in more detail in the early orthodox era is, again, Beza—not the dogmatic, but the exegetical Beza. As his exegesis of Ephesians 1:5 makes clear, the statement that we are elect in Christ before the foundation of the world and that we are adopted as children of God in Christ Jesus does, in a sense, subordinate Christ to the eternal counsel of God. But, Beza adds, a distinction must be made here, given that, considered absolutely as God, *homoousios* and utterly equal to the Father, the son of God is not subordinate. Indeed, we are elect by Christ, together with the Father and the Spirit. When, however, Christ is considered as the “mediator and God manifest in the flesh,” we are elect in Christ, because as mediator he is subordinated to the decree. Indeed, as mediator, Christ is the primary means of execution of the eternal decree.\(^{198}\) This argument carries over with elaboration into the theologians of the next several generations.

Specifically, such formulations continue to appear in commentaries of the early orthodox era, giving support to the doctrinal formulae in the form of exegetical conclusions that were, following the methods of the era, taken up into doctrinal *loci*. Paul Bayne not only borrowed the un-

---


derstanding of Christ considered as God electing and as God-man and mediator elected to the work of salvation, he consciously linked it with an assumption of covenant relationship between God as Father and Christ as mediator:

In him[1] is diversly construed; first, in him, that is in God the Sonne, not considered as God-man, Head and Mediatour of the Church, but as second Person, God with the father. ... But, ver. 3, it is plaine hee doth consider Christ as we are blessed in him, in regard of both natures, even as he hath God for his God by covenant; In him who hath God for his God and Father, we are blessed.\footnote{199}

Similarly, in his commentary on Colossians, on the verse, “grace bee unto you, and peace from God our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ,” Bayne indicates that grace comes from God the Father and also from Christ because Christ, “as he is God, he is the giver of grace and peace with the Father: and as hee is Mediator, God and Man, hee is made of God the common treasury, in whom the fulnesse of all spirituall blessings are stored.”\footnote{200} Bayne’s presentation, moreover, of the relation between the Father and the Son closely approaches the language of the pactum salutis. “The redemption is concluded betwixt God and his beloved Son,”\footnote{201} proceeds, according to an “order enacted in that great Counsell of the Trinity, that the second person should redeem us.”\footnote{202} Christ, in Bayne’s view is “the Sampler of Gods free Predestination”—so that “as God did predestinate him of grace to this honour of being God in fellowship of Person, and of being the Prince of our Salvation ... so God in the Covenant He did make with Him, and in the commandment He gave Him of laying down his life, did strike it and fulfill it of grace.”\footnote{203}

Taking these issues in order—namely, Christ as Mediator according to both natures; the double election or designation of Christ; and the eternity of his sponsio—we arrive at a series of component parts of the eventual formulation of the pactum salutis, all present in other theological loci prior to the separate formulation of the doctrine. First, there is the problem of mediation according to both natures. The objection to such a doctrine from the trinitarian side is clearly offered and answered by Bucanus:

Obj. 7. If the Father and the Sonne have one Essence, the Son should be Mediator to himselfe.

Ans. The Sonne is properly Mediator betwixt us and his Father, not absolutely betwixt us and the divine Essence. And the Office of Mediator dependeth upon the most free ordination of God.\footnote{204}

200. Bayne, \textit{Commentarie upon Colossians}, Col. 1:2, in loc. (p. 8); cf. the comments on 1:3, in loc. (pp. 10-11).
Moreover, there are elements of a basic understanding of inward trinitarian agreement for the sake of outward work in other places in Bucanus’ discussion. In his doctrine of the Trinity, he indicates that there was an eternal intratrinitarian counsel among the persons: “in the creation of man, God as it were taking counsel with his eternall wisedome, that is, the Sonne and the Holy Ghost, saith, vers. 26. Let us make man after our image.”

From a christological perspective, similar issues also arise: Bucanus identifies “Christ” as the equivalent of Messiah and as meaning “Anointed”—a term ascribed “by way of excellency … to the Saviour of the world,” as the promised King, Priest, and Prophet. Bucanus then asks whether this name, signifying “Anointed,” is applied to Christ according to nature or according to person: “His person subsisting in both his natures, not this or that nature alone,” indicating an anointing according to both natures. The point is reiterated in the discussion of Christ’s mediatorial office: all of his mediatorial titles belong to him according to both natures, “although each of them in that work retaineth his owne proper efficacie or operation.” It is the office of Christ, moreover, in which he has “revealed the secret counsel of the Father concerning the redemption of mankinde by the Word.”

This definition of mediation according to both natures also yields the question of whether Christ was “Mediator before his incarnation.” “Hee was, because in the predestination, foreknowledge, and acceptance of God, the two natures were reputed as united: and with him things done and to be done, present and to come are all one.” Accordingly, Bucanus also declares that “the antecedent of inward cause” of redemption was “the unspeakable love of God the Father” but also that “a fellow cause [of redemption] working voluntarily and with election, and obeying God the Father, was the Sonne of God himself.” In parallel arguments, found in his locus on predestination, moreover, Bucanus can speak first of God as “the principal cause” of election, identifying Father, Son, and Spirit as each exercising elective will; and second, of the ordination of...
the Son by the Father “to assume human nature into the unity of his Person” and to suffer and die “for the satisfaction of the elect,” specifically indicating that the Son is here understood not essentially in his consubstantiality with the Father and the Holy Ghost, but in the office of Mediator. He then notes that, understood essentially, “the Son is the first cause of our election, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost.”213

The implications of the point for the doctrine of election are, perhaps, still more clear in Perkins’ thought:

The actual or real foundation of God’s election, & that is Christ: and therefore we are said to be chosen in Christ. He must be considered two ways: as he is God, we are predestinate of him, even as we are predestinate of the Father and the Holy Ghost. As he is our Mediator, we are predestinate in him.214

Perkins is not content, however, with simply identifying election as an act of the entire Trinity, he finds it necessary to speak also of the predestination of the person of the mediator, specifically as it related to both natures:

The ordaining of a Mediatour is that, whereby the second person being the Son of God, is appointed from all eternity to be a Mediatour between God himself & men. And hence it is, that Peter saith, that ‘Christ was foreknown before the foundation of the world.’ And well saith Augustine, that ‘Christ was predestinated to be our head.’ For howsoever as he is (logos) the substantial word of the Father, or the Son, he doth predestinate with the Father, and the Holy Ghost; yet as he is the Mediatour, he is predestinated himselfe.215

In discussing the execution of the eternal decree, Perkins identifies Christ as the “foundation” or fundamentum—that is to say, not the foundation of election, which is the eternal willing of the Godhead, but the foundation of salvation. The argument is very specifically framed on this point:

The foundation [of the execution of the decree] is Christ Jesus, called of his father from all eternity, to performe the office of the Mediatour, that in him all those which should be saved, might be chosen.216

Given that Perkins also assumes, against Roman objections, that Christ must be understood as mediator according to both natures, this definition creates a potential problem of subordinationism as it also creates the impression of an eternal, intra-trinitarian calling of the Son to be

---

213. Bucanus, Institutions, XXXVI (pp. 460-461).
214. Perkins, Exposition of the Creed, 288, col. 2C, citing Eph. 1:4; cf. the nearly identical formulation in Matthias Martinius, Disputationes theologicae ad summulum s. theologiae enarrandum publice habiturum, Decas prima (Bremen: Johann Wessel, 1611), ix.58 (p. 168).
mediator. Among the texts that Perkins cites here, Hebrews 5:5 belongs to the exegetical history of the pactum salutis at least by way of linking Zechariah 6:13 to the concept. Perkins continues:

Question. How can Christ be subordinate unto Gods election, seeing hee together with the Father decreed all things?

Ans. Christ as he is mediatour, is not subordinate to the very decree itselfe of election, but to the execution thereof only.\textsuperscript{217}

The point is also made christologically, with reference to the subordination of Christ: Perkins notes that one might object to the divinity of Christ on that ground that “He that is made of God, this or that, is not God: but Christ is made of God, as Paul saith, \textit{Christ is made unto us wisedome, righteousness, etc.}\textsuperscript{218} In response, Perkins notes that

Christ is said to be made, not because there was any beginning of his Godhead, or any chaunge or alteration in his person: but because in the eternal counsell of the Father, he was set apart before all times to execute the office of a Mediatour, and was withal in time called, and as it were consecrated and ordained thereunto through his baptisme: he is made therefore in respect of his office, not in respect of his person or nature.\textsuperscript{219}

To the objection that Christ recognizes God as his head (1 Cor. 11:13), Perkins offers a similar answer: “God, that is the Father, is the head of Christ, not as he [Christ] is God simply, but as he is God incarnate, or made manifest in the flesh, and in respect of the office to which he willingly abased himself.”\textsuperscript{220} This line of argument carries over into Perkins’ discussion of Christ’s anointing as mediator:

though it be true that Christ is set apart to the worke of mediation, as he is Mediatour, or as he is man, yet as he is God he doth design & set himselfe apart to the same work. For to design the Mediator is a common action of the three persons, the Father, the Sonne, and the Holy Ghost; and yet considering the Father is first in order, and therefore hath the beginning of the action: for this cause he is said especially to designe, as when Saint John saith, \textit{Him the Father hath sealed.}\textsuperscript{221}

Perkins’ point is that, as God, the Son is the one who designates or anoints the mediator—while “as he is Mediator, or as he is man” he is the one anointed or designed. The term “design” or designate carries over into Dickson’s formulation of the eternal covenant of redemption.\textsuperscript{222} The phrase just cited from Perkins, moreover, does not represent a redundancy or simple parallelism, because it is not Perkins’ intention to state...


\textsuperscript{218} Perkins, \textit{Exposition of the Creed}, 175, col. 2D-p. 176, col. 1A, citing 1 Cor. 1:30.

\textsuperscript{219} Perkins, \textit{Exposition of the Creed}, 176, col. 1A.

\textsuperscript{220} Perkins, \textit{Exposition of the Creed}, 176, col. 1B, citing 1 Cor. 11:3 and cf. the nearly identical formulation in Diodati, \textit{Pious and Learned Annotations}, 1 Cor. 11:3, in loc..

\textsuperscript{221} Perkins, \textit{Exposition of the Creed}, 172, col. 1D-col. 2A.

\textsuperscript{222} Cf. Dickson, \textit{Therapeutica sacra}, I.iv.2.
that the Son is designated or anointed merely “as he is man” but that he is anointed also “as he is Mediatour,” which is to say, according to both natures and that, as God, the Son designates himself as well as the human nature to be assumed to the task of mediation. That the text must be read this way (contra Loonstra) is clear from Perkins’ statement, immediately preceding, that

Christ’s anointing is according to both his natures; for in what nature he is a Mediatour, in the same he is anointed: but according to both natures jointly he is a Mediatour: the Godhead is no mediatour without the manhood, nor the manhood without the Godhead: and therefore his anointing extends itself both to his Godhead and to his manhood.

These issues are further developed in Perkins’ discussion of how Christ is “the middle or meane,” namely, \textit{medius}. There is no debate over the statement that Christ is “betwixt God and the faithfull … according to his humanitie,” but, as Perkins recognizes, the identification of Christ as the “mean” and mediator according to his divinity, is a matter of intense debate with Rome. Perkins elaborates the point carefully:

Now the Word is \textit{middle} betwixt the father and the faithfull: I. In regard of order, because the Word was begotten of the Father, and by it we have access to the Father. This subordination, which is of the Sonne to the Father, is not in the divine essence, severally and distinctly considered, but in the relation or manner of having the essence. And those things which are subordinate after this manner, cannot be unequall, if they have one and the same singular essence. II. In regard of his office, the which being imposed on him, by his Father, he did willingly undergoe, & and of his owne accord.

The whole passage just cited concerns the Word, the second person of the Trinity. This needs to be emphasized in particular of Perkins’ first point concerning the Son’s subordination to the Father: the subordination not merely of the human nature to be assumed, but of the pre-incarnate Son, not in his essence, but in his “manner of having the essence,” namely in his sonship or begottenness. Moreover, second, the eternal Word—and here is the distinct parallel with the \textit{pactum salutis}—is subordinate with regard to his office, which has been “imposed” on him but also voluntarily accepted. This official subordination of the Word rests on a distinction between the second person of the Trinity considered as God, according to his divine essence or nature and therefore utterly one with the Father, and the second person of the Trinity considered as Son, according to his being begotten of and therefore distinct

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{223.} This text is misread by Loonstra, \textit{Verkiezing}, 65, n166, who reads the phrase “as he is Mediatour” as identical with “as he is man,” and both juxtaposed with “as he is God”—whereas Perkins’ point is to indicate not two but three categories: as Christ is mediator, both God and man; as Christ is man; and as Christ is God. Cf. the same threefold distinction in Cowper, \textit{Heaven Opened}, 376.
\item \textbf{225.} Perkins, \textit{Golden Chaine}, xviii (p. 26, col. 1C-D).
\end{itemize}
from the Father: in the first member of the distinction, the Son cannot be considered as designated, chosen, elect, subordinate, having office imposed on him, but in the second member he must be so considered. This distinction appears to have slipped by Loonstra in his discussion of these documents.226

Polanus’ definitions are quite in accord with Perkins, perhaps most notably his statement that “the eternal election of Christ is the predestination according to which God designated his only begotten Son from eternity, so that also in his human nature he might be Son of God and the head of angels and human beings....”227 Moreover, an analogue of these formulae appears in Polanus’ Christology, where it is clear that the eternal designation of the Son is a trinitarian designation of the second person, not merely an election or designation of the human nature. He raises the traditional question, given that “the incarnation of Christ is the common work of the entire sacred trinity, why is it that the entire sacred Trinity is not incarnate?”228 Polanus begins with the basic trinitarian point:

The principal efficient cause and author of the incarnation is the entire sacred trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in such a way that the human nature is created and suited for the person of the Son by the Father, Son, and Spirit acting together.229

Nor is Polanus content merely to state that somehow the divine willing of incarnation terminates on the person of the Son, he indicates that the Son himself wills to accept the mediatorial role in the economy of salvation:

The Son, indeed, is incarnate because he wills voluntarily to be made our sponsor, willingly subjecting himself to the Father not according to nature, but according to the voluntary arrangement (voluntaria oeconomia) or dispensation: a natural subjection is, surely, distinct from an economic or dispensational subjection: he is made freely obedient to the Father, not according to the divine nature in itself (in se), but according to will: obedience, indeed, is not the natural act of a nature (actus naturalis naturae), but of the will or free accord of the person of Christ (voluntarius personae Christi).230

226. Cf. Loonstra, Verkiezing, 64-67. The distinction was, however, observed by Barth in the thought of Polanus; see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-1975), II/1, 111-112.
227. Polanus, Syntagma theol., IV.viii (p. 244, col. 2A-B).
228. Polanus, Syntagma theol., VI.xiii (p. 364, col. 1): “Quaeritur: Quum incarnatio Christi sit opus commune totius Sacer sancta Trinitatis, annon tota Sacer sancta Trinitas sit incarnata?”
229. Polanus, Syntagma theol., VI.xiii (p. 364, col. 1): “Incarnationis aeterni Filii Dei causa efficiens princeps atque auror est toda Sacer sancta Trinitas, Pater, Filii & Spiritus Sanctus, quatenus nimimum simul a Patre, Filii & Spiritu Sancto sancta humana, in utero Virginis Mariæ est creata & aptata personæ Filii.”
230. Polanus, Syntagma theol., VI.xiii (p. 364, col. 2): “Incarnatus est enim Filii quia voluit, ultimo sponsor pro nobis factus, ultimo se subiciens Patri non natura, sed voluntaria oeconomia seu dispensatione: discernenda est enim naturalis subjectio ab oeconomia seu dispensatoria: ultimo obedienti factus Patri, non natura divina in se, sed voluntate: obedientia enim non est actus naturalis naturae, sed voluntarius personae Christi.”
This formulation certainly looks toward the *pactum* and it takes the added step of adding the term *sponsor* so important to Cocceius’ version of the *pactum salutis*. Indeed, all three theologians examined—Bucanus, Perkins, and Polanus—indicate, whether in connection with their doctrines of predestination or in connection with their discussions of Christ, that there is an arrangement or agreement of some sort between the Father and the Son in the Godhead, according to which the Son is designated, appointed, or anointed to his office.

2. **Convergence: the Christological, Predestinarian, and Covenantal lines draw together**

What also can be documented is the tendency for these christological and predestinarian concerns that adumbrate the later *pactum* formulations to converge with covenantal language either just prior to Cocceius’ identification of the *pactum salutis* or shortly after. Several thinkers in the generation after Perkins, Polanus, and Bucanus offer formulae that build on these arguments and offer further indications if not of the *pactum salutis* itself, certainly of the reasons for its formulation. As early as 1618, Nicholas Byfield drew together christological and covenantal issues in his discussion of “Christ as Mediator,” defining the covenant of grace as an “agreement made with man by means of the mediator,” and grounding the entire historical administration of the covenant of grace in the willingness of the Son to “undertake” both the satisfaction of “God’s justice, by a price of infinite value,” and “to purchase and merit for us God’s favour and kingdom by a most absolute and perfect obedience.”231 Byfield did not offer a term for this agreement or formulate it as a covenant distinct from the covenant of grace, but he did imply an intratrinitarian arrangement, or at least indicate that the covenant of grace is “unchangeable and eternall,” and “that there is an act for it in the counsel of God from everlasting.”232 What is more he argues the point by citing not only texts typically associated with the development of covenant thought, like Jeremiah 31:33 and Romans 3:23-24, but also texts that would be related to the full formulation of the covenant of redemption or *pactum salutis*, namely Galatians 3:21-22, 1 Timothy 2:6, and Hebrews 8:13.233 In the same year, Matthias Martinius identified the covenant of grace as “founded in the son of God,” citing Hebrews 7:22 and 13:8.234

By way of further example, in the *Summe of Sacred Divinitie* written ca. 1625, probably by John Downham, the topical sequence of the soteriology moves from Christ’s person, to his mediatorial office, to the covenant of grace—and he, once having introduced the covenant of grace,

231. Nicholas Byfield, *The Pattern of Wholesome Words. Or a Collection of such truths as are of necessity to be believed unto salvation, separated out of the body of all Theologie. Made evident by infallible and plaine proofes of Scripture* (London: 1618), 197-198.


inserts the doctrine of predestination prior to the elaboration of the covenantal definitions. The formulae through which this is accomplished are also significant. Downame begins by identifying Christ, the Son of God, as being appointed to the office of mediator to be given for our redemption, “while we were yet enemies” of God: “he thrust not himselfe into this office of Mediation, but had the warrant of a lawfull calling for it.” This calling to the office, together with the anointing that it implies in the name “Christ,” has three parts or elements according to Downame, two of which he argues immediately, one being reserved as a concluding comment and transition to the next discussion—thus, first Christ had the “gifts, and graces necessary to the discharge of his Office” and, second, “a solemn investing of him into this place.”

And necessarie it was hee should thus be called and appointed, that we might be out of doubt of God’s acceptance of that which Christ hath done for us, being his owne ordinance and appointment, and of his good pleasure to save us through him.

The question then arises as to when this appointment of Christ as mediator occurred:

But albeit this office of Mediation in Gods appointment were before all eternitie, yet actualie it began upon Adams fall, coming after the Covenant of works, which was from the beginning.

Christ was, therefore, “invested” with his office not only at the time of his “coming in the flesh,” when God the Father said “this is my well beloved Sonne, in whom I am well pleased,” but also “before his coming into the world,” as is seen from his identification as a “priest forever after the order of Melchizedek.” Therefore, he is called anointed not only because of his calling to the office of mediator and the bestowing of graces necessary to his work, but “because also of Gods everlasting Decree, it is said, Proverbs 8:23, He was anoynted before the World.” Downame, at this point moves from his discussion of Christ’s office to the doctrine of the covenant of grace, with its lengthy, interpolated doctrine of predestination.

What is interesting here is the coalescence, in a single extended argument, of the christological, predestinarian, and covenantal issues that we have traced out in a series of exegetical and dogmatic examples. Arguably, the doctrine of Christ’s mediation according to both natures, drawn out by polemic toward rather detailed discussions of how the second person of the Trinity assumes the office of mediation in the eternal counsel, has led Downham both to the referencing of the eternal decree

235. John Downname, The Summe of Sacred Divinitie briefly and methodically propounded: and then more largely and cleerly handled and explaned (London: W. Stansby, 1625, 1628), II.i (pp. 279–280).
236. Downame, Summe of Sacred Divinitie, II.i (p. 280).
237. Downame, Summe of Sacred Divinitie, II.i (p. 280).
238. Downame, Summe of Sacred Divinitie, II.i (p. 281), citing Matt 3:17; Ps. 110:4; Heb. 5:6.
239. Downame, Summe of Sacred Divinitie, II.i (p. 281).
and to the insistence that the eternal appointment to save is actualized or executed in time as the very point that redemption becomes necessary, namely, the point of the abrogation of the covenant of works—which is precisely where the *pactum salutis* intersects the temporal economy in later Reformed writers. Downham does not yet have a *pactum salutis*—what he does have is the appointment and anointing of the Son to the office of Mediation in the eternal counsel of God as the foundation of the eternal covenant of grace, with a discussion of the trinitarian work of predestination as a way of explaining the transition from a universally applicable but now abrogated covenant of works to the salvifically limited covenant of grace. Indeed, in Downham’s thought, ca. 1625, we see a rapprochement between the trinitarian formulation of predestination with reference to Christ as eternal Son and temporal Mediator (the formulation that begins with Beza’s annotation on Ephesians 1:5 and moved through Polanus and Perkins)—between this and the notion of an eternal foundation of the covenant of grace.

A similar development of the trinitarian point, but now from the perspective of purely covenantal formulation is found in Preston’s *New Covenant* (1629), where the divine attribute of all-sufficiency, drawn from the name El Shaddai in the covenant proclamation of Genesis 17, provides a unifying theme to the exposition of the economy of redemption. In this context, Preston identifies the mediatorial work of Christ as the means by which believers are placed “in the hands of all the persons of the Trinity, as they ioyne in the Deity, as they are God.” The argument clearly reflects the formulae that we have already encountered in Perkins, Cowper, and Polanus concerning the distinction between the Son as God and the Son in his office as incarnate Mediator, made earlier in the context of defining the role of the Son in relation to the eternal decree—here the parallel formulation is distinctly covenantal. Preston can also indicate that inasmuch as the covenant made with Abraham is a covenant made “in the Sonne” the effect of the covenant is to give to its human members a “part” in God’s all-sufficiency.

A further set of formulations from between 1630 and 1640, indicating a covenantal development parallel to the discussion of Christ as *fundamentum salutis*, can be identified in Richard Sibbes’ writings. Notably also Sibbes includes an adumbration of Cocceius’ theme of *amicitia Dei* that is tied to the assumption that Christ is mediator according to both natures, tying together a covenantal theme with issues raised in the contemporary polemic with Bellarmine:

Now, the foundation of the covenant is, that God will be our God, and give us grace and glory, and all good in Christ, the mediator of the new covenant, a friend to both: to God as God, to man as man, God and man in himself and by office; such is his office, as to procure love and agree-

---

ment between God and man. He being the foundation of the covenant, there must be agreement in him. 243

This love, moreover, of God for his adopted children, is eternal because it is founded in the eternal love of the Father for the Son. 244 So too the friendship of God to humankind rests on the fact that Christ, as divine Son, is the friend of the Father and as taking on our nature, “a friend to us” as well. 245 Sibbes also insists, on the ground that “Christ himself was yesterday and to-day, and the same forever,” that God’s covenant promises are “made in him, undoubtedly, eternally,” 246 and that there is no relationship of “new covenant” outside of “the second person” of the Trinity. 247

We can, furthermore, note the coalescence of the arguments in the explanatory apparatus added to Wollebius’ Compendium by Alexander Ross—probably influenced by the same development that had occurred in Cocceius’ classroom disputations. Wollebius (ca. 1626), building on Polanus and indirectly on Beza’s exegesis, offers the following definition: “Christ is to be considered either as God or as the Theanthropos and our mediator; in the former respect he is, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the efficient cause of our election, in the latter respect means of execution of election.” 248 Wollebius then elaborates the point with reference to Ephesians 1:4 and the understanding of election “in Christ”:

We are then said to be elected in Christ, Eph. 1:4, because it is through him that we are brought to salvation. The decree to save us is predestination to the end (praedestinatio ad finem); however the decree concerning Christ, according to which he is given as our head, is a predestination to means (praedestinatio ad media). 249

We have seen much the same correlation between the eternal willing of predestination and a covenanting act in the Godhead in Cloppenburg’s brief anti-Remonstrant statement of the pactum. 250

This trinitarian formulation of the decree, with its specific reference to the christological question of the relationship of the second person of the Trinity to the divine willing, carries over into Cocceius’ definitions in his Aphorismi prolixiores:

The decree of God is made in the Son (factum in Filio) 1. as by the eternal God, who is one with the Father & who works all the things that the Fa-

---

245. Sibbes, Angels’ Acclamations (1638), in Works, VI, 340.
246. Sibbes, Yea and Amen; or, Precious Promises (1638), in Works, IV, 118.
249. Wollebius, Compendium, I.iv.2, canon ix.
250. Cloppenburg, De foedere, III.xvii.
ther is understood to do. 2. as the Sponsor for the Church, in which and by whom God wills to demonstrate his glory.\textsuperscript{251}

What is significant here is both the continuity of Cocceius’ basic definition with the theological point made by predecessors like Polanus, Perkins, and Wollebius, and the inclusion of the specifically federal or covenantal overtone, namely, a shift from the earlier identification of Christ in relation to the \textit{media praedestinationis} as \textit{Theanthropos} and Mediator to his identification as Sponsor. Given that Cocceius’ two sets of \textit{Aphorismi} were written over the course of his academic career at Franeker (1643-1650) and Leiden (1650-1669) “for the private use of students and for use in private disputations,”\textsuperscript{252} it is probably impossible to date any single aphorism or definition.

One may hypothesize, however, a possible Cocceian influence on the explanatory augmentations of Wollebius’ \textit{Compendium} written for the 1650 translation by Alexander Ross.\textsuperscript{253} In Ross’s words,

\begin{quote}
Christ is the efficient cause of election, as he is God equal with the Father; He is the meritorious cause, as he became our Mediator. As head of the Church, he is also the cause of Election. \textit{Joh. 15:16. I know whom I have chosen.} and \textit{Joh. 13:18. I have chosen you.} In respect of his active and passive obedience, he is \textit{prokatarktike}, the outward moving cause. And if he be the cause of salvation, he must needs be the cause of election, on which salvation depends. \textit{Causa causae, est causa causati.} But because we are said to be elected in him, as he became our Surety, he is called the \textit{medium} or mean of election, rather than the cause. As he is God, we are elected by him; as Mediator, in him. As God he is the principal efficient; as Mediator, the secondary mean of election.\textsuperscript{254}
\end{quote}

The similarity to Cocceius’ definition appears in two places—most notably in the reference to Christ as “surety,” namely, the guarantor or sponsor of the elect and, potentially also, in the reference to Christ’s headship over the church—in both cases defining Christ’s causal location as the primary means by which Godhead in all three persons wills to achieve the end or goal of God’s glory.

Finally, that this conclusion concerning relationship of the doctrine of the divine decree to the doctrine of an eternal covenant was in fact drawn by the writers of the seventeenth century is made eminently clear in Dickson’s \textit{Therapeutica Sacra}:

\begin{quote}
This covenant of redemption, is in effect one with the eternall decree of redemption, wherein the salvation of the elect, and the way how it shall be brought about is fixed, in the purpose of God, who worketh all things according to the counsell of His own Will, as the Apostle sets it down, \textit{Ephes. 1 unto the 15 verse}.\textsuperscript{255}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{251} Cocceius, \textit{Aphorismi prolixiores}, x.9.
\textsuperscript{252} Johannes Henricus Cocceius, as cited in van Asselt, \textit{Federal Theology}, 19, note 40.
\textsuperscript{254} Wollebius, \textit{Abridgement}, I.iv.2, canon xii, explanation.
\textsuperscript{255} Dickson, \textit{Therapeutica sacra}, I.iv.4 (p. 25); cf. Williams, “Decree of Redemption is in Effect a Covenant,” pp. 195-196, 210-211.
Similarly, Witsius conjoins the two doctrines in indicating that the origin of the *pactum salutis* “is to be sought in the eternal counsel of the adorable Trinity.” Witsius’ exposition of the *pactum salutis*, moreover, consistently reflects the trinitarian and christological argumentation that we traced out in Polanus’ and Perkins’ doctrine of the divine decree: distinction must be made concerning the person of the Mediator—he is to be understood in three ways, namely as he is God, as he is man, and as he is the Mediator or “God-man.” As God, the Son is equal to the Father and in no subordination or subjugation; as a human being he is without doubt subordinate to God; as Mediator, however, in union with his human nature and having taken the form of a servant, he is voluntarily subordinate in the exercise of his office and that according to both natures. A parallel formulation occurs in Witsius’ doctrine of election.

3. The decree and the pactum: unity and distinction

If the doctrines of the eternal decree and the *pactum salutis* are interrelated, they are also not utterly one and the same. The point is very much like that made concerning the divine attributes: given the simplicity or uncompoundedness of the divine essence, the attributes are essentially identical—they are not, however, formally or rationally identical. Inasmuch as the eternal decree represents the divine willing of all things, including the salvation of the elect, and the *pactum salutis* represents the divine willing concerning the whole work of salvation, from a trinitarian perspective, there is and must be, given the terms of the older orthodoxy, an essential identity of the decree and the *pactum*. It is also clear that the development of the *pactum salutis* stood in close relation to the development of the inner-trinitarian understanding of the eternal decree in the thought of writers like Perkins and Polanus. Nonetheless, as in the case of the divine attributes, there are significant formal differences between the eternal decree and the *pactum salutis*.

Even so, the predestinarian antecedents of the *pactum* indicate an intratrinitarian willing of salvation and offer an understanding of the common willing of the entire Godhead toward the accomplishment of a temporal work that involves the *ad extra* actions of the Son and Spirit, namely the *opera appropriata* or common works of the Godhead that terminate in particular ways on individual persons. All such formulations, and especially those that involve language of the designation of the Son to be the incarnate mediator, look toward the language of the *pactum* and, as it were, provide both a precedent and a foundation for its elaboration. Nonetheless, the *pactum salutis* or covenant of redemption was not, in the minds of its seventeenth-century formulators, merely a covenantal rephrasing of the doctrine of predestination. Rather it took up the

---

256. Witsius, *Oeconomia foederum*, II.i.ii.2.
257. Witsius, *Oeconomia foederum*, II.i.ii.5-8, 16, 19-20.
259. Cf. Muller, *PRRD*, III, 4.3 (D).
specific issue of the way in which the elect alone were beloved of the Godhead and offered a language of eternal foundation for the specifically covenantal dispensation of redemption.

In Dickson’s formulation, the Covenant of Redemption, is a *pactum* or *foedus* “between the God the Father and God the Son, the designated Mediator,” adding, in the English editions, “before the world was, in the council of the Trinity.”260 It is, moreover, a pact or “bargain” made specifically “concerning the elect (lying with the rest of mankind in the state of sin and death, procured by their own merit),” and, as such this “covenant of redemption is in effect one with the decree of redemption, wherein the salvation of the elect, and the way how it shall be brought about is fixed, in the purpose of God, who worketh all things according to the counsell of His own Will.”261 Thus, in Dickson’s thought, there is an intimate relationship between the covenant of redemption and the eternal decree, but not strictly an identity. After all, the essence of God is to be understood as uncompound, not susceptible of real or substantive distinctions among the attributes or between the decree and counsel, but nonetheless allowing formal and rational distinctions *a parte rei*.262 Given that Dickson does not offer a clearly infra- or supralapsarian definition of the decree, but is clearly double predestinarian, pairing election and reprobation,263 what can be said here is that the *pactum* cannot be identical with the eternal counsel or decree itself, inasmuch as the *pactum* concerns only the elect. If, moreover, the covenant of redemption is “in effect one with the decree of redemption,” it is certainly distinct in its form, being a significant expansion, in covenantal terms, on the intratrinitarian willing and an expression of the one will of God to elect as appropriated to the individual persons of the Godhead.

Dickson’s pattern for relating the eternal willing of God to the covenant of redemption is similar, probably a precedent for that later argued by Gillespie, who also understood the covenant of redemption to presuppose prior acts of divine willing. In Gillespie’s more supralapsarian model, the *pactum* presupposes, first, “that God hath purposed in himself, and decreed eminently to glorifie himself in the way of justice and mercy”; second, “that God had purposed and decreed, that there should be objects qualified, and fit for the glorifying of both these Attributes”; third, that God wills not to covenant salvation “without a satisfaction to Justice in his own person, or by a surety of the same kind that sinned”; fourth, that God has purposed to identify these objects of divine willing in the human race; and fifth, that God has chosen Christ to perform the work of satisfying his justice and mercy and has chosen individual human beings in him to be “vessels of mercy ... unto grace and glory.”264 For Gillespie, therefore, the covenant of redemption was hardly identical

---

262. Cf. the discussion in *PRRD*, III, 4.3 (C-D).
263. David Dickson, *An Exposition of all St. Pauls Epistles together with ... St. James, Peter, John, and Jude* (London: R. I. for Francis Eglesfield, 1659), Rom. 9:11, 21, in loc. (pp. 23-24), a double predestination without identifying the “lump” or “mass.”
with the decree; rather, it was set under the decree itself, assuming the full divine willing concerning election and reprobation, as the ad intra statement of the federal grounding of the salvation of the elect.

This understanding is also quite in accord with the model followed by Cocceius and, after him, the non-Cocceian, Brakel. Cocceius describes the eternal covenanted between the Father and the Son in two places—under the rubric of pactum salutis in his Summa doctrinae de foedere et testamento Dei and as an integral element in his discussion of consilium gratiae et irae and the eternal testamentum Dei in his Summa theologiae. In both cases, the doctrine precedes and grounds his treatment of the covenant of grace, and in the fuller systematic context of the Summa theologiae, it is the inward work of the Godhead, understood as a testamentum, that derives directly from the consilium gratiae or eternal decree concerning the salvation of the elect.265 In Van Asselt’s words, “this testament is not identical with the decree ... rather it is a further qualification of God’s unconditional decree concerning his heirs.”266 Brakel, similarly, moves from eternal predestination to the covenant of redemption, identifying the latter discussion as a topic naturally following upon that of the decree of God in general and of the predestination of human beings in particular.267 The eternal covenant of redemption, moreover, is to be understood as an immanent or ad intra work of God inasmuch as “whatever Christ encountered in the world happened to him according to the eternal decree, foreknowledge, and determinate counsel of God.”268 The covenant of redemption, then, is not identical with the decree, but rather presupposes it—a model that Van Asselt identifies as much the same as Cocceius’ approach, despite the differences in the organization of the two theologies.269

This distinction between the pactum salutis and the eternal decree, moreover, goes to the heart of the issue of exegetical antecedents and what one might loosely call the doctrinal motivation behind the formulations, insofar as they are discernible. On the one hand, there is the general assumption of the Reformed that there must be an ad intra divine foundation in knowing, and willing for all divine work ad extra and that true theology follows out this archetypal/ectypal pattern.270 There are, however, a series of doctrinal questions that are answered in the elaboration of the pactum that are not dealt with in the doctrine of the decree—namely, how humanity, in its inability, having violated the covenant of works, can be given a new federal head as a foundation of a new covenant relationship—without at the same time utterly removing the legal foundations of the world order as indicated in the covenant of works.

266. Van Asselt, Federal Theology, 219.
269. Van Asselt, Federal Theology, 244.
This issue is present in all of the early formulations of the *pactum salutis* and is echoed in their exegetical foundations.

V. Some Conclusions

The foregoing comments on exegetical and doctrinal developments immediately prior to the full formulation of the *pactum salutis*, ca. 1638-1645, have demonstrated, I believe, several points concerning the doctrine. First—and it ought to be clear that far more work needs to be done on this score—there is a long trajectory of interpretation related to a series of biblical texts that are crucial to the formulation of the *pactum salutis* at the hands of Dickson, Bulkeley, Cloppenburg, Cocceius and, after them, Witsius. When these texts are examined through the eyes of various exegetes in the sixteenth century and early seventeenth centuries, it becomes apparent that textual criticism, philology, and exegesis had substantively altered the way in which several of these texts could be understood, as in the case of the covenantal dimensions added either by way of re-translation or of textual emendation in Luke 22:29 and Galatians 3:17. These exegetical shifts offered ground for the *pactum salutis* that could not have been recognized in western theology prior to the sixteenth century. A subordinate point here concerns the exegetical role of Beza. It is entirely possible that the theologian who has been read so reductionistically as a predestinarian ought actually to be read as a major exegetical mover of covenant theology. The text frequently noted as offering no exegetical support for the *pactum* by modern studies of the doctrine, namely Zechariah 6:13, played no role in the initial formulation and was only drawn in as a significant *locus* by some later theologians. This conclusion stands contrary to the claims of Loonstra, Beckwith, and others, that the doctrine lacked genuine exegetical support. Arguably the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* arose out of a concerted examination of a series of biblical texts, collated with one another, according to the typical methods of the era, in concert with a series of theological issues, both positive and polemical.

Second, the Reformed tradition’s insistence, against the fairly unanimous teaching of the medieval doctors, that Christ is mediator according to both natures led to polemic over the issue and, in response to the polemic, doctrinal elaborations of how, without undermining the essential equality of the Son to the Father, the Son is nevertheless considered as anointed, subordinated to his office, and even predestinated insofar as the whole person of the mediator, in both natures, is divinely chosen to be the *sponsor* of salvation.

Third, most of these formulations appear to have arisen in the doctrines of predestination and the person of Christ, with reference to the exegesis of such texts as Galatians 3:17ff., Ephesians 1:4ff., 1 Peter 1:20, and various texts from Hebrews 5 and 7-9—several of which we noted as contributory also to later formulation of the *pactum salutis* itself. The yield here is not precisely the *pactum salutis* either in name or (with the partial exception of Downham’s arguments) in systematic location—rather it is a set of precedents for discussing the role of the divine Son, in

...
eternal conjunction with the Father and the Spirit, willing his own suretyship and voluntarily accepting the Father’s designation of him to mediatorial office. These formulations are not an alternative to the *pactum salutis*; they do not speak restrictively of the predestination of the human nature of Jesus by the three persons of the Trinity, but also quite directly, of the Father’s designation of the Son, and the Son’s willingness to be incarnate as mediator; there is an anointing and an election or designation according to both natures, and it is willed by the three persons of the Godhead, eternally, in the intratrinitarian order of their working.

The language of writers like Bucanus, Perkins, and Polanus concerning this “designation” or “appointment” of the Son to mediatorial office, moreover, passes directly over into Bulkeley’s and Dickson’s formulae of a *foedus redemptionis* and is echoed in Cloppenburg’s identification of a *pactum* in the Godhead and, from thence, into the next generation, in such writers as Gillespie. In the case of Dickson’s, Bulkeley’s, and Cloppenburg’s arguments, moreover, there is evidence of an anti-Arminian motive behind the formulation. What is more, the predestinarian analogue to the *pactum* appears also in Cocceius’ and Witsius’ thought—certainly as a parallel and not as an alternative, given that his *pactum salutis* formulation itself, like his federal theology generally, are not alternatives to the Reformed doctrine of predestination. Both the exegetical precedents and the early formulations of the *pactum* make very clear its intrinsic connection with the doctrine of the eternal decree as well as the distinction between the decree and the *pactum*. In short, the exegetical and the doctrinal precedents and parallels, which amount to a rather extended discussion over the course of several generations, rendered the actual formulation of the *pactum salutis* by Cocceius and several others of his generation quite acceptable to a large number of later theologians despite the rather abbreviated pedigree of the doctrine itself.

---
